


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2. The author(s) must elaborate the theme of the article logically,
3. References must be uniform and clear (the author(s) should follow consistently a particular pattern, like Chicago style, or Harvard style),
4. Author(s) must take all care to develop their ideas on their own; there should be no cases of plagiarism,
5. The article can be written in any language. In case it is written in a language other than English, an English summary of at least A4 length is required,
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CONTENTS

Dear Reader,.....	7
HISTORY.....	8
ABDULLAH, Darakhshan	
Emancipation of Central Asian Women	9
SYED, Damsaz Ali	
Awantivarman: Contributor of Socio-Economic Change in Kashmir	23
LINGUISTICS	30
KHAYDAROV, M. Mirazim	
Realization of Turkic Peoples' Language Potential	31
ХАЙДАРОВ, Миразим	
Реализация языкового потенциала тюркских народов.....	42
ТАМБОВЦЕВ, Юрий Алексеевич & ТАМБОВЦЕВА, Алина Юрьевна & ТАМБОВЦЕВА, Людмила Алексеевна	
БАЛТО-СЛАВЯНСКОЕ ЕДИНСТВО: РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ ИЛИ ФИКЦИЯ?	54
TAMBOVTSEV, Yuri & TAMBOVTSEVA, Juliana & TAMBOVTSEVA, Ludmila: The Balto-Slavonic Unity: Reality or Fiction?	67
POLITICS.....	68
QUINLAN, Paul D.	
Moldova's Slow, Tortuous Transition to Democracy as Seen from the Bottom Up	69
SOCIOLOGY.....	83
WANI, Ayjaz Ahmad & LONE, Sheeraz Ahmad	
Changes in the Institution of Marriage in Uzbekistan from Pre-Soviet to Post Independent Era	84
LITERATURE & ARTS	95
EKUKLU, Bülent	
Yeraltı	96
EKUKLU, Bülent : Underground	99
MURAKEÖZY, Éva Patrícia	
Rubens, Van Dyck & Jordaens — Flemish Painters from the Hermitage —	100

WARJRI, Jobeth Ann & SENGUPTA, Rakesh	
Subjectivation: The Two-headed Symptom.....	108
TRAVELOGUE.....	113
TAPON, Francis	
Eastern Germany — Nearly 25 Years after the Wall	114
BOOK REVIEW	121
Heritage of Our Future XX. → XXI.	122
FARKAS, Flórián	
Nomonhan, 1939.....	126
CLASSICAL WRITINGS ON EURASIA.....	128
VÁMBÉRY, Ármin	
From Samarkand to Herat	129
CHRONICLE	135
OBRUSÁNSZKY, Borbála	
Tsyrenzorzhiev Readings — 2012 —	
Tibetan Civilization and Nomadic Peoples of Eurasia: Cross-Cultural Contacts.....	136
Our Authors	139

DEAR READER,

ANOTHER NAIL IN THE COFFIN OF ORIENTALISM

For me personally writers fall into two categories: either good or bad. Of those who fall into the first category I read their whole œuvre. Those dropping into the second one remain non-existent. Elif Şafak definitely belongs to the first category. During the past months I have been reading her whole œuvre, including her latest novel *Honour*. With much pleasure I must admit.

Her novels show a fine mix of components that make her writings outstanding: an intriguing plot, well-researched background, mystical threads, etc. With a female perspective of course, though she is masterfully avoiding all the pitfalls of feminism. Her œuvre earned a well-deserved place in my library and I can only urge every lover of literature to consider her works.

Next to the literary values the œuvre of Elif Şafak exhibits, it is worth mentioning another dimension of it, namely its role in destroying the whole fabric of *Orientalism*, a phenomenon best analysed and presented by the scholar Edward Saïd. Orientalism is a product of a definite period of the Western world (though having roots in much earlier periods as well), whose influence is still felt today. It has transformed somehow, it adjusted itself to the current era, it has become more 'politically correct', but in essence it remained the same.

The validity of an idea can only be examined in the light of another idea. The grip of a pseudo idea-system can only be loosened by the power of a real and clear one. In countering the negative aspects of Orientalism the works of genuinely oriental, world-class writers like Salman Rushdie in UK, Orhan Pamuk in Turkey, Gao Xingjian and Amin Maalouf in France, and Kader Abdollah in the Netherlands are invaluable. Elif Şafak joins their ranks in this respect and especially through her novels *The Bastard of Istanbul*, *The Forty Rules of Love* and *Honour* she ensures that the coffin of Orientalism gets a couple of extra nails.

Flórián Farkas

Editor-in-Chief

The Hague, June 30, 2012

HISTORY

ABDULLAH, Darakhshan

Emancipation of Central Asian Women

Throughout the Soviet period (1917-1991), defenders of Soviet regime tried hard to highlight the achievements of Soviet policy towards women; so doing, they concealed the other aspects of this policy, mainly, its serious implications for women even in post-Soviet period. Soon then, in the 1990s, with the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent disintegration of the political and economic framework within which that emancipation and modernization of Central Asian women was accomplished, many aspects of the Soviet legacy came to be re-examined and reassessed. The new estimation helped by the ample information freely flowing forth from non-Soviet sources and pinpointing its negative implications, the worth and validity of Soviet emancipation policy towards Central Asian women is now being openly questioned.

This paper is one humble effort toward s the reappraisal of the implications for Central Asian women of the Soviet women's emancipation policy – a policy considered a pre-requisite step for the establishment of a Socialist state rather than a philanthropic move ¹.

The establishment of Soviet rule in 1917 witnessed an intensive process of Sovietization and modernization throughout the Czarist Empire² including Central Asia. In Central Asia the indigenous population which was entirely Muslim was secularized; Islamic belief and *adats* (local customs) were obliterated; Traditional culture was either destroyed or rendered invisibly confined to the most intimate and private spheres; Legal system was abolished; Educational institutions were abolished and new universal compulsory education underpinned by newly fashioned languages and Western style literature was introduced; Medical and social welfare networks were established thereby improving health standards and raising life expectancy by several years; New national identities were created in the public arena.

Perhaps the most dramatic experiment of Soviet regime was the changes initiated in the life of Central Asian women³. Prior to the revolution, these women were veiled and secluded, confined to their homes, prohibited to play any role in public life; only about 2% of them aged 9-49 were literate, and none of them practically employed in the economy. The advocates of Communism saw them as the worst oppressed section of society, and therefore made it a fundamental pillar of their struggle to liberate them⁴. They did it; the veil was outlawed, women were pushed out into public life, their 99% literacy was achieved, they numbered about one-third of total students in higher and secondary specialist educational establishments, and they soon constituted 47% of Central Asian workers employed in the economy during the Soviet period⁵. Surely, immense success was thus achieved in changing their socio-economic status and thereby their overall position in society.

Indeed, such impressive targets were achieved by various constitutional reforms, which clearly ruled that "All old laws according women unequal status with men have been destroyed to provide her equal rights with men for economic independence; by involving women in social production, by providing a

favourable conditions for combining motherhood with work⁶.” But an impartial study reveals that, despite these reforms, actual equality was never achieved during the entire Soviet period and there were contradictions and inconsistencies in Soviet objectives and policies. The much hyped equality has been challenged on several grounds:



Since the Soviet regime abolished the basic concept of private property, equality of men and women turned out in practice to mean the equality of no-rights before the State. As a matter of fact, equality of rights was recognized as entailing equal voting rights in Soviet institutions, equal rights in workplace, and equal rights in family matters. But, the vast majority of people, by traditional cultural setting and upbringing, continued endorsing women's subordinate status as something natural, majority of men failed to free themselves from the superiority complex over women, and roles and responsibilities of men and women remained predetermined – men were still considered as breadwinners and women as mothers or “hearth guardians⁷.” Many fundamental aspects of women's daily life thus remained unchanged, and equal rights in family matters remained on papers only. This has been observed that customs and prejudices had taken precedence over law and norms of human rights when it came to the position of women in the family. Research conducted by OSCE⁸ in Uzbekistan reveals that majority of women were treated as second class members even within the family⁹. Their basic rights of choice and freedom were alienated and according to survey report 52% of women do not have the right to choose their husband; 82% of women have no voice in family decisions; 43% of them cannot independently decide on family planning issues; 64% have no access to the family income and 60% of women are deprived of the right to express their opinion on family problems. Therefore, by custom 98% of women experience deprivation of their rights¹⁰ and this discrimination against women in family continued throughout the period under review.



The emergence of Central Asian women from seclusion of the 1920s and resulting induction into production process placed additional burdens upon them. This double burden imposed has been lamented by Uzbek women, thus: “For the majority of Uzbek women there was only one destiny: the work in the fields and endless work at homes and little love in their lives. Just like before the revolution, men treated women as an object. Nothing has changed¹¹.”



Such observations of contemporary Uzbek women expose the myth that Soviet regime changed the plight of native women. Instead, the regime signified their double exploitation, – that because it failed to abolish women's domestic responsibilities in a society where the patriarchal traditions remained strong. At home, it still was wife...not husband...who used to perform all domestic chores of washing, cleaning, cooking, feeding children, and over this all bearing her husband's complaint about dinner being late. The life of rural women was even harder for the absence of facilities like safe water, other municipal facilities, heating, health care, etc. Unpaid household work apart, women had to contribute at community level activity in the preparation of special food for numerous weddings, funerals, and other traditional rituals¹² involving large numbers of people. These tasks consumed much time and income of women, leaving hardly any opportunity for their self-improvement, personal development, or recreation. Such monotonous and unpaid work dampened and deformed women's individuality. True, these physical and physiological burdens had their reflections on women's relationships with family

members also, – who in turn received little care, love, interaction, involvement, and support. And simultaneously was destroyed also the traditional socio-economic supportive mechanism that was available to women, by sharing their domestic responsibilities in large combined families. Now in the new Soviet nuclear family¹³, the responsibilities of wife, mother, domestic and working unit, etc., all together fell on a single woman¹⁴ and these she had but to bear all by herself.

Again, the so-called women's right to work as guaranteed by the Constitution has been challenged on the grounds that practically it did not become any means of economic independence for women¹⁵ but simply a new form of enslavement ensuring their right to exploitation¹⁶. Although land reforms of 1920¹⁷ gave Muslim women a chance to gain economic freedom, and display their initiatives and energies for reviving the agriculture devastated during the civil war, yet with the collectivization process on, they lost their personal liberty and got chained, both economically and physically to the kolkhozes¹⁸. The abolition of the little economic freedom granted during the land reform period hit these traditionally discriminated women hardest, and the principle of equality as proclaimed by the Soviet Constitution proved just a propaganda myth.

The destiny of majority of peasant women living and working in the Soviet period was to work from dawn to dusk in all seasons with no holidays and no respite for pregnancy, childbirth, children's needs, and sickness; relief came only with death. Discrepancy in Soviet policy is at once discovered in the half-hearted supportive mechanism provided to mothers whose prenatal and postnatal leave did not exceed, respectively, one month and 56 days. Any woman leaving her job for looking after her baby was dismissed with no pension benefits, – to earn maximum pension benefits, she had to have a 20-year continuous service in one single phase¹⁹. And upon this, abortion and divorce were banned from 1930s to 1950s, and special privileges and rewards and medals were accorded to mothers getting more children. In fact, these women, themselves constituting about half of able-bodied population engaged as manual labourers²⁰ in collective farms and State farms, were duty bound to also provide the State cheap working hands for collectivization and 'cottonisation'²¹. Thus trapped by the limitations of monoculture, the two generations that grew up from 1930s were unable to raise the level of their education and culture, failed even to meet the low standards of Soviet average, more so in villages, and consequently a major gap emerged between rural and urban living standards as also in their education and culture. Even in 1980s the life of kolkhoz women did not witness any dramatic improvement as claimed by Soviet propaganda²². The myth of young smiling women proudly displaying medals on breasts and collecting cotton is exposed by the award winner cotton pickers revealing the harsh realities of cotton monoculture²³ thus: "Can any women get satisfaction from working under the burning sun, from picking cotton, when her hands swell red with pain, when her back cannot straight, when all she can think about is how to make the day end faster and go to bed earlier, no matter whether it's in a windswept barrack, or a poor kolkhoz home. Millions of our compatriots have just such a life. This is how Soviet state free women from the bonds of domestic slavery²⁴."

Not only in agriculture, these women toiled side by side with men in industrial sector also and did heavy manual tasks. Initially, as a part of Sovietization process, they were induced into production process through cooperative artels. These artels brought handicraftsmen together and soon became prime centres for utilizing the skills of various craftswomen also. The artels assured the supply of raw

materials on credit, guaranteed the sale of the produce, and this made women, working at home, somewhat able to look after their own interests and somewhat independent too. However, the First Five Year Plan (1928-1932) had artels merged into State establishments, and new forms of manufacture in textiles, foodstuffs, and garments began; and here were these women used for heavy manual labour²⁵. And then came, many males leaving for war front during 1930s and 40s, the shortage of male workers that was but to be compensated by female workers²⁶ in all productive sectors and hence had these women to face tough and dangerous working conditions²⁷. Succinctly, the maximum possible output was extracted from them in order to increase productivity and, to catalyse them, fierce competitions were held between similar establishments and winners were bestowed awards, titles, and certificates²⁸. But their working conditions were little improved. This absurd state policy caused irreparable damage to the health of workers who had to work in too long shifts running weeks together; they worked and slept²⁹ in the factory. The State apathy toward these workers is reflected by the harsh reality that, despite sacrificing their whole life in these factories, even champions and award winner women workers were not able to get a flat from the State even after their retirement.

The mockery of equality in Soviet policy is proved by the fact that while women were given equal rights to perform hard physical work in all sectors alongside with men, yet they were all treated as a cheap labour and employed in low skilled jobs with low wages. They were mostly kolkhoz workers performing the lowest paid agricultural works or then doing petty non-mechanized jobs in the *solkhozs*³⁰ (state farms); some were subordinate workers in manufacturing, construction, and transport; yet some were road workers, sanitary workers, sweepers, sales girls, waitresses, librarians, teachers, staff at day care centres, engineers and technicians in planning centres, nurses, and social workers³¹. Table 1 shows the percentage of female work force in Uzbekistan 1928-1989.

Furthermore, these women's wages, on an average, were one-third less than men's wages. And then in 1980s revised pay scales were introduced, yet there was no increase in the salaries of workers. The same discriminatory policy was followed in case of bonus funds as well, – while the administration received a bonus ranging from 75% to 100%, workers received it at only up to 50%³².

Discrimination on gender basis has been prevalent throughout the Soviet period not only in agricultural and industrial sectors³³ but also among the white-collar workers and the intelligentsia³⁴. Take, for instance, 1977: Then, women constituted a little over one-third of the 32000 scientific workers in Uzbekistan; Women constituted more than one-third of the junior scientific workers and assistants, the lowest rung on the academic ladder; Women formed only one-eighth of the *Doktor Nauk*; Women formed only about one-tenth of the professors, members, and correspondent members of the academy of science. Take it another way: According to many Soviet officials, and by various educational enrolment statistics, the medical field has been one of the most popular fields among indigenous women; these women constitute more than three-quarters of the medical personnel, but in 1970 they constituted only 39% of the head doctors³⁵. Table 2 compares the number of women scientific workers with the total number of scientific workers, in Uzbekistan³⁶.

Table 1:
Female Work Force in Uzbekistan 1928-1989

Percentage of total work force		
Sector	1928	1989
Industry	13.0	49.0
Agriculture	15.0	38.0
Forestry	-	23.7
Transport	-	12.7
Communications	30.0	47.7
Construction	-	14.9
Trade	-	47.3
Media & Information	-	72.0
Other Sectors	-	69.4
Health	64.0	73.3
Education	35.0	59.6
Culture	-	54.6
Arts	-	38.1
Science	-	46.1
Finance and Insurance	-	61.7
Administration	19	38.1
TOTAL	18.0	43.4

Source: Marifa Tokhtajkhdehjeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, 1992

Table 2:

Women Scientific Workers in Uzbekistan, by level of Skill (Based on data from the end of 1977)

Degree Level	Total Number of Scientific Workers	Total Number of Women	Women as % of total Scientific Workers
All scientific workers ¹	32.311	11.967	37.0
Whom with the degree of:			
Doktor nauk	867	108	12.5
Kandidat nauk	11.662	2,998	25.7
With the title of:			
Academician,correspondent Member,Professor	635	62	0.8
Assistant professor, And senior scientific Worker	4696	1,066	22.7
Junior scientific Worker and assistant	1,250	565	45.2

Note: Includes scientific-pedagogical staff of institutes of higher education.

Source: Nancy Lubin: *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 33, 1981

The professional growth of lady scientists was often obstructed so as to squeeze more out of them. A successful career during Soviet regime being dependent not on individual professional abilities but on the unquestioning loyalty towards the communist regime³⁷, the lady scientists' knowledge and research capabilities were often appropriated and exploited by their dominating male supervisors³⁸. Discrimination was not limited to the distribution of powers and resources only but exhibited in the salaries of men and women also. A field survey conducted by a sociologist in three major planning institutes of Tashkent in 1997 reveals that every second woman earns 30-40% less than a man with similar qualifications and experience³⁹. Statistical studies reveal that the disparities in skill levels between sexes were even more pronounced with regard to nationality. Despite the impressive educational attainments among indigenous women, non-indigenous or Slavic women dominated the high-skill positions in industrial and certain other key sectors where women were employed⁴⁰. However, some experts believe that these disparities do not necessarily imply discrimination against indigenous women; for, many indigenous women with relatively high educational attainments and higher skills preferred low-skill jobs, – they did so with certain conditions in mind such as working nearer home, having shorter working days⁴¹, etc.

The next discrepancy in the Soviet system is reflected in its quota system, which theoretically guaranteed the representation and participation of local nationalities in general and women in particular. This façade of social gesture was expected to exhibit and substantiate the complete emancipation and equality as practically achieved by women. However, facts reveal that Soviet State was not sincere in implementing its declared policies to promote the real participation of women in governing the state. Except in few cases, women were not appointed to top decision-making positions in the government; as a result, women in lower ranks far outnumbered those in the higher. Throughout Soviet history only two women were appointed, at all union levels, to the position of minister, and that too in the departments of culture and health. The Communist Party tactfully restrained the involvement of women in powerful executive positions and assigned them secondary positions everywhere – in council of ministers, line ministers, and party committees at territorial levels⁴². Yadgar Nasretddinova, an exceptional woman from Uzbekistan, was able to achieve the highest levels of power in Soviet system from 1940s to 70s and held, at various times, Chair of the Supreme Soviet in Uzbek SSR and Chair of the Upper Chamber of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR⁴³.

Such women as entered the corridors of power and formed part of power structure were subjected to the vetting system like social origin⁴⁴ and their loyalty to the proclaimed Soviet ideals; such were the main criteria – not the actual capabilities and talents of women including their educational and professional abilities – for the selection of delegates and deputies of the Soviet ruling elite. Such lapses often resulted in less qualified and non-professional women being promoted to the positions of power and the few patronized by the government occupying a visible but often decorative place in public offices. These dubious policies projected a pseudo-image of women politicians; women were broadly deemed lacking decision-making qualities, and this mutilated their essence and image.

May it not be taken to mean, however, that there were no women ruling and loved by the people. Indeed, there were exceptional women who, believing that educated women could influence the destiny of their people, pursued freedom consciously and vigorously. These women remained a product of the local Muslim culture with its traditional quest for spirituality; and they regarded modern knowledge and modern professions like medicine, teaching, art, etc., also as essential for their people. However, there was a quick sharp decline in the proportion of women involved in both local and central governmental bodies at all levels, late 1980s, when the quota system for women was abolished.

Significantly again, despite some impressive achievements in the areas of education and social welfare and employment, equality of sexes remained but illusionary and latent discrimination continued to persist. It found its reflection in gender disparities and unequal gender roles; for instance, women had a disproportionate burden of responsibilities and men were almost exempted from the household sphere. No doubt women were better educated and contributed much more to the economic life in an organized manner than they did in the past, but utilization of women specifically to attain a more rational distribution of labour and to contribute to the most balanced development of the economy as a whole has had its drawbacks.

Moreover, the path towards freedom for Central Asian women undoubtedly was quite bloody; their majority who experienced this forced liberation, which introduced the compulsory form of equality, had to face much bitterness, misunderstanding, and resentment. This was an agonizing historical process which gave premature birth to a puny form of freedom, infirm and defective, whose impact is being felt

even today by all women in newly independent states of Central Asia. There was quiet resistance too by the basic core of population – the main reason being that women's emancipation in Central Asia was linked to destroying Muslim traditions and institutions like polygamy, *kalym* (bride-price), forced marriage of underage children, seclusion of women, and the veil. The Soviets were determined to struggle against such traditions considered backward all in the name of modernization and secularization of the country. They intended to use women to destroy the Muslim patriarchal family, to break the blood and tribal ties that were the very basis of Central Asian society, and to establish new social bonds on a socialist basis. And to attain their goal, certainly, Central Asian women were their instrument for change, – “the surrogate of the proletariat” in total absence of a working class⁴⁵.

Nevertheless, these facts well reveal that the secularization of a society cannot be achieved through proclamations and slogans only. Europe, for example, in the evolutionary process of social development, its improved communications, increased mobility, emergence of secular culture embodying the conditions under which religion gradually diminished its role as the inter-regulator of people's interrelationships, and the consequent new forms of social interactions emerging, still consumed more than two centuries toward practical secularization. None of these conditions obtained in Central Asia in 1920s; contrarily, religious norms formed a characteristic feature of life during the Soviet period. Although Sovietization of society promoted new forms of social interaction, nevertheless, in essence, these remained grounded in ideology – that is, the ideology of new communist religion. Society remained religious; but, in contrast with the pre-revolutionary period, it became bi-religious – that is, the internal religion of Islam got cloaked in the outer communist religion, and under such conditions could neither develop nor reform. Under such a complex situation, Central Asian women became most vulnerable and were caught in the dilemma which continues even in post-Soviet period in the wake of fresh articulation of nation building and reinstatement of Islamic values as guiding principles for post-Soviet society.

Summing up, the often-claimed overall impact of Sovietization of Central Asia was that Muslim society along with its position of women was transformed, its gender segregation was liquidated in principle, women were no longer veiled, walked alone on streets, and did spend a lot of time outside their homes. However, the claim is only superficially true. ‘Attitudes and perceptions are always slower to change’ and good many of these women preferred to work segregated from males, those with higher education and good jobs too observed traditional etiquette even within home, and many sought female enclaves when forced into public life⁴⁶. In fact, actual exact equality was never achieved as there was no social base for a wider and real growth for the self-realization of women, both in society and family. Precisely, Central Asian women's life during Soviet times was regulated by both State and family, with numerous hidden and invisible checks and barriers. And these, discrimination restricting their right to work growing, they had to confront and overcome all by themselves, even in post-Soviet period. Leaving aside the negative consequences of women's involvement in the production process, undeniably, work bestows satisfaction to women, economic independence, and the possibility of self-realization. The only thing required is a change in social attitudes towards them besides sound economic incentives backed and safeguarded by the State. Then definitely they can play a leading role in the modernization of their country.

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 14. Marufa Tokhtajkhodehjeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 68
 15. Since basic issue i.e. the control over the money earned by a women was not actually addressed by the Soviet authorities. Several descriptions on extended family reveals that husbands mother still controlled entire treasure of the family. M.A. Tolmcheva; "The Muslim Women in Soviet Central" Central Asian Survey, Vol. 12 (4), P 536, Great Britain., 1993.
 16. The induction of women into the production process was motivated by economic considerations apart from ideological transformation. Prior to the revolution Central Asia served as one main source of raw cotton for Russian textiles. However, during the years of Civil War there was a drastic curtailment in cotton production due to large scale peasant movements and their shift to grain cultivation. To achieve self-sufficiency in cotton, Soviet regime brought new lands under cotton cultivation for which they needed working force and such working hands were found among women who were hard working, patient, and skilful.
 17. During the land reforms period, women heading households were legally acknowledged as the heads of their families and, by virtue of this status, agricultural lands along with equipment and seed were allotted to women. Just in four regions of Uzbekistan 706 women received land and achieved economic equality. M. Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 54
 18. During 1930s a ban was proclaimed on job changes. No kolkhoz worker could find a job anywhere without producing the passport from previous administrator. M. Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 54
 19. M. Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 105
 20. According to a 1970 survey, women constituted only about 2% (out of 21,680) of the mechanized agricultural workers whereas about 98% were engaged as manual labourers. Nancy Lubin: "Women in Soviet Central Asia, Progress and Contradictions," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 182-203, 1981
 21. As 1930s were all years of collectivization, 1960s and 1970s were the years of 'cottonisation,' which involved over half of the female rural population in age group 15-50 in one way or another in cotton production.
 22. The portraying of cotton-gathering women as truly happy, and some happier being rewarded by the leaders in Soviet style, was used to hypnotize the Soviet people and the world outside into accepting the
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mythical freedom of Soviet Central Asian women. M. Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 115

23. The tyranny of cotton monoculture is hurtfully expressed here in a folk-song:

Ruling over us from time immemorial white cotton black day!

Heaven beyond the grave, but for now,

All we get is work, while others grow rich!

The white cotton grows tall, but our wage packet is small.

God is in heaven, but for now

All we get is work, while others grow rich!

Honey is sweet but the bee stings

There we shall be rewarded, but for now

All we do is sweat while others grow rich!

Still ruling over us from time immemorial;

White cotton, black days.

M. Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 115

24. Women of Uzbekistan have narrated numerous agonies which they have experienced during the Soviet period and the heavy price they paid for the success of Soviet policies. For details see M. Tokhtakhdejeava's *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*
25. By a decree of 1931, Central Asian Bureau of Trade Unions removed the restrictions on the induction of female workers in production process and legalized women's right to perform heavy physical labour. M. Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 118
26. By one estimate, in 1931, Tashkent leather industry had 9800 workers 5800 of them females, textile industry had 7000 women workers 3000 of them from local nationalities, and silk factory had 1107 workers 514 of them females. M. Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 118
27. "There was a low mechanization and non-existence of safety measures which often caused casualties to the workers. In certain factories temperature used to be very high which caused humidity and a dreadful smell especially in summer." Such were the many comments of factory workers working in the industrial sector during Soviet period, as viewed from M. Tokhtakhdejeava's *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 121
28. *Shock-worker* and *Stakhanovite* awards were conferred upon those workers who exceeded the targeted quota of production.

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29. Instead of protecting the interests of workers, trade unions became a party to administration in exploiting the labour. In stitching and shoemaking factories, production quotas were raised so high that even highly skilled cobblers were unable to complete quota without extra shifts. Reports go that job-related illness among textile workers had increased five times in late 80s, which led to increase in skin and bone diseases besides muscular and digestive problems. M. Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 122 ..
 30. Their predominance in unskilled positions is borne out by 1970s when women constituted only 2.4% of 21680 mechanized agricultural workers: against this, women formed 98.9% of manual labourers on state farms. Very few women were enrolled in agricultural studies; by one estimate, out of 10,104 students in agricultural mechanization schools only 292 or 2.9% were women; in some oblasts no women were enrolled. Nancy Lubin: "Women in Soviet Central Asia," *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXIII, No 2, Taylor and Francis, 1981.
 31. In metallurgical and woodwork industries of Uzbekistan, for instance, only 15% of the total 10000 workers were women. Similarly, women constituted 50% of the workforce doing other heavy physical and manual works like driving tractors, etc.
 32. Even in textile industry, which was superficially prosperous, the average wages remained only 30% higher than the country's official minimum. A massive income generated by workers was spent on running the establishments and their overstaffed managements, and workers had no say in policy matters. M. Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, p. 123
 33. The disproportionate representation of women in industrial sector as manual labourers is proved by the fact that in 1972 53.5% workers were employed in manual labour of whom about half were women even though their proportion in total labour force was only about 46%. Nancy Lubin, "women in Soviet Central Asia" p 184, *Soviet Studies*, Vol XXXIII, no 2, 1981.
 34. Although in 1930's to 1960's women made remarkable strides in every field like doctors, lawyers, orientalists, scientists, philologists, professors and philosophers yet after on the period of stagnation has set in which roughly is considered from the 1960's till beginning of perestroika in 1985 and only few women stood out of entailing numberless compromises with their individuality. The tragic stories unfolded by a Sociologist about the career of working women in Soviet period substantiates the fact that even those women who held power position were caught by dichotomy between their supposed position
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of power and the reality resulting pain and agony at the end of their career. For details see M.Tokhtakhdejeava *Between the Slogans of Communism and the laws of Islam* P 134-157

35. M.Tokhtakhdejeava *Between the Slogans of Communism and the laws of Islam* p 126
36. Nancy Lubin, "women in Soviet Central Asia" ., *Soviet Studies*, Vol XXXIII, no 2, 1981.
37. During this period, the universally accepted criteria, like professional abilities and skill to do concrete tasks in specific fields, were of secondary importance.
38. The various experiences of intellectual workers and scientists, as narrated by a sociologist, reveal the frustration which women scientists were confronting during Soviet period. Often, new ideas originated from women but were exploited by their men supervisors. For details see Marfua Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, pp. 126-129
39. The salaries of women working in intellectual fields were less than the minimum wages of women labourers. For details of women's dramatic struggle against the totalitarian system, see Marufa Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, pp. 139-142
40. In one of the clothing factories of Fergana valley, for instance, out of 2743 women workers, the Uzbek were 2737 and 90% of them concentrated in the lowest skill jobs: Slavic women constituted 70% of female engineering, technical, and white-collar workforce. Nancy Lubin: *Women in Soviet Central Asia, Progress and Contradictions*, p. 185
41. Nancy Lubin: *Women in Soviet Central Asia, Progress and Contradictions*, p. 186; M.A.Tolmacheva, *The Muslim Women in Soviet Central Asia*, p.535, Great Britain, 1993.
42. Usually, women were assigned subordinate roles like Secretary of a district or a city committee, even when they composed one-third to one-fifth of the legislative, party, and *komsomol* bodies. But the official data claimed that the quotas of representation, as reserved for women within government and party organs, had been achieved in 1970s. *Encyclopaedia of Women*, Vol. II, year 2005.
43. For details of her dramatic struggle against the totalitarian system, see Marufa Tokhtakhdejeava: *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam*, pp. 139-142
44. It is noteworthy that women who emerged 1930s-40s did not come from the traditional background, – so because social attitudes rejected those who openly broke away from traditional concepts regarding the position and role of women. These female cadres came mostly from the de-classed, where women's traditional dependence including economic dependence had weakened as a result of their life

circumstances or political conviction. These included young women who had lost their parents and relatives and were brought up in boarding schools run by the state women's department.

45. G. Masell: *The Surrogate Proletariat Muslim Women and Revolutionary Strategies in Soviet Central Asia – 1919-1929*, Princeton, 1974.
46. For the role of central Asian Women in preserving the traditional values see habiba; "Women Clerics of Central Asian Islam," *Central Asian Survey*, vol,16[1]P38,1993.



SYED, Damsaz Ali

Awantivarman: Contributor of Socio-Economic Change in Kashmir

Awantivarman's period (AD 855- 883) is famous not for wars but for peace and prosperity. The reign is known for bringing agricultural revolution, state machinery was utilized for the betterment of healthy social structure irrespective of caste, color and creed. The economic prosperity proved in effect a stabilizing factor and all the changes are plainly reflected in the magnificent and extensive foundations laid in the time of Awantivarman. He encouraged his friends, relatives and members of his council to join hands in carrying out developmental works. During the period of Awantivarman learning received such a patronage that learned men were provided every sort of encouragement.

So far as peace, development and justice are concerned Awantivarmans rule holds great importance in the socio-religious and cultural history of the Kashmir Empire. His main aim was to spread the message of love and equality throughout his empire and to connect the valley with other parts of the world. Awantivarman¹ founded the Utpala dynasty in 855. A.D. He was the noblest ruler of Kashmir because he waged no wars, not even to regain the territories which his predecessors had lost long before. His times were the happiest and he took every possible step to make the life of his subjects happy² and prosperous. For the said purpose all state resources were utilized for the betterment of common masses irrespective of religion. The only problems which he faced were raised by his own kiths and kins, but they were suppressed with the help of his able minister, Sura. By his way the agricultural sector also received more and more attention.

Agriculture³ was the main economic activity of the Kashmiri people. No doubt there were other economic sectors too, like trade and industry. But the trade of country was mainly dependent on agricultural production. The people who mainly remained engaged with land were the peasants with small holdings of land. These holdings were mainly managed single-handedly by them, while as the people with large holdings of land rented out their lands for cultivation to peasants for a certain share of produce. The lot of agriculturalist was on the whole most unviable, they lived in poverty. Their life was very much miserable, while the people with large holdings were living the life of ease. In such a social disorder a new section of people came into existence known as Damras (feudal lords). Damras have mostly inhabited the northern parts of the valley that, in those areas where the land was yielding more.

¹ Lawrence W, 2000. *Valley of Kashmir*, Chinara Publishing house Srinagar, p.170.

² Journal of archaeological survey of India, 1993, p.27.

³ Kapur M.L, 1992. *The history and culture of Kashmir*, Publishers Jay Kay book house, Jammu, p.31.

The Damras have grown into a very powerful body and source of problems for rulers as well as for people in general, especially when the ruler was weak to face their challenge.

It was Lalitaditya 724-61 A.D. who had first realized their strong impact, although he himself did not live long to crush these elements. His reign was undoubtedly epoch-making in almost all respects. He not only extended the boundaries but there was all-round development, new routes were opened and had been credited with wide popular support among the people, among others for his philanthropic activities. The most important step taken by him was to increase the agricultural produce and to save the valley from frequent floods. Floods in the valley occurred largely owing to the difficult passage of the river Jehlum near the Baramulla Pass and overflowing of the world-famous Wular Lake. Lalitaditya drained off the lake waters by means of suitable water channels and by this way the danger of floods was lessened. In this way more and more land was brought under cultivation and he constructed canals side by side to irrigate the Karewas lands especially the land lying between the left bank of river Jehlum from Vijbror 'Awantipora' to below Chakdhara 'modern Tsakdar'. The area was out of cultivation because of lack of irrigation facilities. Due to the efforts of Lalitaditya at Chakdhara the water of Jehlum was distributed to various villages in the area by constructing a series of water wheels. He was a very great builder and a number of towns came into existence during his reign. His liberal religious policy is yet another proof of his benevolence, himself being a follower of Vishnu. Naturally Vaishnavs received liberal patronage but other religions were equally respected and given full freedom to flourish. Even many Buddhists were appointed at higher posts of administration. Scholars and learned men also received liberal patronage under the loving care of the king. He had left a deep imprint as a great conqueror, good administrator and above all well-wisher of common people irrespective of religion. Lalitaditya constructed many beautiful temples, viharas and stupas and also spent huge amount of wealth on them and also granted villages to them for their maintenance. In the town of Parihaspora alone silver and gold images of Vishnu were installed in the existing temples of the area. Not only images of Vishnu but also the images of Lord Buddha and Garuda were found in number of temples and dedicated for public worship. At modern Ushkur a big vihar was constructed which served as the resting place for foreigners.

After his departure the Damras (land lords) became very powerful under the rule of his weak successors. During the reign of Karkota ruler Ajitapida, 813-850 A.D., the life of the common people was at its worst. Revenues and all the resources of the state were carried off by high officials and they utilized it for their personal benefits and other unnecessary activities that resulted in the total downfall of the dynasty. Once again there was complete social disorder and people were forced by the circumstances to desert their lands. Under these circumstances Damras gained power using their position as local potentates and had been able to amass fortunes by high-handed methods and also by forcible occupation of villages. Keeping armed retainers, they showed scanty regard even for the king's authority. But Awantivarman restrained their activities through reorganization of administrative setup. The age-old practice of ruling the country like an autocrat came to an end, and instituted a council for the first time to run the administration. The people were lucky that the valley came under the rule of Raja Awantivarman, whose only aim was to restore peace and order and to change the economic setup of the country. The whole structure of the state underwent great changes, a great number of measures and reforms were taken for the welfare of the people, which healed the wounds of misgovernment of the

preceding reigns. And there is no greater name in the whole history of Kashmir than Awantivarman. His reign is famous for bringing agricultural⁴ revolution to the valley of Kashmir. The arable land available till then and the produce were not enough to fulfill the needs of the people. Further problems were added by frequent floods. Only Lalitaditya had earlier tried to drain out the water through suitable channels. But the later Karkota rulers had neither carried his measures any further nor even cared for to maintain the old channels. Consequently, once again floods had started ravaging the valley, and the threat of famine arose. The sufferings of people further increased. The people of the valley at that time were saved by the king with the help of an able and gifted engineer, Suyas⁵. Claiming no aristocratic lineage yet animated by the noble pride of a profound scholar as he was, Suyas often used to say to his friends and colleagues that he knew how to save the valley from recurring floods, but what could he do without means. Soon his utterness and dedication reached the ears of King Awantivarman and the latter summoned him to his personal presence. On hearing the news Suyas at once presented himself before the king. On seeing his confidence the king decided to try him and placed at his disposal all the resources of the state. Suyas's first measure was to boost the agricultural sector. The agricultural measures taken by him made him much loved among the people. No doubt, some measures were taken by the early rulers, but the credit goes to Awantivarman. The first step taken by the gifted and able engineer, Suyas, was drainage and irrigation. For this purpose the king provided him all the means. He took a lot of money from the Government treasury and proceeded in boats towards his destination reaching near the village of Yaksadara (near Khadanyar near Baramulla.) The agile minded Suyas first threw a handful of money in the river *Jehlum* (Vitasta) near the village of Yaksadara, and he continued this practice for several days. The famine-stricken people at once jumped into the river *Jehlum* and in this way got money and also dragged out from the river rocks and boulders too⁶. The next step of Suyas was that the beds of *Jehlum* (Vitasta) were cleared by the cunning method. According to Kalhana he diverted the water of *Jehlum* (vitasta) to the other side near Baramulla for a few days, so that the beds of *Jehlum* (Vitasta) could be cleared. Besides cleaning the river *Jehlum* (Vitasta) and widening its size Suyas also constructed stone embankments (setu, now suth in Kashmiri language) for a length of seven yojanas⁷ about (42 miles), in order to prevent the rocks from rolling down in the river *Jehlum*. In a similar way courses of many tributaries also were regulated with the result the thousands of acres of arable land was reclaimed and on their sites sprang up a number of populous and prosperous villages and their protection was provided by the construction of circular dykes, which gave them the appearance of round bowls or kundal. To make the irrigation system of a country more effective and advanced, a network of canals⁸ was constructed and water facilities were provided to those areas which were dependent on rain. The Nur Canal is about 13 kilometers long and takes its water from the river *Jehlum* at Shadipur and then flows into the Wullar Lake, irrigating Anderkot village. It is a model of the canal that was constructed by Suyas during Awantivarman's reign. The Nandikul Canal takes its water from the Nullah Anantnag at Lassipur. It is 30 kilometers long and irrigates 8,000 acres of land in the northern areas of Anantnag. In

4 Raghunath Rai, 1996. A history of the Kashmir, Academic Publishing co. Jalandhar, p,34.

5 Lawrence W, 2000. Valley of Kashmir, Chinara Publishing house Srinagar, p,187.

6 Kapur M.L, 1992. The history and culture of Kashmir, Publishers Jay Kay book house, Jammu, pp,35-36.

7 Raghunath Rai, 1996. A history of the Kashmir, Academic Publishing co. Jalandhar, p,35.

⁸ Kalhanas, 1989. *Rajtarangni*, Trans.by M.A.Stein,vol,ii, Motilal Banarasi Dass Delhi, reprint p.460.

order to distribute the water equally, Suyā took samples of soil from each village to ascertain the difference in the absorbing capacity of different soils of different villages. In the valley of Kashmir there are different soils with different water-absorbing characteristics. Accordingly, he distributed the water not according to the area of land of each village, but according to the absorbing capacity of the soil⁹. After taking these wonderful measures Kashmir was not only saved from recurrent food famines, but the production increased to such an extent that according to Kalhana the price of paddy came down to 36 dinnars¹⁰ per *Kharwar*, the lowest price the Kashmir valley had ever witnessed. Prior to Awantivarman the normal price used to be 200 *Dinnars*, leaving aside 1500 *Dinnars*, during the times of famines. So Kalhana calls Suyā (Anapati) lord of food. The economic prosperity proved in effect a stabilizing factor in Kashmiri politics too, and all these changes are plainly reflected in the magnificent and extensive foundations laid in the time of Awantivarman and the king himself founded the town of Awantipora.

The town Awantipora is 29 kilometers away from Srinagar City in the South of Kashmir, located on the both sides of Srinagar Jammu national highway on the left side of the river Jehlum. This town was established by popular and renowned Raja Awantivarman in 853-883 A.D. The town is affiliated with the name of King Awantivarman and before it was known as “Vethpora” but changed later on by the king. In Raj Tarangni Pandit Kalhana says this town was a most important sacred religious pilgrimage place in ancient times and was called “Vishvakasar”. Raja Awantivarman constructed many stone temples and a palace there. The monuments of high and big stones temples are still found in the town, with a great archaeological importance. Visitors from the whole world come to visit this town. This town has significant importance also due to Ziyarat Sharief of Syed Hassan Mantaqi Sahib (RA).

Suyā laid the foundation of a town namely Suyapora¹¹ (modern Sopore) on the banks of the river Jehlum. Sopore occupies an almost central position in the valley of Kashmir surrounded by the picturesque Lolab Valley and Bandipora District in the east-north; on the west by outskirts of Baramulla City and on the south by Karewas of Tangmarg Tehsil. Until the end of the 14th century the town did not observe any significant growth. It was after the independence of India that Sopore experienced a rapid rise in population and expansion of the town. After independence, a new bridge about 1.5 miles downstream from the site of the old bridge was constructed and administrative offices brought radical change in the overall development of the town. The rapid urban growth of the town can be attributed mainly to its locational advantage as the center of the valley, its rich and fertile soil which is good for agriculture, the abundance of water, potentially supportive for the rearing of a rich variety of fish due to the proximity to Wular Lake and several forest resources.

Surapora¹² — founded by Sura, the prime minister of Awantivarman — is the modern Hiripora in the present district of Shopian and in order to enhance its importance he transferred here a watch-station from a high place on the Pir Panjal Pass. Awantivarman¹³ constructed two temples: Awantiswamian¹⁴

⁹ Kapur M.L., *The history and culture of Kashmir*, Publishers Jay Kay book house Jammu, 1992, p.37.

¹⁰ Majumdar R.C., *Ancient India*, Motilal Banarasi Publishers Delhi, 1998, p.355.

¹¹ Kalhanas, *Rajtarangni* Trans.by M.A.Stein, vol., ii, Motilal Banarasi Dass Delhi, 1989, reprint p.460.

¹² Sufi G.M.D., *Kashir being a history of Kashmir*, reprint, Capital Publishing house New Delhi, 1996, p.56.

¹³ Dutt Jogesh Chander, *Kings of Kashmira*, vol, i, Mittal Publications New Delhi, 1990, p.112.

and Awantivishwara¹⁵ temple. Awantiswamian temple was the Vishnu¹⁶ temple and Awantivishwara was the Shiva¹⁷ temple. Awantiswamian temple is situated on the bank of river Jehlum and is about one kilometer away from Awantipora market. The temple is a complex of five temples, with one major shrine. The five complex temples, known as panchyathra, is a special feature of the Kashmiri Vishnu temples. The structure of the temple is in a colonnaded peristyle form with an enclosing courtyard. The peristyle is comparatively plain externally except on the west side, which has a row of fluted columns; only decoration on the other three sides is in rectangular spaces, corresponding respectively with the cornice on the plinth and the cells inside. The entrance which is in the middle of the west wall, is divided by a cross wall into two chambers, and is approached by a flight of steps. The front pilasters of the side walls bear figures of Vishnu and of his consorts carved in relief on either side of it was a portico supported on tall massive advanced columns, one of which exists to this very present day, though in a precarious condition. Awantivishwara temple is about two and half kilometers away from Awantipora market. This place is the modern Jobara (Awantipora). These temples most probably represent the last stage of the growth of temple architecture in Kashmir Valley. The architecture¹⁸ of these temples is almost having the resemblance with the Karkota temples, they too are made of big stone blocks, and their layout is almost the same. However, certain improvements were made in it by the Utpalas; especially their pillars are more ornated, and have been carved so magnificently that they looked like wooden pillars. Some motifs carved on the columns and pillars, are Indian, west Asian and Kashmiri. These two temples are now shapeless masses of ruins but the gateways of both are standing and are great examples of stone architecture, and the colonnade of the smaller temple, which had been completely buried underground has recently been partially excavated and repaired.

Awantivarman was succeeded by his son Shankarvarman (883-902 A.D.). He first decided to reoccupy those areas which had been conquered during the time of Karkota ruler Lalitaditya, but lost during the later rulers of the said dynasty. With this intention he set out with his huge army and while conquering small and major states, he reached Kabul. By that time Kabul was ruled by a Hindu King, Lallaya. His people were not satisfied with his activities that resulted in the success of Shankarvarman and Kabul came under the control of Kashmir. During the time of Shankarvarman Kashmir became strong politically and militarily. It is worth emphasizing that during the time of Lalitaditya Kashmir had become strong militarily, while during the period of Awantivarman Kashmir became strong economically. During the rule of Shankarvarman Kashmir started achieving progress in both fields. Shankarvarman succeeded in establishing direct rapport with the people as a successful politician. As a result of gaining control over Kabul, many influential leaders emerged on the scene in Kabul who challenged Shankarvarman. Though both Kabul and Kashmir were completely Hindu regions, it was not easy to gain control over the people of Kabul only with arms. After his death the disorder continued; during the time of Gopalvarman (902-904 A.D.), the next ruler of valley, who proved to be an able strategist by changing his policies following his understanding of the spirit of bravery and self-respect of

¹⁴ Lawrence W, *Valley of Kashmir*, Chinara Publishing house Srinagar, 2000, p.187.

¹⁵ Sufi G.M.D, *Kashir being a history of Kashmir*, reprint, Capital Publishing house New Delhi, 1996, p.55.

¹⁶ R.C.Kak, *Ancient Monuments of Kashmir*, Gulshan Publishers Srinagar, 2002, p.82.

¹⁷ Raghunath Rai, *A history of the Kashmir*, Academic Publishing co. Jalandhar, 1996, p.34.

¹⁸ Kapur M.L, *The history and culture of Kashmir*, Publishers Jay Kay book house Jammu, 1992, p.39.

the people of Kabul. He sent to Kabul a group of soldiers, under the leadership of an officer Prabhakar Dev to pacify the revolt and control the disrupted administrative setup there. After his initial victory Prabhakar Dev thought it better to hold parleys with the King of Kabul, Lallaya. The parleys were successful and under an agreement Tromanna, son of Lallaya, was installed on the throne of Kabul. In the presence of Prabhakar Dev and with his blessings Tromanna's coronation as Kamluk was completed. This way the relations between Kabul and Kashmir became strong. Kashmir had also religious relations with Kabul.

Among the later rulers of the dynasty which developed the economy of the valley Suravarman-I (933-934 A.D.) needs to be mentioned, who boosted the developmental works in the valley and built a math, a Gokula and various famous temples at various places in the valley. The courtiers and others equally contributed a lot and laid the foundation of various pother towns and villages. Right from the time of Awantivarman efforts were made to develop the internal and external trade of the valley. However, the internal was mainly dependent on the agricultural production and was carried out through the river Jehlum and its tributaries. The external trade was carried out through different routes connecting Kashmir with India, Afghanistan, Tibet and various other countries. Geographically Kashmir occupies an important position having border connectivity with the countries mentioned above. The trade relations of Kashmir with the foreign countries can be traced directly from the Maruyan Empire. These contacts were further strengthened during the time of later Utpala rulers.

Awantivarman's period is also famous and popular for the rich tradition of education and learning. It is only education that can change the shape of any society; education is a way to progress in all diverse aspects of life. For this very particular purpose every possible step was taken by the king to help learners at all possible levels. During the period of Awantivarman learning received such patronage that learned men were provided seat in the king's Sabha¹⁹. According to Kalhana the scholars who were granted great fortunes and high honors proceeded to the Sabha in vehicles worthy of kings. On account of great patronage which the scholars received, we find scholars of great repute like Muktakana, Sivasvarman, Anandvardhara and Ratnakara²⁰. Awantivarman provided all opportunities²¹ and facilities to people to progress²² in all spheres of development, construction and welfare. He encouraged²³ his friends, relations and members of his council of ministers to join hands in carrying out development²⁴ works. Awantivarman²⁵ himself supervised construction of several temples²⁶ and monasteries.

¹⁹ Hassan Mohibul, *Kashmir under Sultans*, Publishers Ali Mohd. and sons Srinagar, 1974, p.48.

²⁰ Journal of archaeological survey of India, 1993, p.39.

²¹ Kapur M.L., *The history and culture of Kashmir*, Publishers Jay Kay book house Jammu, 1992, p.28.

²² Raghunath Rai, *A history of the Kashmir*, Academic Publishing co. Jalandhar, 1996, p.36.

²³ Majumdar R.C., *Ancient India*, Motilal Banarasi Publishers Delhi, 1998, pp.355-356.

²⁴ Kalhanas, *Rajtarangni*, Trans. by M.A.Stein, vol, ii, Motilal Banarasi Dass Delhi, 1989, reprint pp.421-422.

²⁵ Raghunath Rai, *A history of the Kashmir*, Academic Publishing co. Jalandhar, 1996, p.34.

²⁶ Sufi G.M.D., *Kashir being a history of Kashmir*, reprint, Capital Publishing house New Delhi, 1996, p.56.

Conclusion

Awantivarman passed away after a glorious rule of about 28 years. His period holds great importance in the history of Kashmir so far as peace, development and justice are concerned. During his time there was all-round prosperity, because the emperor did not wage any war during the period; instead of spending time in the battlefields, he concentrated on the welfare of people irrespective of caste, color and creed. He was very generous, simple, wise, and kindhearted and all his actions were marked by warmth of love and softness.



LINGUISTICS

KHAYDAROV, M. Mirazim

Realization of Turkic Peoples' Language Potential

Abstract: Turkic peoples are counted among ethnic groups widely spread at vast territories and numbering hundreds of millions of people. Meanwhile as opposed to ethnic groups that have common literary languages, Turkic peoples at present do not have one. Availability of common language would provide the Turkic peoples with the advantages that ethnic groups possessing common literary languages already have. Turkic peoples had several languages served as above-dialect standardized languages for several Turkic peoples. Turkic languages are considered to be mutually intelligible and they are closer to each other than the languages of many ethnic groups possessing common languages. In this connection it is very realistic to create the language that would serve as above-dialect language for the whole Turkic community. The prospects of its implementation will depend on several factors including convenience, neutrality and ability to be used in high spheres. Several principles of the language creation that would provide its maximum perfection are recommended. Propagation of the language will depend on how much the Turkic peoples will be interested and successful in creation of common cultural and information space. Independently of how successful the common-Turkic language implementation will proceed, Turkic peoples should follow the minimum program in order to utilize Turkic languages' potential.

Key words: ethnic groups, Turkic peoples, the advantages of common literary language, principles of the common-Turkic language creation, minimum program.

The modern globalizing world is characterized firstly by increasing amount of international relationships and interdependency, and secondly by sharp increase of magnitude of information and its exchange in these relationships. This, in turn makes the problems of communication means, including linguistic problem, more topical.

As a result of need in international communication means the English language has spread worldwide. English has already formed as a language of international intercourse, and as per intensification of above mentioned trends is penetrating deeper into various spheres. If, for example before World War II, French held a solid position in the sphere of international diplomacy, and German in scientific-technical sphere, nowadays English predominates in these spheres too.

Besides English that has already formed as a universal language, there are also regional languages which serve to many countries or populations of many millions, such as Chinese, Hindi-Urdu, Spanish, Arabic, French, bahasa Indonesia-Malayan, German, Farsi and others.

There are several ethnic groups in the world whose settling in vast territories greatly increased the number of speakers of their languages, which provided formation of these languages as regional ones. Let us see some of these groups.

Russians and English-speaking nations have colonized predominantly sparsely populated regions and mixed little with indigenous populations; that is why there are just a few differences in language and culture between different groups of Russian- and English-speaking nations. In contrast to them Arabs, Spanish-speaking nations, and the Chinese have settled in the territories that had been densely populated before their settling.

Arabic nations have formed by superimposition of Arabic prides onto various, mainly Semitic peoples, and nowadays Arabic dialects actually are separate languages markedly differing from each other (mainly because of the influence of local substratum). Classical Arabic language, in which the Qur'an was written, had served as a common literary language for Arabic peoples over the centuries. At present, availability of this language lets Arabs from different countries communicate with each other, have common Arabian literature, common informational, educational and media space etc.

The Spanish-speaking nations of Latin America have formed as a result of mixture of Spanish with different Indian peoples (as well as African and other European peoples) in different proportions. Spanish-speaking nations speak differing dialects, but they also have a common literary language.

The Chinese nation is in fact a group of peoples which differ in language, culture and have some racial differences. Southern groups of Chinese were formed by the mixture of Chinese with various local peoples. Dialects of local groups of Chinese differ so much that are considered to be mutually unintelligible. The situation is eased with that the words pronounced differently in different dialects are indicated by identical hieroglyphs at script. In many experts' opinion if China did not have a common script it would have disintegrated long ago.

The availability of common standardized language creates huge advantages to the close ethnic groups. Literary languages of above mentioned ethnic groups are UN official languages.

Turkic peoples are settled on the vast territory from the Arctic and Pacific Oceans to the Mediterranean Sea and Balkans. All Turkic languages except the Chuvash and Yakut languages are considered by scientists to be mutually intelligible. It is explained with that in the past Turkic peoples were a single people and then a group of geographically and ethnically close peoples, which later settled in the vast areas of Eurasia.

Until the 20th century Turkic peoples had several above-dialect languages, i.e. literary languages used at vast territories that had differing oral dialects, the Turki language can be referred to them. In the 20th century division of the Turkic world to more than 30 literary languages took place as a result of creation of Turkic literary languages for each area on the basis of local dialects.

According to the British researcher Mark Dickens, the Bolsheviks could have created common-Turkic language in USSR in 1920s in the frame of the policy of merging of peoples. But this contradicted the

interests of Bolsheviks to disunite the Turkic community; that is why they carried out the policy of not simply creation of separate Turkic languages but emphasizing the differences between them¹.

Turkic peoples whose languages are probably closer to each other than the languages of local groups of above mentioned peoples, do not have a common literary language in contrast to them.

The negative trend is that Turkic languages developed and continue to develop independently from each other, and that influenced their estrangement from each other.

The numbers of the above mentioned language speakers in the world is as follows:

	Language	Number of speakers
1	Chinese dialects	1,136 billion
2	Spanish dialects	322-400 million
3	English	309-400 million
4	Arabic dialects	186-422 million
5	Russian	164-170 million
6	Turkic languages	180-185 million

Source: Wikipedia

If Turkic peoples created a common literary language and practice in it the Turkic community, this language in accordance with its potential could be rated as regional one.

But at present due to the absence of the sole standardized language Turkic peoples are divided beyond the bounds of national level to the incidences of the other regional languages – Russian, English, Farsi, and Chinese, etc. For official intercourse, for example between Turkic countries of CIS Russian is used, between Turkey and Turkic countries of CIS English language is used, a Turk from Iran and a Turk from Afghanistan will probably use Farsi to communicate with each other, etc.

Here is approximate number of Turkic-speakers settled in regions with certain language domination within region or above national level (particularly in inter-Turkic communication):

	Dominating language	Region	Number of Turkic Population	Share in total Turkic Population
1	English	Turkey	≈ 75 million	≈ 41%
2	Russian	CIS	≈ 66 million	≈ 36%
3	Farsi	Iran and Afghanistan	≈ 23 million	≈ 12,5%
4	Chinese	China	≈ 15 million	≈ 8,2%

Source: Wikipedia

Many smaller Turkic peoples, especially in Russia, are under the process of physical and linguistic assimilation. Even such large Turkic nations as Kazakhs, Tatars and Kyrgyz face a big problem with the knowledge of native language by its people. The situation is worsened with that Russian, Chinese and

¹ Dickens Mark. *Soviet language policy in Central Asia*. <http://www.oxuscom.com/lang-policy.htm>

Farsi languages are the languages which have large geography and number of speakers, rich cultural, scientific background and importance, international significance, official usage and government support, so it is too hard for the small Turkic languages to compete with them.

To avoid linguistic assimilation it is necessary to increase the importance of the Turkic languages by creating and practicing a common-Turkic language close to all Turkic languages and widening cooperation between Turkic nations in language and cultural spheres, including approximation of Turkic languages to each other.

Practicing the common-Turkic language is not only the issue of Turkic nationalism, because not only the Turkic world but humanity as a whole would benefit from its adoption. The main part of rural population in Turkic countries does not know any of regional languages and does not have means to learn them, and implementation of a regional language close to spoken one in a region will lead to educational and cultural improvement, will ease communication problems not only within a certain region, but between region and the outer world, will be a step to globalization via regionalization.

Importance of a language is determined by which opportunities it gives. Nowadays a Turkic-speaker needs to study other regional languages to get a better education and information. Creation of a common language would enable storage of information sources of not one but all Turkic nations; would let to the better management of this language, which in addition would be native to all Turkic-speakers.

Proximity of Turkic languages creates huge opportunities for Turkic nations, which benefits are getting lost with time. Creating and practicing a common-Turkic literary language would give to Turkic peoples the following advantages:

- 1) Enlargement of opportunities for inter-Turkic intercourse.
- 2) Keeping and utilizing the information sources of all Turkic peoples.
- 3) Increase in importance of every Turkic language.
- 4) This language in contrast to other regional languages would be native to Turkic peoples.
- 5) Studying of this language would be much easier than studying other regional languages.
- 6) Resource-saving would be achieved both in communication and information sharing and on account of small expenditure required for studying this language.

It is very crucial to create a common-Turkic language for the tasks like intercourse, study, and information storage, because the worth of this issue is that every Turkic community will realize its unused potential and achieve the above-mentioned advantages or it will continue to lose most of its potential provided by the kinship of Turkic languages.

Turkic literary languages are above-dialect standardized languages created on the basis of standard of a chosen district in appropriate Turkic regions where dialects differing from each other exist. Taking into account the proximity of Turkic languages that allows considering them as dialects, it is very realistic to create a standardized Turkic language that would serve as above-dialect language for the whole Turkic community.

For that it is necessary to determine the basis of which standard it is expedient to create the above-dialect Turkic language, so that it could be acceptable for the whole Turkic-speaking community.

Practicing the standardized literary common-Turkic language will depend on the following factors:

1. Subjective interest, i.e. the will of Turkic peoples to instill as a lingua franca the very common-Turkic language.
2. Neutrality of the language.
3. Maximal perfection and richness of the language, its ability to become a language of government, science, technique etc.
4. Taking into account the language peculiarities of all Turkic languages.

Implementation of the language in Turkic community will depend mostly on objective factors not depending on the will of those who will form this language, such as the will of Turkic community to take some losses beforehand and so that this language could be widely implemented. But linguists' job will be to do their best to make this language as attractive, convenient and demanded for usage as possible.

The common-Turkic language should be created on the basis of the existing Turkic languages so as to provide proximity to all Turkic languages. This will ensure its coming-to-be the language of all Turkic nations. Thereby a very important advantage – neutrality and equality will be attained, i.e. this language will not be rejected due to psychological and political reasons. As an example we can mention the Swahili language in case of which such an advantage as neutrality contributed to its spreading in East African countries.

Inasmuch as the common-Turkic literary language will be created artificially, and at the same time on basis of Turkic languages, elements of naturalness and artificiality will be harmonized in it. This on the one hand will provide maximum perfection and richness of the language and on the other hand the language will not be taken out of nowhere, but from the really existing Turkic languages.

The most optimal way can be based on factors #2, #3, and #4 when methodically creating the averaged-Turkic language as suggested by the Uzbek scientist Bakhtiyar Karimov.

Professor Karimov is the author of the mathematic linguistics method. He is suggesting the creation of the common-Turkic language by means of computer averaging. The language suggested by professor Karimov was called ortaturk, i.e. averaged Turkic language. According to him the criterium for creation of the ortaturk language should be the availability of a word or a grammatical form used:

- 1) in the most Turkic languages
- 2) by the most Turkic persons
- 3) with the most semantic proximity
- 4) during the longest period of time

Currently professor Karimov is working on the creation of the ortaturk language at the Ortaturk Institute under the World Assembly of Turkic Peoples². Thus the main advantage of this method is the

² The international institute of language "Ana Turk" the World Assembly of Turkic People. http://dta1.org/eng/index_page1.6.htm

principle of averaging. This principle is optimal for solving the basic problem of the common-Turkic language – the lexical part.

Also the following principles when creating the averaged-Turkic language can be suggested:

1) Principle of Turkism. The priority in words selection should be given to aboriginal Turkic words, then to Arabian-Persian words (which have been traditionally used in Turkic languages), and then to European words. For example, in Uzbek such a simple word as “left” is of Persian origin – “chap” (though Uzbeks use “sol” also), so the variant “sol” will be chosen, so are simple words as “black” and “white” in Turkish – “siyah” and “beyaz”, the words “kara” and “ak” will be chosen accordingly.

Applying the purism principle is contradictory. On the one hand it enables to realize the desires of nationalists to purify the languages. On the other hand as we see in the example of the Turkish language, it went much farther from other Turkic languages because of its purification of Arabic-Farsi words. Following purism too much will also estrange Turkic languages from world languages. Because, say Arabic-Farsi words bring together Turkic languages not only with Arabic and Farsi, but also with many other world languages, including the most spread ones, for example Hindi³. In this connection, the purist principle should be used within reasonable limits, concerning predominantly with the simplest words, and secondly, when replacing words with a Turkic variant it is necessary to use the variant already implemented in Turkish. This principle should also include reestablishment of Old Turkic words.

The main sense of the Turkism principle is not purism, but restoration of some aboriginal Turkic phonemes lost in some Turkic languages. For example in Uzbek because of loss of aboriginal Turkic phonemes the words like «ün» - «sound» and «un» - «flour», the words «böl» - «divide» and «bol» - «be» became homonyms. In Turkish because of loss of velar «ñ» phoneme the words «añ» - «mind» and «an» - «moment» became homonyms. Other Turkic languages were also influenced by the local substratum that led to their distancing from aboriginal Turkic pronunciation. Elimination of such defects is in the context of the following principle, too.

2) Principle of richness. Maximal enrichment of the common-Turkic language should be carried out owing to usage of words, virtues and word-formation means available in all Turkic languages. For example in Turkish there is a separate form of future tense expressed with «acak»-«ecek», whereas in Uzbek future tense is similar to the simple present tense. In Uzbek and Kazakh there are dual verbs making meanings richer, and they do not exist in Turkish. In the common-Turkic language all forms should be used. If there are several variants of a word the aboriginal Turkic one should be chosen, if several variants are aboriginal Turkic, then they could be used simultaneously, for example, both “emas”-“yemes” and “değil”-“tügül” (“not”).

One more example: in Kazakh “ch” is changed into “sh”, and “sh” is changed into “s”. So the word “ach” (“hungry”) is changed into “ash”, the word “ash” (“food”) is changed into “as”, and the word “as” (“hang”) is also spelled as “as”. In other words, because of the absence of one phoneme (“ch”) the language has in some way become penurious. Then in selection of consonants for the common-Turkic language it is inexpedient to choose Kazakh-Nogay variant of consonants.

³ Singh Gajendra. *Turkic languages: their contribution into the development of Hindustani.* <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers7/paper681.html>

3) Principle of simplicity. In contrast to the principle of richness, the principle of simplicity stipulates abolition of unnecessary virtues and non-admission of language complication. For example in Kypchak languages in genitive case “t”-“ti”, “d”-“di”, “n”-“ni” suffices are used, whereas it could be sufficient to use only “n”-“ni” in genitive case in order not to complicate the language. Or in plural tense instead of lar, dar, tar, ler, der, ter it could be sufficient to use only lar, ler. But on the other hand this consonant harmony in Kypchak languages is convenient for pronunciation, so this suggestion on suffices is disputable.

Another example: in adopted words in Uzbek for some reason sonants are used like in original “kitab”, “talab”; also “kelib”, “ketdi”. If we use dull sounds in words kind of these it will fit the principle of simplicity, because the literal language would approximate to the spoken language, and as a result of approximation to the aboriginal Turkic pronunciation the principle of Turkism would also be realized in this case.

Turkic languages in many cases differ from each other only with the variants of consonant sounds used in certain regularity. For example: “dağ”-“tağ”-“taw” (“mountain”). For such cases as a simplified example the following variants of phonemes which can be accepted as a standard in averaged-Turkic language can be offered:

1) For the vowel sounds the vowel sounds of Oguz and Kypchak languages should be chosen, because the vowel sounds of Karluk languages have lost aboriginal Turkic characteristics.

2) For the consonant sounds the consonant sounds of Karluk languages should be chosen, because the consonant sounds of Karluk languages hold intermediate position between the Oguz and Kypchak languages: “k” and “t” in the beginning of words (instead of “g” and “d”) – similar with Kypchak languages, “y” in the beginning of words (instead of “j”) – similar with Oguz languages, “ğ” in the middle and endings of words (instead of “w”) – similar with Oguz languages, not missing of “n” in the affixes – similar with Kypchak languages.

3) Also the consonant sounds in the affixes can be used of Karluk languages due to the following reasons:

1. The consonant sounds in the affixes in Kypchak languages are in variance with the principle of simplicity. See the example given in the principle of simplicity.

2. The consonant sounds in the affixes in Oguz languages are in the variance with the principle of richness. Because of missing the “n” sound in the affixes in Oguz languages “kitabnıñ (sayfası)” and “(seniñ) kitabıñ” – “kitabın” become homonyms, “kitabnı (oku)” and “(onıñ) kitabı” – “kitabı” also become homonyms.

This is not the compulsory variant of consonants and vowel sounds to be used, actually the usage of phonemes can be very free. If words differ not only with the variant of consonant used, but are totally different, several variants can be used like it was mentioned before.

The averaged-Turkic language can be for some extend variable. In my opinion the Karluk and Kypchak languages are very close to each other, and the Oguz languages are a little bit farther. The

common-Turkic language can be implemented in two branches: Oguz – for Turkish, Azeri, Turkmens, Iran Turks, Gagauzs and Karluk-Kypchak – for other Turkic peoples. Then within these groups these variants would be very close to all.

Another advantage is that these two branches of averaged-Turkic language will be created on the principle of mutual approximation. For example, in Turkish there is no “yahshi” word, it exists in Azeri. In Azeri past tense is expressed with “ib”, while in Turkish with “ti-di” as in the Karluk-Kypchak languages. Therefore in the Oguz branch the “yahshi” word and “ti-di” for past tense will be used, i.e. the variant identical with Karluk-Kypchak will be used. In the Karluk-Kypchak branch also the variant identical with Oguz will be used. The maximal proximity between the Karluk-Kypchak and Oguz branches will provide their consideration as “k-t” (“keldi-tağ”) and “g-d” (“geldi-dağ”) dialects of the common-Turkic language.

Applying the abovementioned principles the following variants of phonemes can be offered (taking into account that it is a simplified approach):

- 1) In Karluk-Kypchak branch the following phonemes can be instilled

Vowel phonemes – of Kypchak languages – Turkism principle.

Consonant phonemes – of Karluk languages, because of the examples shown in 2nd and 3rd principles.

- 2) In the Oguz branch the “q” and “ñ” phonemes will be reestablished. So both the principles of Turkism and richness will be realized, and proximity to the Karluk-Kypchak branch will be achieved.

Big disadvantage of letting bilingual variability exist in the common-Turkic language is that instead of the sole language there will be two dialects for the Turkic world (though there are no more than 30 languages existing presently). But the advantage will be that each branch will be closer to the languages within referring groups rather than the common-Turkic language, so it will be easier to practice them.

Several widespread languages also exist in local variants like Farsi in Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan, Hindi-Urdu in India and Pakistan etc.

Actually the common-Turkic language could be created not artificially but by the free intercourse of Turkic-speakers, each of who could use his own language and thus after a while an averaged language could occur. It could be realistic because of the proximity of Turkic languages.

But nowadays because of the wide usage of regional languages like Russian it is improbable that Turkic-speakers will use their own Turkic dialects facing problems in mutual understanding. Secondly, forming averaged language by free intercourse may require many decades. Thirdly, an unofficial intercourse language can be more likely created in this way. Fourthly, inter-Turkic communication is not so intensive at present that a Koine language could be formed. Fifthly, artificial creation of an averaged-Turkic language creates one more important advantage. Each language has certain disadvantages. Creation of common-Turkic language artificially, could allow elimination of some disadvantages and to create a language as perfect as possible.

The best-known example of an artificial language is Esperanto. About 2 million⁴ people in different countries use it, there is a lot of literature in it, including original, books and magazines are published in it. Esperanto failed to become universal language as it was proposed, because it could not compete with English. Nevertheless, Esperanto is relatively widely used — despite being an artificial language and close only to European languages — because of its enthusiasts' efforts. Compared to Esperanto the common-Turkic language, which will be close to all Turkic languages has much more chances to be realized within the Turkic community.

The main disadvantage of the averaged-Turkic language is that it will sound artificial, because it will not coincide fully with any Turkic languages. But I believe that after using it for some time firstly in written and then in oral forms, because of its proximity to Turkic languages, simplicity, richness and perfection it will be convenient and acceptable for usage within the Turkic community.

For example for Tashkent inhabitants the literary Uzbek language used on TV and radio also sounds very artificial, because it differs very much from the Tashkent dialect, but Tashkent inhabitants accept it as a standardized variant, taken as for official usage.

In Indonesia the Bahasa Indonesia language was accepted as a governmental language which had been created on the basis of Malayan⁵, while Malayan people make only 3.4%⁶ of the Indonesian population and because of the proximity of Indonesian peoples' languages to Malayan language Bahasa Indonesia could be spread as the national language of Indonesia. Several other examples can be pointed out when a language gained a wide ground (further expansion) within a geography because of its acceptance as an official or national language, say – Hindi in India, Tagalog – in Philippines. Thus the success of spreading of a language in many respects depends on giving it a status, if not legal, then moral.

The common-Turkic language could become a part of ideology of the Turkic peoples. In the 20th century the national project of the Jewish people – Israel was realized. Restoration and implementation of the Hebrew language played an important role in this process. It has to be emphasized that the Hebrew language was literally restored from the status of a dead language. This example is a good argument for skeptics of the common-Turkic language.

In the beginning the common-Turkic language can be learned and used by enthusiasts whose number may make about several thousand people. Primarily it is supposed to use the language for internet-communication and creation of internet resources including Wikipedia in the common-Turkic language.

Further propagation of the language will depend firstly on its ability to face communication and information challenges and secondly on necessity of its implementation, which is directly connected with how much the Turkic peoples will succeed in the creation of a common cultural space.

⁴ Esperanto. Wikipedia. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esperanto>

⁵ Indonesian language. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_language

⁶ Demographics of Indonesia. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Indonesia

Minimum Program

As in Arab countries, where literal Arabic is used in inter-Arabic formal and informal intercourse and partly at formal national level, the common-Turkic language can be also used in inter-Turkic formal and informal intercourse, while Turkic languages will remain at national levels. So, special attention should be paid to the approximation of Turkic languages to each other and to the common-Turkic language.

Independently of how successful the common-Turkic language project will turn out, in order to utilize advantages and potential of Turkic languages kinship, Turkic peoples should follow the minimum program as follows:

1) Transition of all Turkic peoples to a uniform (or maximum possible close) script. Only the Latin script can be a uniform script for Turkic peoples due to the next reasons:

1. Two other script variants – Cyrillic and Arabic are the scripts used in countries where Turkic peoples are under the greatest threat of assimilation – Russia, Iran, and Afghanistan. The Latin script could be the facility of overcoming this factor.

2. The Latin script is the most spread in the world and it is the means of maximum access to the global information system.

3. The Latin script is the means of connection of Turkic languages with the Turkish language which is the most advanced and possessing the richest information sources among Turkic languages.

2) Putting in order coordination in development of Turkic languages, which should provide maximum identity of implemented terms, up to abolition of the earlier inculcated terms and transition to common ones.

Each Turkic language is a key to other Turkic languages. I mean if one learns for example the Tatar language it will only take him another 2-3 months to learn Kazakh etc.

History provided Turkic peoples with relatively close languages. It is the duty of Turkic peoples to deepen this great chance. The closer the Turkic languages to each other are:

1. The more it enables utilization of information resources and literature available in one Turkic language by other Turkic peoples.

2. The more importance each of Turkic languages separately has.

The important thing is that none of the languages stands still; all languages are in the process of development. Turkic languages are also permanently moving in some direction and it is necessary to give the desirable direction to this process, i.e. coordinately promote their motion towards each other.

The averaged-Turkic language could be the standard for mutual approximation of Turkic languages.

3) Inculcation into Turkic languages of words and word-formation means available in other Turkic languages.

It is desirable to follow the principle of Turkism, i.e. implementing new terms of Turkic origin, restoration of old Turkic words etc. in the development and coordination of Turkic languages.

One of the main disadvantages of Turkic languages is their relatively less developed vocabulary, word-formation means and partly expression means. So the words available in one Turkic language need to be implemented in another Turkic language too in order to enrich them. Enrichment of Turkic languages will increase their seductiveness, ability to be used in high spheres; enrichment of them owing to each other will also mutually approximate them.

ХАЙДАРОВ, Миразим

Реализация языкового потенциала тюркских народов

Аннотация: Тюркские народы принадлежат к числу этнических групп, расселенных на огромных пространствах и исчисляющихся сотнями миллионов человек. В то же время в отличие от этнических групп, обладающих общими литературными языками, тюркские народы в настоящее время не имеют общего литературного языка. Наличие общего языка давало бы тюркским народам ряд преимуществ, которые сейчас имеются у этнических групп, обладающих общими языками. Тюркские народы в прошлом имели ряд языков, служивших наддиалектными для ряда тюркских народов. Тюркские языки считаются взаимопонимаемыми и стоят намного ближе друг к другу, чем языки многих этнических групп, обладающих общими языками. В этой связи вполне реально создание языка, служащего общим литературным языком для всего тюркского сообщества. Перспективы его внедрения на практике зависят от ряда факторов, таких как удобство, нейтральность и способность быть использованным в высших сферах. Предлагается ряд принципов его создания, позволяющих обеспечить его максимальное совершенство. Распространение данного языка будет во многом зависеть от того, насколько тюркские народы будут заинтересованы и успешны в создании общего культурного и информационного пространства. Независимо от успешности внедрения общетюркского языка тюркские народы должны следовать программе-минимум, в целях реализации имеющегося языкового потенциала.

Ключевые слова: этнические группы, тюркские народы, преимущества общего литературного языка, принципы создания общетюркского языка, программа минимум.

Современный глобализирующийся мир характеризуется, во-первых, все возрастающим объемом международных связей и международной взаимозависимости, во-вторых, резким увеличением значимости информации и обмена ею в этих связях. Это, в свою очередь, актуализирует проблему средств коммуникации, в том числе, лингвистическую проблему.

Следствием потребности в средстве международного общения стало распространение английского языка в глобальном масштабе. Английский язык уже сложился как язык международного общения, и, по мере роста вышеуказанных тенденций, проникает все дальше в различные сферы. Если к примеру, до второй мировой войны французский язык занимал прочное место в сфере международной дипломатии, а немецкий – в научно-технической сфере, то сейчас английский язык господствует и в этих сферах.

Помимо английского языка, который уже сложился в качестве глобального языка, имеются также языки региональные, обслуживающие множество стран или многомиллионное население,

такие как китайский, хинди-урду, испанский, арабский, французский, бахаса индонезия-малайский, немецкий, фарси и др..

В мире есть ряд этнических групп, расселение которых на огромном пространстве значительно расширило количество носителей их языков, обеспечив становление этих языков в качестве региональных. Рассмотрим некоторые из этих групп.

Русские и англоязычные народы расселились преимущественно в малозаселенных областях, очень мало смешиваясь с автохтонным населением, поэтому между различными группами русских и между англоязычными народами нет большой разницы в языках и культуре. В отличие от них, арабы, испанцы, китайцы расселились на территориях, заселенных до них.

Арабские народы сложились в результате наслоения арабских племен на различные, преимущественно семитские народности, и в настоящее время диалекты арабских народов по сути представляют собой отдельные языки, значительно отличающиеся друг от друга (в том числе из-за влияния местных субстратов). Классический арабский язык, на котором был написан Коран, на протяжении веков служил единым литературным языком для арабских народов. И в настоящее время наличие этого языка позволяет арабам различных стран общаться между собой, иметь общеарабскую литературу, общее информационное, образовательное и медиапространство и т.д.

Испаноязычные народы Латинской Америки сложились в результате смешения испанцев с различными индейскими народностями (а также африканцами и представителями других европейских народов) в различных пропорциях. Испаноязычные народы также разговаривают на различающихся диалектах, однако и они имеют общий литературный язык.

Китайский народ фактически является группой этносов, различающихся в языковом, культурном и имеющих определенные расовые различия. Южные группы китайцев образовались путем смешения китайцев с различными местными народностями. Диалекты локальных групп китайцев настолько различаются, что считаются взаимонепонимаемыми. Ситуация облегчается тем, что слова, звучащие разное на различных диалектах, на письме обозначаются одинаковыми иероглифами, и по мнению ученых, если бы не общая графика, Китай давно распался бы на несколько государств.

Наличие общего нормированного языка создает перед близкими этническими группами огромные преимущества. Литературные языки вышеуказанных групп народов являются языками ООН.

Тюркские народы расселены на огромном пространстве от Северного Ледовитого и Тихого океанов до Средиземного моря и Балкан. Все тюркские языки, кроме чувашского и якутского, считаются учеными взаимопонимаемыми. Это объясняется тем, что в прошлом тюркские народы представляли собой единый народ, затем группу географически и этнически близких народов, которые затем расселились на огромных пространствах Евразии.

До 20-века тюркские народы имели ряд наддиалектных языков, то есть литературных языков, употреблявшихся на больших пространствах с различающимися разговорными диалектами, к ним можно отнести и язык тюрки.

В 20-веке в результате создания тюркских литературных языков для каждой местности на базе местных диалектов произошло разделение тюркского мира на более чем 30 литературных языков.

Согласно британскому исследователю Марку Диккенсу, большевики могли бы создать в СССР единый литературный тюркский язык в 1920-е годы, в рамках политики слияния народов. Однако это противоречило интересам большевиков, заключавшимся в разобщении тюркского сообщества, в связи с чем, большевики проводили политику не просто создания отдельных тюркских языков, но и усугубления различий между ними¹.

Тюркские народы, языки которых возможно ближе между собой чем языки локальных групп вышеуказанных народов, в настоящее время в отличие от них не имеют общего литературного языка.

Негативной тенденцией является то, что развитие тюркских языков пошло и продолжает идти независимым друг от друга путем, что в определенной степени повлияло на отдаление тюркских языков друг от друга.

Численность говорящих на вышеуказанных языках в мире составляет:

	Язык	Количество говорящих
1	Диалекты китайского	1 136 миллионов
2	Диалекты испанского	322-400 миллионов
3	Английский	309-400 миллионов
4	Диалекты арабского	186-422 миллионов
5	Русский	164-170 миллионов
6	Тюркские языки	180-185 миллионов

Источник: Википедия

Если бы тюркские народы, создали общий литературный язык и внедрили его для использования в тюркском сообществе, то этот язык по своему потенциалу можно было бы отнести к числу региональных.

В настоящее же время, в связи с отсутствием единого стандартизированного языка, тюркские народы разделены за рамками внутригосударственной сферы на сферы действия других региональных языков – русского, английского, фарси, китайского и т.д. Для официального взаимного общения, к примеру, между тюркскими странами СНГ используется русский, между Турцией и тюркскими странами СНГ – английский, тюрк из Ирана и тюрк из Афганистана скорее всего будут использовать фарси для общения между собой и т.д..

Приблизительная численность тюркоговорящих, расселенных в регионах с доминирования определенного языка внутри региона или за пределами государственного уровня (включая меjtюркское общение) такова:

¹ Dickens Mark. *Soviet language policy in Central Asia*. <http://www.oxuscom.com/lang-policy.htm>

	Язык доминирования	Регион	Количество тюркского населения	Доля в общем тюркском населении
1	Английский	Турция	≈ 75 миллионов	≈ 41%
2	Русский	СНГ	≈ 66 миллионов	≈ 36%
3	Фарси	Иран и Афганистан	≈ 23 миллионов	≈ 12,5%
4	Китайский	Китай	≈ 15 миллионов	≈ 8,2%

Источник: Википедия

Многие малочисленные тюркские народы, особенно в России, находятся сейчас в процессе физической и языковой ассимиляции. Даже у таких крупных тюркских народов, как казахи, татары, киргизы, проблема знания родного языка стоит достаточно остро. Ситуация усложняется тем, что русский, китайский и персидский языки являются языками, имеющими широкую географию и количество говорящих, богатое культурное и научное прошлое и важность, международную значимость, официальное употребление и государственную поддержку, и малым тюркским языкам слишком сложно выдерживать конкуренцию с ними.

В целях противодействия языковой ассимиляции необходимо повышать значимость тюркских языков путем создания и внедрения общетюркского языка, который был бы близок ко всем тюркским языкам и расширения сотрудничества между тюркскими народами в языковой и культурной сферах, включая сближение тюркских языков друг с другом.

Внедрение общетюркского языка является не только вопросом тюркского национализма, потому что не только тюркский мир, но все человечество получит выгоду от его принятия. Основная часть сельского населения в тюркских странах не владеет ни одним из региональных языков, и не имеет возможностей к их изучению, и внедрение регионального языка, близкого к разговорному языку в регионе, способствует образовательному и культурному прогрессу, упростит коммуникационную проблему не только внутри региона, но и между регионом и внешним миром, явится шагом к глобализации через регионализацию.

Значимость языка во многом определяется тем, какие возможности он открывает. В настоящее время для того, чтобы получить хорошее образование и информацию, представителям тюркских народов нужно учить др. региональные языки. Создание общего языка, позволявшего бы хранить информацию не одного, а всех тюркских народов, позволило бы в большей степени обходиться этим языком, являвшимся бы к тому же родным для всех тюрков.

Близость тюркских языков создает перед тюркскими народами огромные возможности, которые не просто не используются, но с течением времени теряются. Создание и внедрение общетюркского литературного языка, дало бы тюркским народам следующие преимущества:

- 1) Расширение возможности межтюркского общения.
- 2) Хранение и пользование информацией всех тюркских народов.
- 3) Рост значимости каждого тюркского языка.

4) Этот язык в отличие от других региональных языков являлся бы родным для тюрков.

5) Изучение этого языка было бы намного более легким, чем изучение других региональных языков.

6) Достижение экономии ресурсов, как вследствие решения коммуникационной и информационной проблем, так и вследствие относительно малой затратности изучения данного языка.

Создание для целей взаимного общения, обучения, и хранения информации общетюркского языка является жизненно важным, потому что ценой вопроса является то, что либо тюркское сообщество реализует свой неиспользованный потенциал и добьется вышеуказанных преимуществ, либо будет продолжать терять большую часть своего потенциала, обусловленного близостью тюркских языков.

Тюркские литературные языки являются наддиалектными стандартизированными языками, созданными на базе стандарта определенного района, в соответствующих тюркских регионах, где существуют различающиеся друг от друга диалекты. Учитывая взаимную близость тюркских языков, позволяющую считать их диалектами, вполне реально создание стандартизированного тюркского языка, выполняющего функцию наддиалектного языка для всего тюркского сообщества.

Для этого необходимо определить, на основании каких стандартов целесообразно создать наддиалектный тюркский язык, для того, чтобы он был приемлем для всего тюркоязычного сообщества.

Внедрение на практике стандартизированного литературного общетюркского языка зависит от следующих факторов:

1. Субъективная заинтересованность, т.е. воля тюркских народов внедрить в качестве лингва франка именно общетюркский язык.

2. Нейтральность данного языка.

3. Максимальное совершенство и богатство данного языка, его способность стать языком государства, науки, техники и т.д.

4. Учет в языке особенностей всех тюркских языков.

Внедрение данного языка в тюркском сообществе будет зависеть главным образом от факторов, не зависящих от воли тех, кто будет его создавать, например желания тюркского сообщества нести определенные издержки до, и в целях широкого внедрения данного языка. Но задачей лингвистов будет сделать все возможное, чтобы сделать это язык как можно более привлекательным и удобным для использования.

Общетюркский язык необходимо создать, взяв за основу существующие тюркские языки, с тем, чтобы он был максимально близок ко всем тюркским языкам. Это обеспечит становление языка как языка всех тюркских народов. Этим самым достигается очень важный плюс – нейтральность и равноправие, т.е. этот язык не будет отвергаться из-за психологических и политических причин.

Это преимущество – нейтральность – к примеру, в свое время (да и сейчас) послужило широкому распространению языка суахили в странах Восточной Африки.

Поскольку общетюркский литературный язык будет создаваться искусственно, и в то же время на базе тюркских языков, в нем будут сочетаться элементы естественности и искусственности. Это с одной стороны обеспечит максимальное совершенство и богатство языка, с другой стороны он будет взят не с пустого места, а с реально существующих тюркских языков.

Наиболее оптимальным с точки зрения факторов 2, 3, 4 является методика по созданию усредненного тюркского языка, предложенная узбекским ученым Бахтияром Каримовым.

Профессор Каримов является разработчиком метода математической лингвистики. Он предлагает создание общетюркского языка путем компьютерного усреднения. Язык, предлагаемый Каримовым был назван ортатюрк, т.е. усредненный тюркский язык.

Профессор Каримов предлагает использовать в качестве критериев при создании “ортатюрк” наличие слова или грамматической формы:

- 1) в большинстве тюркских языков.
- 2) у большинства тюркоязычных личностей.
- 3) с наибольшей семантической близостью
- 4) в течение наибольшего промежутка времени

В настоящее время профессор Каримов ведет работу над созданием языка ортатюрк в Институте ортатюрк при Всемирной Ассамблее Тюркских Народов².

Таким образом, основным преимуществом данной методики является принцип усреднения. Этот принцип оптимален для решения основной проблемы для общетюркского языка – лексической части.

Можно предложить для рассмотрения и другие принципы создания общетюркского языка:

4) Тюркскость. Приоритет при подборе слов должен отдаваться сначала тюркским словам, затем – арабско-персидским (которые традиционно применялись в тюркских языках), затем – европейско-русским. Например, в узбекском языке такое простое слово как «левый» - персидского происхождения – “chap” (хотя узбеки используют “sol” тоже), таким образом, будет выбран вариант “sol”, такого же рода слова «черный» и «белый» в турецком языке – “siyah” и “beyaz”, соответственно будут выбраны слова “kara” и “ak”.

Применение пуризма имеет двойственный характер. С одной стороны, он позволяет реализовать стремление националистов максимально очистить язык. С другой стороны, как мы видим на примере турецкого языка, он значительно отделился от других тюркских языков из-за его очищения от арабо-персидских слов. Также чрезмерное следование пуризму отдалит тюркские языки от языков мира. Потому что, скажем арабо-персидские слова, имеющиеся в

² The international institute of language “Ana Turk” the World Assembly of Turkic People. http://dta1.org/index_page1.6.htm

тюркских языках, сближают их не только с арабским и персидским языками, но и со многими другими языками мира, в том числе самыми распространенными, например хинди³.

В связи с этим, во-первых, принцип пуризма должен применяться в разумных пределах, касаясь преимущественно простейших слов, во-вторых, при замене слов на тюркский вариант, необходимо использовать вариант, уже внедренный в турецком языке.

Применение данного принципа также должно подразумевать восстановление древнетюркских слов.

Основное значение принципа тюркизма должно заключаться не в пуризме, а в восстановлении исконно тюркских фонем, утерянных в отдельных тюркских языках. Например, в узбекском языке из-за утери исконно тюркских гласных звуков слова «*ün*» - «голос» и «*un*» - «мука», слова «*böl*» - «дели» и «*bol*» - «будь» превратились в омонимы, в турецком языке из-за утери фонемы «*ñ*» («*ң*») слова «*an*» - «миг» и «*añ*» - «сознание» превратились в омонимы. Другие тюркские языки также были подвержены влиянию местных субстратов, что привело к их отдалению от исконно тюркского произношения. Устранение подобных недостатков входит в рамки и следующего принципа.

5) Принцип богатства. Максимальное обогащение общетюркского языка за счет использования слов, свойств и средств словообразования, имеющихся во всех тюркских языках. Например, в турецком языке имеется отдельная форма будущего времени («*асак*», «*есек*»), тогда как в узбекском языке форма будущего времени совпадает с формой длительного настоящего времени. В узбекском, казахском и др. языках имеются двойные глаголы, обогащающие значение, которых нет в турецком. В общетюркском языке должны использоваться все формы. Если имеется несколько вариантов одного слова, предпочтительно выбрать исконно тюркский вариант, если несколько вариантов являются исконно тюркскими можно использовать их параллельно. Например, могут параллельно использоваться и «*emas*»-«*yemes*» и «*değil*»-«*tügül*» («не»).

Еще один пример: в казахском языке «*ch*» превращается в «*sh*», «*sh*» - в «*s*». То есть слово «*ach*» («голодный») произносится как «*ash*», «*ash*» («пища») произносится как «*as*», «*as*» («вешай») также произносится как «*as*». То есть из-за отсутствия одной фонемы («*ch*») происходит некоторое обеднение языка. Значит при выборе согласных звуков для общетюркского языка, нецелесообразен выбор казахско-ногайского варианта согласных звуков.

6) Принцип простоты. В отличие от принципа богатства принцип простоты предусматривает отмену лишних свойств, недопущение усложнения языка. Например: в кыпчакских языках в родительном падеже употребляются аффиксы “*ti*”-“*ti*”, “*di*”-“*di*”, “*ni*”-“*ni*”, вместо этого использовать только – *ni*, –*ni*, для того, чтобы не усложнять язык. Вместо форм множественного числа –*lar*, –*dar*, –*tar*, –*ler*, –*der*, –*ter* использовать только –*lar*, –*ler*. Но с другой стороны эта гармония согласных в кыпчакских языках удобна для произношения, поэтому это предложение спорно.

Другой пример: в узбекском языке заимствованные слова используется как в оригинале – «*kitob*», «*talab*», в словах “*kelib*”, “*ketdi*” и т.д. почему-то используется звонкий звук. Если

³ Singh Gajendra. *Turkic languages: their contribution into the development of Hindustani.* <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers7/paper681.html>

использовать вместо звонкого глухой звук, это будет соответствовать принципу простоты, потому что письменный язык приблизится к устному, также вследствие приближения к тюркскому произношению в данном случае будет осуществлен и принцип тюркскости.

Тюркские языки зачастую отличаются друг от друга всего лишь вариантом согласных, используемых в определенной закономерности. Например: “dağ”-“tağ”-“taw” (“гора”). Для таких случаев в качестве упрощенного примера можно предложить следующие варианты фонем, которые могли бы быть приняты как стандарт в общетюркском языке:

1) Гласные – гласные фонемы огузских и кыпчакских языков, потому что гласные фонемы карлукских языков утратили исконно тюркские свойства.

2) Согласные – согласные фонемы карлукских языков, потому что согласные фонемы карлукских языков занимают промежуточное положение между согласными фонемами огузских и кыпчакских языков: “к”, “т” в начале слова – одинаково с кыпчакскими языками, “й” в начале слова – как в огузских языках, “ғ” в середине и в конце слова (ағиз, тағ) – как в огузских языках, невыпадение «н» в аффиксах – как в кыпчакских языках.

3) Также согласные в аффиксах могут быть использованы – карлукских языков. Причина:

1. Согласные в аффиксах в кыпчакских языках противоречат принципу простоты. См. пример, приведенный в принципе простоты.

2. Согласные в аффиксах в огузских языках противоречат принципу богатства. По причине выпадения имеющегося в аффиксах в карлукских языках звука «н» в языках огузской подгруппы “китобнинг (бети)” и “(сенинг) китобинг” – “kitabın” – превратились в омоним, “китобни (ўқи)” и “(унинг) китоби” – “kitabı” – также превратились в омоним.

Это не обязательный вариант согласных и гласных, на самом деле применение фонем может быть очень вольным. Если слова различаются не только вариантом согласного, а совершенно разные, несколько вариантов слов может быть использовано, как это указывалось ранее.

Среднетюркский язык, мог бы быть в определенной степени вариабельным.

Мне кажется карлукские и кыпчакские языки очень близки друг к другу, а огузские языки немного дальше. Поэтому общетюркский язык мог бы быть внедрен в двух ответвлениях: огузском – для турков, азербайджанцев, туркмен, тюрок Ирана, гагаузов, карлукско-кыпчакском – для остальных тюркских народов. Тогда внутри данных групп эти варианты были бы близки ко всем.

Еще одним преимуществом было бы то, что эти два ответвления создавались бы по принципу взаимного сближения. Например, в турецком языке нет слова “yahshi”, оно имеется в азербайджанском. В азербайджанском для прошедшего времени используется “ib”, тогда как в турецком применяется “ti-di” как и в карлукско-кыпчакских языках. Соответственно в огузском ответвлении будет использоваться слово “yahshi” и “ti-di” для прошедшего времени, т.е. будет использоваться вариант идентичный с карлукско-кыпчакским. Максимальная близость между

огузским и карлукско-кыпчакским ответвлениями позволит рассматривать их в качестве “k-t” (“keldi-tağ”) и “g-d” (“geldi-dağ”) диалектов общетюркского языка.

Применяя вышеуказанные принципы можно в качестве примера предложить следующие варианты фонем (конечно, учитывая, что это упрощенный подход):

3) В карлукско-кыпчакском ответвлении могут быть внедрены следующие фонемы

Гласные – кыпчакских языков – принцип тюркскости.

Согласные – карлукских языков, по причине примеров, показанных в принципах 2 и 3.

4) В огузском ответвлении будут восстановлены фонемы “q” и “ñ”. В этом случае будут реализованы и принцип тюркскости и принцип богатства, и будет достигнуто сближение с карлукско-кыпчакским ответвлением.

Большим недостатком допущения билингвизма в общетюркском языке станет наличие двух диалектов вместо единого языка (хотя это и не более 30 языков, существующих сейчас). Но преимуществом будет то, что каждое ответвление будет ближе ко всем языкам внутри соответствующих групп, чем общетюркский язык, что облегчит их внедрение на практике.

Ряд распространенных языков также существует в локальных вариантах, таких как персидский в Иране, Афганистане и Таджикистане, хинди-урду в Индии и Пакистане и т.д..

Общетюркский язык мог бы формироваться не искусственно, а путем вольного общения тюркоговорящих, каждый из которых использовал бы свой язык, и таким образом через некоторое время возник бы усредненный язык. Это могло быть реализуемым, учитывая близость тюркских языков.

Но в настоящее время из-за широкого использования региональных языков, как, например, русского, маловероятно, что тюркоговорящие будут использовать свои тюркские языки, сталкиваясь с проблемами взаимонепонимания.

Во-вторых, формирование усредненного языка путем вольного общения может потребовать десятки лет.

В-третьих, таким путем может быть создан скорее язык неформального общения.

В четвертых, межтюркское общение в настоящее время не столь интенсивно, чтобы могло сформироваться койне.

В-пятых, искусственное создание среднетюркского языка создает одно важное преимущество. В каждом языке имеются определенные недостатки. Создание общетюркского языка, позволит, устранив определенные недостатки, создать по возможности совершенный язык.

Наиболее известным примером искусственного языка является эсперанто. Около 2 миллионов⁴ людей в различных странах используют этот язык, на нем существует значительное количество литературы, включая оригинальную, печатаются книги и журналы. Эсперанто не смог стать мировым языком, потому что не мог конкурировать с английским языком. Тем не менее,

⁴ Esperanto. Wikipedia. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Esperanto>

эсперанто используется довольно широко для искусственного языка, главным образом из-за усилий энтузиастов, несмотря на то, что он близок только к европейским языкам. Если сравнивать с эсперанто, общетюркский язык, который будет близок ко всем тюркским языкам, имеет больше возможностей быть реализованным в тюркоязычном сообществе.

Основным недостатком среднетюркского языка станет то, что он будет звучать искусственно, потому что он не будет полностью совпадать ни с одним из тюркских языков. Но, думаю, после его употребления в течение некоторого времени сначала в письменной, затем в устной формах, благодаря своей близости к тюркским языкам, простоте, богатству и совершенству он станет удобным и приемлемым к использованию в тюркском сообществе.

К примеру, для жителей Ташкента, литературный узбекский язык, используемый на телевидении и радио, также звучит очень искусственно, поскольку он значительно отличается от ташкентского диалекта, однако ташкентцами этот язык принимается как стандартизированный вариант, принятый для официального употребления.

В Индонезии в качестве государственного языка был принят язык бахаса индонезия, который был создан на базе малайского языка⁵, тогда как малайцы составляют лишь 3.4%⁶ населения Индонезии и благодаря близости языков народов Индонезии к малайскому, бахаса индонезия мог быть распространен в качестве национального языка Индонезии.

Можно привести ряд других примеров, когда тот или иной язык получал широкое (дальнейшее) распространение в рамках определенной географии, благодаря его принятию в качестве государственного или национального языка, скажем – хинди в Индии, английский и французский – в африканских странах и т.д.

Таким образом, успех распространения того или иного языка во многом зависит от придания ему определенного статуса, если не юридического, то морального.

Общетюркский язык мог бы стать частью идеологии тюркских народов. В 20-веке был реализован национальный проект евреев – Израиль. Важную роль в этом процессе сыграло возрождение и внедрение языка иврит. Необходимо подчеркнуть, что иврит был буквально возрожден из статуса мертвого языка. Этот пример является хорошим аргументом для скептиков общетюркского языка.

В начале общетюркский язык может изучаться и использоваться энтузиастами, чье количество может составить несколько тысяч человек. Первоначально предполагается использовать язык для интернет-общения и создания Интернет-ресурсов, включая Википедию на общетюркском языке.

Дальнейшее распространение языка будет зависеть, во-первых, от его способности отвечать коммуникационным и информационным запросам, и, во-вторых, от необходимости его внедрения, зависящей от того, в какой степени тюркские народы будут успешны в создании общего культурного пространства.

⁵ Indonesian language. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indonesian_language

⁶ Demographics of Indonesia. Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Indonesia

Программа-минимум

Также как и в арабских странах, где литературный арабский язык используется в межарабском официальном и неофициальном общении и частично на официальном государственном уровне, общетюркский язык тоже может использоваться в межтюркском официальном и неофициальном общении, в то время как тюркские языки останутся в использовании на национальном уровне. Поэтому специальное внимание должно быть уделено сближению тюркских языков между собой и с общетюркским языком.

Независимо от того, насколько успешным окажется проект по созданию и распространению общетюркского языка, в целях использования преимуществ и потенциала близости тюркских языков программой минимум для тюркских народов можно считать:

4) Переход всех тюркских народов на унифицированную (или максимально близкую) графику. Этой графикой может стать только латинская, вследствие следующих причин:

1. Два других варианта графики – кириллица и арабская является графикой стран, в которой тюрки подвержены максимальной опасности ассимиляции – России, Ирана и Афганистана. Латинская графика является средством преодоления этого фактора.

2. Латинская графика является самой распространенной в мире и средством максимального доступа к мировой информационной системе.

3. Латинская графика является средством связи тюркских языков с турецким языком, являющимся самым развитым и имеющим самые обширные источники информации среди тюркских языков.

5) Налаживание координации в сфере развития тюркских языков, при которой должна обеспечиваться максимальная идентичность вводимых терминов, вплоть до отмены ранее введенных терминов и переходу к общим словам.

Каждый тюркский язык является ключом к другим тюркским языкам. Имеется в виду, что если кто-либо выучит, например татарский язык, ему потребуется всего лишь 2-3 месяца, чтобы выучить казахский и т.д.

История снабдила тюрков относительно близкими языками. Обязанностью тюркских народов является использование этой великой возможности. Чем ближе тюркские языки друг к другу:

1. тем больше возможности использовать информационные ресурсы и литературу, имеющиеся в одном тюркском языке другими тюркскими народами.

2. тем большей значимостью обладает каждый тюркский язык в отдельности.

Важно то, что ни один язык не стоит на месте, все языки находятся в процессе развития. Тюркские языки также постоянно двигаются в каком-то направлении и необходимо этому процессу придать желаемое направление, т.е. координировано содействовать их движению в направлении друг друга.

Среднетюркский язык мог бы стать стандартом для взаимного сближения тюркских языков.

6) Внедрение в тюркских языках слов и средств словообразования, имеющих в других тюркских языках.

При развитии и координации тюркских языков желательно придерживаться принципа тюркизма, т.е. осуществлять внедрение новых терминов тюркского происхождения, восстановление древнетюркских слов и т.д.

Одним из основных недостатков тюркских языков является их относительно менее развитый запас слов, средства словообразования и частично средства выражения. Поэтому слова, имеющиеся в одном тюркском языке, должны быть внедрены в других тюркских языках для их обогащения. Обогащение тюркских языков повысит их привлекательность, способность использоваться в высших сферах; обогащение их друг за счет друга также будет их взаимно сближать.



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**БАЛТО-СЛАВЯНСКОЕ ЕДИНСТВО: РЕАЛЬНОСТЬ ИЛИ
ФИКЦИЯ?**

Аннотация

Применение критерия “хи-квадрат” позволяет объективно измерить расстояние между языками по звуковой картине. Было измерено фоно-типологическое расстояние между балтийскими и славянскими языками. Фоно-типологическое расстояние между литовским и латышским намного больше, чем между литовским и древнерусским. Литовский язык по его звуковой картине более похож на современный русский (6,07), чем на латышский.

В свою очередь, латышский язык по звучанию еще больше похож на древнерусский язык (2,47), чем литовский. Латышский язык также ближе по его звучанию к современному русскому (3,65), чем литовский.

Близость балтийских языков по их звуковой картине к славянским языкам можно объяснить как былой балто-славянской общностью, так и интенсивными языковыми контактами.

В статье предлагается метод исследования, который решит давний спор, является ли балто-славянское единство реальностью или же это фикция. Этот метод основан на измерении типологической близости языков. Он применяет некоторые критерии фонологической статистики, используемые в языкознании. Фоно-метрические, т.е. типологические характеристики звуковых цепочек языка проявляются через их частотные величины в звуковом потоке любого языка, поэтому они могут быть измерены [Тамбовцев 2010].

Целью данной работы является установление фоно-типологических расстояний между славянскими и балтийскими языками, чтобы установить их единство. Можно применять различные критерии математической лингвистики. Нами был выбран критерий «хи-квадрат» как один из самых простых, но достаточно мощных. Так, по величине критерия “хи-квадрат” мы установили схожесть между балтийскими языками (латышским и литовским) с одной стороны, а также древнерусским, русским и некоторыми другими славянскими языками, с другой стороны.

Многие лингвисты и этнографы [С.Б. Берштейн, С. В. Бромлей, В.Н. Топоров и другие] отмечают, что в прошлом существовал длительный и тесный контакт славян с древними балтами, что дает основание предположить существование общего балто-славянского праязыка [Бромлей, 1985; БСЭ, 1976: 552 – 553; Топоров, 1966: 455]. Исследователи балтийских (литовского и

латышского) языков также отмечают их близость к славянским языкам. К. Ульвидас, В. Амбразас, В. Вайткавичюте, А. Валяцкене, К. Моркунас, А. Сабаляускас и другие отмечают, что фонетическая, морфологическая, лексическая и синтаксическая структура литовского языка больше всего похожа на структуру славянских языков. Это может происходить от того, что балтийские и славянские языки имели общий балто-славянский праязык, как результат бывшего балто-славянского единства [Амбразас и др., 1966: 500–501]. Целью нашей работы является проверка балто-славянского единства на фонологическом уровне.

Было протранскрибировано большое количество текстов. Далее, на компьютере была вычислена схожесть этих лингвистических объектов с помощью методов математической статистики и распознавания образов. Анализируется типология строения звуковых цепочек в языках и их диалектах в качестве образа [Тамбовцев 1994а; Тамбовцев 1994: б]. На основании доминантных фонетических признаков звуковых картин построены фоно-типологические расстояния между лингвистическими объектами. Сравняются между собой только звуковые картины лингвистических объектов, хотя в дальнейшем эти же методы можно применить как на лексическом, так и синтаксическом уровне. Под обобщенным термином «лингвистический объект» подразумевается язык или диалект. Мы вводим понятие «лингвистический объект» именно потому, что часто разделить диалект и язык невозможно. Эдельман Д.И. отмечает, что формальные признаки отделения диалекта от языка не выработаны [Эдельман 1980].

Для построения расстояний используются значения критерия «хи-квадрат». На его базе вычисляется коэффициент ТМВ (Тамбовцева), детальное описание вычисления которого дается ниже. Самым главным для наших исследований является то, что коэффициент ТМВ служит показателем расстояния между лингвистическими объектами [Тамбовцев 2010б]. В научной литературе по классификации языков, взятые нами лингвистические объекты зарегистрированы по-разному: то как отдельные языки, то как диалекты какого-либо языка. С учетом порогового значения коэффициента ТМВ эти лингвистические объекты классифицируются на диалекты и отдельные языки уже по новому, т.е. на основании величины показателей типологических расстояний по фонетическим признакам. Лексические, синтаксические и семантические характеристики в данном случае не учитываются. Таким образом, построенная нами модель языка является чисто фонетической.

Заметим, что один язык может выступать как один лингвистический объект, если мы берем его в литературном варианте. Язык может выступать и как несколько лингвистических объектов, т.е. как класс объектов, если мы берем несколько его диалектов. Класс объектов может называться таксоном или образом. Следовательно, диалект – это единичный объект, а язык может быть классом объектов, т.е. образом или таксоном, если он имеет целый набор диалектов.

Введение

Языкознание в настоящее время находится на таком этапе развития, когда без применения точных количественных методов исследования продвижение вперед невозможно. Числовые характеристики хорошо отражают лингвистические закономерности [Tambovtsev, 2006]. На компьютере нами были обработаны большие массивы текстов, что позволило получить надежные

статистические результаты в численном виде по звуковым картинам различных языков. На основе применения методов математической лингвистики получена возможность решения лингвистической задачи как близости различных языков, так и их диалектов, которая не могла быть решена в старых рамках классического языкознания.

Язык и диалект в данном случае трактуются как фонетические объекты. Таким образом, язык (как и любой другой объект) можно интерпретировать в терминах распознавания образов, где объекты понимаются как отдельные представители образов в пространстве признаков [Загоруйко 1972: 7]. В связи с тем, что выбранные нами фонетические признаки имеют количественное выражение, мы можем сказать, что к изучению языков в данном случае применена самая сильная, т.е. абсолютная шкала. Точная нумерическая информация позволяет измерять точные расстояния как между отдельными объектами, так и между таксонами [Загоруйко 1999: 61]. Под таксонами мы будем понимать подгруппы, группы, семьи или общности (супер-семьи) языков. В то же время, таксоном может считаться один язык, если он имеет несколько диалектов. В том случае, когда мы имеем какой-либо лингвистический объект (т.е. язык или диалект), который мы должны поместить в какой-либо лингвистический таксон (т.е. подгруппу, группу, семью и т.д.), мы можем это сделать на основе типологического расстояния, измеренного по выбранным признакам. По величине расстояния между лингвистическими объектами можно определить величину функции принадлежности объекта к образу [Загоруйко 1999: 167-169]. Если расстояние от лингвистического объекта до некоторого образа (таксона) меньше, чем до других образов, то можно считать, что объект принадлежит к данному образу. Велико или невелико расстояние можно судить по величине коэффициента TMB [Tambovtsev 2006; 2007]. Вычислить этот коэффициент достаточно просто [Тамбовцев 2003].

В данной работе осуществлен типологический подход, в основе которого лежит выделение каких-либо признаков систем лингвистических объектов и их дальнейшая группировка с помощью обобщенной модели на основе этих выделенных признаков. Таким образом, лингвистический объект уже представлен не целостно, а в виде некоторого количества признаков, которые имеют нумерические значения. Этот подход обычно применяется в распознавании образов, но мы также используем его и в языкознании, где он дает интересные лингвистические результаты [Tambovtsev 2009b]. Мы можем назвать этот подход численно-типологическим. Следует отметить, что применение типологического подхода на основе определенных выбранных признаков, но без нумерического значения признаков, осуществлялось в языкознании и ранее. Наиболее последовательным представителем типологического подхода в языкознании является В.Д. Аракин. Таким образом, типологический подход позволяет сопоставлять не только генетически родственные языки (например, русский, украинский и белорусский), но и достаточно далекие языки, например, русский и английский [Аракин 2000: 5-8]. Концепция типологического подхода в языкознании позволяет сравнивать любые языки мира с разными структурами не только на фонетическом, но и на других уровнях языка. В то же время важность сопоставления различных языков в типологическом плане на фонетическом уровне подчеркивается в современном языкознании, например, [Tambovtsev, 2007, 2008, 2009]. Метод фундаментального типологического сопоставления позволил В.Д. Аракину сравнивать между собой такие разные

языки как славянские, германские, тюркские, малайско-полинезийские и другие языки с разным генетическим происхождением и разных систем и структур [Аракин, 2000].

Еще раз отметим, что в общем виде, язык можно определять как лингвистический объект. При определении степени самостоятельности лингвистических объектов, т.е. языков и их диалектов, мы используем фоностатистический критерий близости звуковых картин. Этот же фонотипологический метод может быть использован при измерении близости звуковых картин любых других протранскрибированных текстов [Tambovtsev 2009]. Под звуковой картиной языка мы подразумеваем совокупность звуковых цепочек анализируемых языковых объектов. Исследование проводилось на материале самодийских, финно-угорских, монгольских, индо-европейских и тюркских языков. С целью сопоставления привлекались данные, полученные нами ранее при изучении языков некоторых других семей.

Проблемой, насколько один язык отличается от другого, интересовались еще в древности. Уже тогда на арену истории вышли различные народы с различными языками. Проблему языка и диалекта поставили еще древнегреческие философы, которые пытались решить ее в общем, т.е. как проблему целого и частного. Известно, что частное включает в себе характеристики целого. Действительно, можно ли диалект считать частью определенного языка или же этот языковой объект следует считать самостоятельным языком? Иными словами, служат ли отличия, которые характеризуют диалект, подтверждением общих тенденций функционирования языка и его диалекта? В связи с тем, что любой язык достаточно вариативен, это является трудной задачей. Диалект от языка может отделять зона неопределенности, которая будет тем шире, чем больше их схожесть. Являются ли близкородственные языки действительно разными языками или же это диалекты, которые называют отдельными языками? Это касается, например, таких близкородственных языков как русский, белорусский и украинский или немецкий и голландский.

Материал исследования.

Материалом исследования послужили тексты на различных славянских и балтийских языках, которые были представлены в фонетической транскрипции. Детальное описание материала по всем языкам, которые были взяты для фонологических и статистических исследований приведено в монографиях Ю.А. Тамбовцева [Тамбовцев, 2001а; 2001б; 2001в].

По латышскому языку были использованы фоно-статистические данные З.М. Байкова, которые мы пересчитали по 9 фонетическим признакам. Мы сравниваем их в деталях с аналогичными фоностатистическими данными Е.Ш. Пиель, А. Лоренц, З. Несауле, З.М. В. А. Кузиной и Т.А. Якубайтис [Тамбовцев, 2001а: 65-66].

Литовский язык представляют пересчитанные по 9 фонетическим признакам данные А. Гирденеса [Girdenis, 1981]. Мы сравниваем их в деталях с результатами фоностатистического подсчета Б.И. Свецевичуса [Тамбовцев, 2001: 67-69].

В качестве материала по древнерусскому языку послужили некоторые тексты из Христоматии по истории русского литературного языка [М.:Высшая школа, 1974, которую составил для студентов университетов и педагогических институтов А.Н. Кожин. Памятники древнерусской

письменности 10-13 веков включали следующие тексты: 1) Русская правда; 2) Повесть временных лет; 3) Киевская летопись; и 4) Поучение Владимира Мономаха. Эти древнерусские тексты сравнивались по частоте встречаемости в их звуковых цепочках выделенных фонетических признаков.

Сколько и каких языков конкретно было привлечено для исследования в данной работе и их объемы в фонемах показано ниже. Кроме того, Таб.1 показывает частоту встречаемости 9 групп фонем в потоке речи на этих языках. Выборки фонем по лингвистическим объектам в данном исследовании имеют следующий объем:

Балтийские языки: латышский (ЛТШ) — 25410; литовский (ЛИТ) — 100000.

Славянские языки:

Восточно-славянские: древнерусский (ДРС) — 68234; русский (РУС) — 20189475; белорусский (БЛР) — 37487; украинский (УКР) — 300000;

Западно-славянские: польский (ПОЛ) — 104603; чешский (ЧЕШ) — 186641; словацкий (СЛО) — 20000; сербско-лужицкий (ЛУЖ) — 93110.

Южно-славянские: болгарский (БОЛ) — 18240; сербско-хорватский (СРБ) — 45486; македонский (МАК) — 62795; словенский (СЛН) — 108363.

Методика исследования

Расстояние между лингвистическими объектами измеряется при помощи величины коэффициента ТМВ, вычисленного на основе критерия хи-квадрат. Известно, что критерий «хи-квадрат» используется в статистических исследованиях для сравнения распределений объектов двух совокупностей на основе измерений в числовом виде признаков в двух независимых выборках. Данный статистический критерий широко известен. В рамках данной статьи невозможно, да и нет необходимости вдаваться в тонкости математических подсчетов с помощью критерия «хи-квадрат». Его описание можно найти в любых учебниках по математической статистике или математической лингвистике [напр. Пиотровский и др., 1977]. Кроме того, они даются в компьютерных приложениях в виде таких программ, как «Статистика», «Математика», «XL» и другие. Критерий хи-квадрат применялся нами ранее для определения типологической близости языков различных семей [Тамбовцев, 2003].

Важность применения критерия хи-квадрат для лингвистических исследований заключается в том, что он позволяет исключить субъективизм суждений путем точного сопоставления любых лингвистических объектов, у которых признаки выражены в числовых величинах. Например, сравнение числовых значений признаков звуковых картин венгерского, хантыйского и мансийского языков подтвердило правомерность классификации венгерского языка в качестве члена угорской группы финно-угорской семьи. В то же время, оно не позволило отнести его к подгруппе обско-угорских языков, куда традиционно относятся хантыйский и мансийский язык. Наш метод позволил выделить его в отдельную, венгерскую, подгруппу, которая до сих пор еще не выделялась внутри угорской группы [Tambovtsev 2009: 123].

При трактовке полученных данных следует учитывать наличие обратной зависимости между близостью языков и фонетическими расстояниями между ними: схожесть языков тем больше, чем меньше расстояния, и наоборот [Tambovtsev, 2008]. Таким образом, величина «хи-квадрат» показывает несхожесть языков и диалектов. Мы воспользовались методом сравнения двух выборок, которые могут иметь разный объем [Тамбовцев, 2003].

В качестве основополагающего критерия мы предложили ввести понятие «лингвистическая компактность» [Тамбовцев, 2002]. Его сущность заключается в том, что два типологически близких друг другу лингвистических объекта образуют один лингвистический таксон, если они близки друг другу. Это покажет типологическое расстояние [Tambovtsev 2006]. Чем меньше расстояние, тем более похожи эти объекты. В тоже время, чем меньше сумма расстояний в каком-либо таксоне, тем более похожи лингвистические объекты в этом таксоне. Под таксоном, как мы уже указывали выше, мы имеем в виду любую группу языков, даже такую, которая состоит только из двух членов, т.е. любая пара языков или диалектов [Тамбовцев 2002: 131]. Так, можно говорить о таксоне мансийского языка, представленного сосьвинским и кондинским диалектами. Карельский язык состоит из трех диалектов, татарский язык представлен также тремя диалектами. Языки и диалекты выступают в виде лингвистических объектов и составляют финно-угорский таксон. Алтайский язык имеет пять диалектов и в совокупности с другими тюркскими языками составляет отдельный таксон. В этом же смысле можно говорить о таксоне балтийских языков или таксоне славянских языков.

Рассчитывая величину критерия «хи-квадрат», мы должны выбрать уровень статистической значимости и количество степеней свободы. Уровень статистической значимости и количество степеней свободы может быть разным. В данном случае, такая мера сходства как «хи-квадрат» может чаще употребляться в лингвистических исследованиях, если мы облегчим для классического лингвиста понимание процедуры его расчета. Под мерой сходства мы подразумеваем величину расстояния между двумя лингвистическими объектами.

Для упрощения понимания величины расстояния нами был введен коэффициент ТМВ, который учитывает количество степеней свободы и уровень статистической значимости. Фактически, коэффициент ТМВ – это отношение эмпирически полученной величины критерия «хи-квадрат» к его теоретической к величине с учетом степеней свободы и уровня значимости. Нами выбран уровень значимости 0,05. Мы имеем 9 признаков, что дает 8 степеней свободы. Теоретическое значение «хи-квадрат» при 8 степенях свободы и уровне значимости 0,05 составляет 15,507. Если количество признаков будет другое, то даже при этом же уровне значимости, теоретическое значение критерия «хи-квадрат» будет другое.

Выбор признаков

В типологических исследованиях важно определить базовые признаки [Тамбовцев, 2003], на которых строится наше сравнение. В данном случае было выбрано 9 доминантных фонетических признаков, к которым мы относим показатели частоты встречаемости восьми групп согласных в звуковых цепочках языка: губных, переднеязычных, среднеязычных, заднеязычных, сонорных, шумных смычных, шумных щелевых, шумных звонких, – а также гласных [Тамбовцев 2001в, 2003].

Фактически данные фонетические признаки являются необходимыми и достаточными для распознавания звуковых картин различных языков. Обычно в распознавании образов признаки должны быть проверены с точки зрения их необходимости и достаточности [Загоруйко1972: 55]. Нам нет необходимости делать такую проверку в связи с тем, что мы взяли все базовые артикуляционные признаки согласных, которые выделяются в фонетике. Гласные берутся без деления на группы потому, что данные 9 признаков хорошо различают различные лингвистические объекты на фонетическом уровне. Если два языковых объекта не различаются по 9 признакам, то можно ввести дополнительные фонетические признаки. Мы согласны с Н.Г. Загоруйко, что нужно по возможности минимизировать количество признаков, так как это уменьшает размерность пространства, что, в свою очередь, уменьшает затраты усилий при распознавании объектов [Загоруйко 1972, 54-57; Загоруйко 1999: 102-108].

Под звуковой цепочкой имеется в виду последовательность звуков, т.е. слова, которые в совокупности составляют текст. В языкознании отмечается, что в диалектах звуковые цепочки похожи. Более того, они похожи и в генетически родственных языках. Метод поиска генетической близости языков основан на анализе материального сходства, т.е. сходства звуковых цепочек на уровне слов. Эти материальные сходства приводятся в любом учебнике по введению в языкознание, напр. [Баранникова 1973: 276-279] Действительно, в родственных языках слова имеют сходные звуковые цепочки: русский – «мать»; украинский – «мати»; белорусский – «маці»; болгарский – «майка»; сербский – «мати»; чешский – «матер»; польский – «мац». В то же время, в тюркских языках слово «мать» имеет уже другую звуковую цепочку: азербайджанский – «ана»; башкирский – «ана»; казахский «ана»; киргизский – «энэ»; кумандинский – «анам»; татарский – «ана»; тувинский – «ава»; туркменский – «ана»; узбекский – «она».

Таб. 1

Балтийские языки: ЛТШ – латышский; ЛИТ – литовский.

Славянские языки:

Восточно-славянские: ДРС – древнерусский; РУС – русский; БЛР – белорусский; УКР – украинский;

Западно-славянские: ПОЛ – польский; ЧЕШ – чешский; СЛО – словацкий; ЛУЖ – сербско-лужицкий.

Южно-славянские: БОЛ – болгарский; СРБ – сербско-хорватский; МАК – македонский; СЛН – словенский.

	Группы фонем	ЛТШ	ЛИТ	ДРС	РУС	БЛР	УКР	ПОЛ	ЧЕШ	СЛО	ЛУЖ
1.	Губные	10,86	13,63	13,19	12,63	14,45	13,01	16,66	13,57	12,79	14,83
2.	Переднеязычны	35,89	33,37	33,30	35,18	33,84	34,60	27,42	32,16	30,03	32,12
3.	Среднеязычны	3,07	3,59	2,96	4,27	4,63	3,91	9,31	6,20	7,21	6,47
4.	Заднеязычные	5,55	7,39	5,98	5,74	7,12	6,28	5,75	6,87	6,39	6,68
5.	Сонорные	19,48	19,28	19,44	23,07	20,70	21,42	21,10	21,39	20,25	27,12
6.	Смычные шумные	20,78	22,25	20,17	20,14	21,91	21,18	21,16	20,47	20,82	18,79
7.	Щелевые шумные	15,11	16,45	15,82	14,61	17,43	15,20	16,88	16,94	15,35	14,19
8.	Звонкие шумные	11,10	12,63	11,72	11,69	12,53	15,19	13,90	13,28	9,69	11,51
9.	Сумма гласных	44,63	42,02	44,57	42,18	39,96	42,20	40,86	41,20	43,58	39,90

	Группы фонем	БОЛ	СРБ	МАК	СЛН	
1.	Губные	12,91	11,96	11,67	12,54	
2.	Переднеязычные	30,24	31,75	36,95	35,53	
3.	Среднеязычные	1,45	5,53	0,89	4,40	
4.	Заднеязычные	6,68	5,63	6,20	6,28	
5.	Сонорные	19,54	25,06	18,68	24,04	
6.	Смычные шумные	14,96	20,37	24,12	21,08	
7.	Щелевые шумные	16,78	9,44	12,91	13,63	
8.	Звонкие шумные	12,51	9,89	13,27	13,72	
9.	Сумма гласных	48,72	45,13	44,29	41,25	

В соответствии с целью данной работы мы пытаемся установить близость между языками на фонетическом уровне. Именно поэтому так важно получить надежные данные по частоте встречаемости различных групп фонем в звуковой цепочке языка. Расчет фоно-типологических расстояний по величине критерия “хи-квадрат” между балтийскими языками (латышским и литовским) с одной стороны, а также древнерусским, русским и некоторыми другими славянскими языками, с другой стороны, фактически покажут эту близость. Более того, эти расстояния исключают субъективизм исследователя. Они показывают, насколько звуковая картина одного языка объективно похожа на звуковую картину другого. Под звуковой картиной

языка мы имеем в виду сумму звуковых цепочек языка, которая отражает общую частоту групп фонем в потоке речи. Таким образом, данная работа выполнена в плане лингвистической фонологометрии, или лингвометрии, т.е. науки об измерении межъязыковых расстояний на основе звуковой картины языка [Тамбовцев, 2002].

Применяется объективный типологический метод, который использует информацию о структуре частоты встречаемости фонологических единиц. Известно, что язык имеет две стороны: фонетическое содержание, т.е. материальную оболочку, и семантическое содержание. Мы базируем наше исследование на материальной стороне языка, которая существует в языке вне нас и независимо от нас. В связи с этим, фонетическое содержание хорошо поддается изучению статистическими методами. Это дает нам основание полагать, что мы получаем объективные данные потому, что эти данные могут быть получены любым другим независимым экспертом, кто возьмет данные языки и применит данный статистический метод и выделенные фонетические признаки. Взятые нами фонетические признаки присущи всем языкам мира, поэтому они хорошо показывают место латышского и литовского языка среди других языков древней балтославянской общности. Эти фонетические признаки можно назвать универсальными.

Следует обратить внимание на проблему соизмеримости, которая требует единообразного описания лингвистических единиц. В нашей работе это достигается тем, что мы берем классификацию, т.е. разбиение на группы, с точки зрения работы артикуляционного аппарата человека. Кроме того, получаемые статистические данные должны быть соизмеримы, что достигается определенным способом нормирования через вычисление процентов частоты встречаемости фонетических элементов во всей цепочке языка. Прежде, чем привлекать методы математической лингвистики, например, критерий “хи-квадрат”, можно показать, даже простые данные по частоте встречаемости фонем в звуковых цепочках разных языков, могут дать важную лингвистическую информацию. Конечно, перед тем как сравнивать эти частоты необходимо их пронормировать, чтобы получить соизмеримость. В данном случае – это переводение частоты встречаемости в проценты.

В качестве таких признаков использовалась частота встречаемости групп согласных, которые выделены по работе активного органа артикуляции, характера артикуляционной преграды и работе голосовых связок. Таким образом, сравнение было полным и системным с фонетической точки зрения.

Перед тем, как сравнивать схожесть языков по критерию “хи-квадрат”, приведем упорядоченные ряды пронормированных частот наших 9 признаков по взятым языкам. Эти упорядоченные ряды дают важную лингвистическую информацию потому, что они показывают соседние языки, в которых схожая концентрация определенных фонемных групп в звуковой цепочке. В то же время, следует указать, что шкала порядка дает не такое точное представление о схожести языка, как абсолютная шкала. Именно поэтому мы далее применяем анализ по самой сильной шкале – абсолютной шкале.

Упорядоченный ряд по возрастанию концентрации **губных** согласных в балтийских и славянских языках: 1) латышский – 10,86%; 2) македонский – 11,67%; 3) сербско-хорватский – 11,96%; 4) словенский – 12,54%; 5) русский – 12,63%; 6) словацкий – 12,79%; 7) болгарский – 12,91%;

8) украинский – 13,01%; 9) древнерусский – 13,19%; 10) чешский – 13,57%; 11) литовский – 13,63%; 12) белорусский – 14,45%; 13) сербо-лужицкий – 14,83%; 14) польский – 16,66%.

Данный упорядоченный ряд (шкала порядка) показывает, что по употреблению губных согласных латышский язык больше похож на македонский, а литовский – на чешский и белорусский. Польский выходит из ряда вон, так как концентрация губных у него наивысшая.

Упорядоченный ряд (шкала порядка) по возрастанию концентрации **переднеязычных** согласных в балтийских и славянских языках: 1) польский – 27,42%; 2) словацкий – 30,03%; 3) болгарский – 30,24%; 4) сербско-хорватский – 31,75%; 5) сербо-лужицкий – 32,12%; 6) чешский – 32,16%; 7) древнерусский – 33,30%; 8) литовский – 33,37%; 9) белорусский – 33,84%; 10) украинский – 34,60%; 11) русский – 35,18%; 12) словенский – 35,53%; 13) латышский – 35,89%; 14) македонский – 36,95%.

Данный упорядоченный ряд показывает, что по употреблению переднеязычных согласных латышский язык больше похож на словенский, а литовский – на древнерусский. Македонский выходит из ряда вон, так как концентрация переднеязычных у него наивысшая. Опять польский язык выходит из ряда вон, но уже с наименьшей концентрацией переднеязычных в потоке речи.

Упорядоченный ряд (шкала порядка) по возрастанию концентрации **среднеязычных** согласных в балтийских и славянских языках: 1) македонский – 0,89%; 2) болгарский – 1,45%; 3) древнерусский – 2,96%; 4) латышский – 3,07%; 5) литовский – 3,59%; 6) украинский – 3,91%; 7) русский – 4,27%; 8) словенский – 4,40%; 9) белорусский – 4,63%; 10) сербско-хорватский – 5,53%; 11) чешский – 6,20%; 12) сербо-лужицкий – 6,47%; 13) словацкий – 7,21%; 14) польский – 9,31%.

Данный упорядоченный ряд показывает, что по употреблению среднеязычных согласных латышский язык больше похож на древнерусский, а литовский – на латышский. Македонский выходит из ряда вон, так как концентрация среднеязычных у него наименьшая. Опять польский язык выходит из ряда вон, но уже с наибольшей концентрацией среднеязычных в потоке речи.

Упорядоченный ряд (шкала порядка) по возрастанию концентрации **заднеязычных** согласных в балтийских и славянских языках: 1) латышский – 5,55%; 2) сербско-хорватский – 5,63%; 3) русский – 5,74%; 4) польский – 5,75%; 5) древнерусский – 5,98%; 6) македонский – 6,20%; 7) словенский – 6,28%; 8) украинский – 6,28%; 9) словацкий – 6,39%; 10) сербо-лужицкий – 6,68%; 11) болгарский – 6,68%; 12) чешский – 6,87%; 13) белорусский – 7,12%; 14) литовский – 7,39%.

Данный упорядоченный ряд показывает, что по употреблению заднеязычных согласных латышский язык больше похож на сербско-хорватский, а литовский – на белорусский. Латышский стоит на краю ряда, так как концентрация заднеязычных у него наименьшая. На противоположной стороне ряда оказался литовский язык с наибольшей концентрацией заднеязычных в потоке речи.

Упорядоченный ряд (шкала порядка) по возрастанию концентрации **сонорных** согласных в балтийских и славянских языках: 1) македонский – 18,68%; 2) литовский – 19,28%; 3) древнерусский – 19,44%; 4) латышский – 19,48%; 5) болгарский – 19,54%; 6) словацкий – 20,25%; 7) белорусский – 20,70%; 8) польский – 21,10%; 9) чешский – 21,39%; 10) украинский – 21,42%; 11) русский – 23,07%; 12) словенский – 24,04%; 13) сербско-хорватский – 25,06%; 14) сербо-лужицкий – 27,12%.

Упорядоченный ряд (шкала порядка) по возрастанию концентрации **смычных** согласных в балтийских и славянских языках: 1) болгарский – 14,96%; 2) сербо-лужицкий – 18,79%; 3) русский – 20,14%; 4) древнерусский – 20,17%; 5) сербско-хорватский – 20,37%; 6) чешский – 20,47%; 7) словацкий – 20,82%; 8) латышский – 20,78%; 9) словенский – 21,08%; 10) украинский – 21,18%; 11) польский – 21,16%; 12) белорусский – 21,91%; 13) литовский – 22,25%; 14) македонский – 24,12%.

Упорядоченный ряд (шкала порядка) по возрастанию концентрации **целевых** согласных в балтийских и славянских языках: 1) сербско-хорватский – 9,44%; 2) македонский – 12,91%; 3) словенский – 13,63%; 4) сербо-лужицкий – 14,19%; 5) русский – 14,61%; 6) латышский – 15,11%; 7) украинский – 15,20%; 8) словацкий – 15,35%; 9) древнерусский – 15,82%; 10) литовский – 16,45%; 11) болгарский – 16,78%; 12) польский – 16,88%; 13) чешский – 16,94%; 14) белорусский – 17,43%.

Упорядоченный ряд (шкала порядка) по возрастанию концентрации **шумных звонких** согласных в балтийских и славянских языках: 1) словацкий – 9,69%; 2) сербско-хорватский – 9,89%; 3) латышский – 11,10%; 4) сербо-лужицкий – 11,51%; 5) русский – 11,69%; 6) древнерусский – 11,72%; 7) болгарский – 12,51%; 8) белорусский – 12,53%; 9) литовский – 12,63%; 10) македонский – 13,27%; 11) чешский – 13,28%; 12) словенский – 13,72%; 13) польский – 13,90%; 14) украинский – 15,19%.

Упорядоченный ряд (шкала порядка) по возрастанию концентрации **гласных** в балтийских и славянских языках: 1) сербо-лужицкий – 39,90%; 2) белорусский – 39,96%; 3) польский – 40,86%; 4) чешский – 41,20%; 5) словенский – 41,25%; 6) литовский – 42,02%; 7) русский – 42,18%; 8) украинский – 42,20%; 9) словацкий – 43,58%; 10) македонский – 44,29%; 11) древнерусский – 44,57%; 12) латышский – 44,63%; 13) сербско-хорватский – 45,13%; 14) болгарский – 48,72%.

Литовский язык по употреблению гласных ближе всего к русскому языку, а латышский – к древнерусскому. Наименьшая концентрация гласных в сербо-лужицком языке. Наибольший процент встречаемости гласных в болгарском языке.

Напомним, что для более точного анализа величины расстояния между языками использовался критерий “хи-квадрат”, который не только учитывает порядок языков в упорядоченном ряду, но и дает точное расстояние по каждому признаку. Свойства аддитивности этого критерия позволяет нам выводить суммарное расстояние по взятым 9 фонетическим признакам. Кроме того, нами был введен коэффициент ТМВ, который упрощает лингвистический анализ. Этот коэффициент учитывает количество степеней свободы и уровень статистической значимости, что позволяет сравнивать выборки с разным количеством признаков. Фактически, коэффициент ТМВ – это отношение эмпирически полученной величины критерия “хи-квадрат” к его теоретической к величине, в данном случае, с учетом 8 степеней свободы и уровня значимости 0,05.

Фоно-типологическое расстояние по 9 признакам между литовским и латышским языком составило 6,45. Мы должны понять, много это или мало. Как говорили древние философы, все познается в сравнении. Для этого мы должны сравнить расстояние, которое мы вычислили (6,45) с аналогичными расстояниями между другими исследованными языками.

Фоно-типологическое расстояние между литовским и латышским намного больше, чем между литовским и древнерусским. Литовский язык по его звуковой картине более похож на современный русский (6,07), чем на латышский.

В свою очередь латышский язык по звучанию еще больше похож на древнерусский язык (2,47), чем литовский. Латышский язык также ближе по его звучанию к современному русскому (3,65), чем литовский.

Были получен следующий упорядоченный ряд по расстояниям (ТМВ) между **литовским** и некоторыми славянскими языками: 1) белорусский – 1,92; 2) древнерусский – 2,84; 3) украинский – 3,64; 4) русский – 6,07; 5) чешский – 6,14; 6) латышский – 6,45; 7) словенский – 7,46; 8) словацкий – 12,99; 9) македонский – 17,11; 10) сербо-лужицкий – 18,22; 11) болгарский – 19,64; 12) польский – 24,62; 13) сербско-хорватский 25,66.

Таким образом, с учетом всех фонетических характеристик ближе всего к литовскому оказался белорусский язык. Менее всего литовский язык похож на сербско-хорватский.

Был получен следующий упорядоченный ряд по расстояниям (ТМВ) между **латышским** и некоторыми славянскими языками: 1) древнерусский – 2,47; 2) русский – 3,65; 3) литовский – 6,45; 4) украинский – 7,50; 5) словенский – 8,83; 6) белорусский – 10,68; 7) македонский – 12,34; 8) чешский – 14,38; 9) болгарский – 15,89; 10) словацкий – 16,31; 11) сербско-хорватский – 19,97; 12) сербо-лужицкий – 24,46; 13) польский – 39,66.

Прежде всего следует отметить большую схожесть латышского и древнерусского языка, что может говорить о былой балто-славянской группе в индо-европейской языковой семье. Достаточно близок к латышскому и современный русский язык. Менее всего похож по звучанию на латышский – польский язык.

Между **древнерусским** и другими языками были получены следующие расстояния по величине коэффициента ТМВ, которые составили упорядоченный ряд по возрастанию: 1) литовский – 2,84; 2) латышский – 3,65; 3) русский – 4,71; 4) украинский – 5,20; 5) белорусский – 6,42; 6) словенский – 8,60; 7) чешский – 10,29; 8) болгарский – 11,08; 9) македонский – 13,92; 10) словацкий – 14,20; 11) сербско-хорватский – 15,31; 12) сербо-лужицкий – 20,16; 13) польский – 30,54.

Из этих расстояний можно сделать вывод, что по звуковым картинам к древнерусскому ближе всего литовский и латышский, но не русский, украинский или белорусский. Меньше всего на звуковую картину древнерусского языка похожи звуковые картины сербо-лужицкого, греческого и сербско-хорватского языков. Близость литовского языка к белорусскому можно объяснить не только былым балто-славянским единством, но и интенсивными контактами между ними в составе единого литовско-белорусского государства.

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TAMBOVTSEV, Yuri & TAMBOVTSEVA, Juliana & TAMBOVTSEVA, Ludmila:
The Balto-Slavonic Unity: Reality or Fiction?

There were and still are some heated discussions about the reality or fiction of the Balto-Slavonic unity. The application of “Chi-square” criterion allows us to measure the distances between languages objectively. The phono-typological distance between Baltic and Slavonic languages was measured. The phono-typological distance between Lithuanian and Latvian languages is much greater than between Lithuanian and Old Russian. The sound picture of Lithuanian is more similar to modern Russian (6,07) than to Latvian. In its turn, Latvian's sound picture is more similar to Old Russian (2,47) than Lithuanian. Latvian is more similar to modern Russian (3,65) than Lithuanian by its sound picture. The closeness of Baltic and Slavonic languages may be explained by the former language unity and by intensive language contacts.

Key words: typology, closeness of languages, sound picture, phono-typological picture, “Chi-square” criterion.



POLITICS

QUINLAN, Paul D.

**Moldova's Slow, Tortuous Transition to Democracy
as Seen from the Bottom Up**

Moldova is a poor, territorially fragmented, small country, only slightly larger than Belgium. But because of Moldova's geopolitically significant location on a historical fault line in southeastern Europe (the "keys to the Balkans," according to Russian General Alexander Lebed), along with the eastward expansion of the EU and NATO into Russia's self-proclaimed "privileged" zone, the "near abroad," Moldova has become part of the ongoing rivalry between East and West. The creation by the EU of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2003, designed to surround the EU with a buffer zone of friendly states with democratic governments and market economies, but minus a commitment of eventual membership in the EU, outlined the EU's future policy toward the Moldovan state. Both the Voronin government and the current pro-democratic Alliance for European Integration (AEI) coalition government declared membership in the EU their primary goal. Moldova is highly unlikely to be promised accession into the EU in the foreseeable future, however. A major reason for this has been the Moldovan government's reluctance to live up to or adopt basic EU requirements necessary for a functioning democratic government, especially under the former Voronin regime. Nevertheless, Moldova is high on the EU's and Washington's list of former republics of the Soviet Union to make a successful transition to democracy, partly because of the progress Moldova already made in establishing functioning democratic institutions in the 1990s. In January 1999, President Clinton described Moldova "as a model" of democracy in Eastern Europe. Yet only a little over two years later, in the parliamentary elections of February 2001, viewed as free and fair by international observers, the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) increased its total vote by more than 20% from what it had won in the previous parliamentary elections giving them a commanding 51% of the votes and subsequent domination of Parliament. With the victory of the PCRM and its leader, Vladimir Voronin, who subsequently became president of Moldova, further progress toward democracy largely came to a halt as a more authoritarian state was more to the liking of the Communists. In order to better understand Moldova's stagnant democratic transition, this study will attempt to gauge the attitude and relevance of democracy and democratic government to Moldovans by using a bottom-up approach through the study of Moldovan public opinion polls.

Studies using public opinion polls have been done for Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union and Communist states of Eastern Europe, especially those by Richard Rose and his associates, who have the great advantage of conducting their own polls. Unfortunately, Rose did not include Moldova in his opinion polls. Nevertheless, numerous public opinion polls have been conducted of Moldovan politics, economy, and other aspects of Moldovan life, and these polls will provide the groundwork for this study. Since a number of other former republics of the Soviet Union are facing similar problems as Moldova, to better understand Moldova's situation comparisons with Ukraine, also experiencing a rocky transition to democracy, should prove helpful.

The overriding concern of Moldovans since the country gained independence twenty years ago is the dismal state of its agrarian-centered, energy-deficient economy. For over the past decade, Moldova bore the ignominious distinction of being the most impoverished country in Europe, only recently surpassed by Kosovo. And the Moldovan economy for much of this period actually witnessed a significant economic upturn. This virtually endless economic tragedy has caused well over half a million mostly young Moldovans to go abroad to seek jobs. Not surprisingly, the economy has been the predominant concern of most Moldovans as aptly reflected in public opinion polls.

Mainly because of the bleak economy, Moldovans have largely responded in the negative to the question: Is Moldova moving in the right or wrong direction? In the latest Institute for Public Policy's Barometer of Public Opinion (BPO) poll of November 2011, 85.3% of Moldovans said the wrong direction, while only 10.7% said the right direction.¹ Based on annual BPO polls going back to 2000, the average number of Moldovans who saw their country moving in the wrong direction was 58%, while those who responded in the right direction the average number was only 27%.²

In the November 2011 BPO poll, Moldovans were asked what worries them the most. Respondents said poverty, 54.6%, prices, 67.5%, unemployment, 46.9%, and their children's future, 39%; and this was not just due to the current recession.³ BPO polls taken since 2000 show that the above four categories have been by far the main concern of most Moldovans since 2000 by a sizable margin.⁴ In the same November 2011 BPO poll, 70.5% of Moldovans responded that they were not satisfied with Moldova's economic situation, while only 5.1% said they were.⁵ In another opinion poll, conducted on behalf of the International Republican Institute (IRI) by Baltic Surveys/Gallup Organization, in February-March 2010, Moldovan respondents listed unemployment, 35%, as the main problem they saw their country facing, while low income, economic development, and political crisis followed with 19% each.⁶ Like Moldova, Ukraine public opinion polls also show economic issues tops the list of the country's chief problems. In a 2010 opinion poll, conducted by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Ukrainians were asked what are the most serious problems facing the country; 74.7% answered high prices/inflation, followed by 56% unemployment, and 51.3% poverty.⁷

According to the IRI February-March 2010 poll, when asked the main problems facing you and your household, 64% of Moldovans said financial problems/low income.⁸ In the November 2011 BPO poll, Moldovans were asked to evaluate their family income. To the question is your family income just enough for essentials, 41.1% of respondents said yes, while 33.9% said no. Only 17.1% of Moldovans said their family income was enough for a decent life, but not enough to buy anything expensive, and 6.7% of Moldovans said their family income was enough to afford some expensive items after cutting spending in other areas.⁹ Of course, the above Moldovan BPO family income figures partly reflect the ongoing world recession, which saw Moldova's real GDP plummet from 7.8% in 2008 to -6.5% in 2009. It should be noted, however, that the average BPO family income figures for the period beginning with the Voronin government's eight years in office (February 2001- July 2009) followed by the AEI government's over two and a half years in office vary little from the 2011 BPO family income figures shown above.¹⁰

Yet, in spite of the dismal economy, the economy, in part, explains the continued popularity of former two term president and Communist party boss Voronin, until recently the country's most popular political figure, according to opinion polls. When Voronin was first elected president in April 2001 by the Moldovan parliament, Moldova had just ended its first decade of independence that was largely

dominated by the plunging economy, leaving Moldova the poorest country in Europe. Along with Moldova's disruptive attempt to make the transition from a socialist command economy to a market system, in the 1990s Moldova's fledgling democracy was confronted with a brief but bloody civil war over Transnistria, ethnic problems that threatened to further split the state, splintering political parties, incessant infighting among elites resulting in political deadlock, and even the country's existence as an independent state. Thanks partly to the economic recovery in Russia and the economic reforms put in place by the non-Communist government in Moldova in the late 1990s, the Alliance for Democracy and Reform (ADR), Moldova's economy finally began to rebound, with the new Voronin government getting the credit.¹¹ From a dismal real GNP of -3.4% in 1999 and 2.1% in 2000, in 2001, with the new Voronin government in power, real GDP jumped to 6.1% and only fell below 6.1% twice until 2009 when real GNP plummeted to -6.5% due to the worldwide recession. Reflecting the economic turnaround, in the August 2000 BPO poll only 5% of the respondents said the country was moving in the right direction, but in March 2002 under Voronin this figure had jumped to 39%. Likewise, respondents who said the country was moving in the wrong direction dropped from 82% in the August 2000 BPO poll to 46% in November 2002.¹² A similar upswing in public opinion was also reflected in BPO polls evaluating family income, when a whopping 53% of the population in 2000 said their family income did not cover essentials.¹³

The EU and the US, on the other hand, have had mixed feelings of Voronin, in part because of his reluctance as president to further substantial democratization and backsliding, especially in areas that threatened his tight hold on power. Three areas in particular that the EU had tried repeatedly, but largely unsuccessfully, to pressure Voronin into implementing reforms were depoliticizing the judiciary, clamping down on systemic corruption, and loosening government control over the mass media. Moldovans have been highly critical of their judicial system characterized by a widespread corruption and political influence. During the Voronin presidency, Moldovans rated the judiciary as one of the least trusted public institutions according to BPO polls, usually ranked in the bottom half in polls rating trust in leading public institutions. In the last BPO poll of the Voronin era, in July 2009, the judiciary placed third from the bottom with a public trust score of 27.1%, only ahead of trade unions with a rating of 22.9% and political parties with 21.5%.¹⁴ Since coming to power, the AEI has made an independent judiciary one of its top priorities and has been making substantial progress in reforming the system, but noticeable overall change in its daily functioning, at least when it comes to public trust, has not been reflected in opinion polls. In the latest BPO poll of November 2011, the judiciary had slipped to a rating of 18.3% in public trust, its lowest rating of this century.¹⁵ When the November 2011 public trust figures are broken down according to BPO categories of gender, residence, age, nationality, education, income/socio-economic level, there were no sizable deviation from the above low rating among the different categories of respondents.¹⁶ But opinion polls also show that Moldovans do not see judicial reform as a top priority for the government, being far outweighed by economic concerns.

Unlike the judiciary, the mass media consistently ranks high in Moldovan public opinion polls. During the Voronin years the media generally ranked as the second most trusted public institution in Moldova, surpassed only by the church. At the same time, the EU, Washington, NGOs, and other organizations sharply criticized the Voronin government for seriously violating media freedom. According to Freedom House, media freedom steadily declined under Voronin. In the Freedom House 2009 Report on Press Freedom in the World, Moldova ranked 148 out of 195 countries surveyed and 19th among former East

European Communist countries and former Soviet republics, behind Ukraine and Georgia, but ahead of Russia.¹⁷ The 2009 Reporters without Borders (RWB) Press Freedom Index ranked Moldova 8th among former Soviet states behind Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia Tajikistan, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.¹⁸ Although the 2005 RWB Press Freedom Index ranked Moldova 74th among countries of the world, by 2009, the year Voronin and the Communists left office, Moldova had dropped to 114 out of 175 countries surveyed.¹⁹ Even though freedom of the media is guaranteed in Moldova by the constitution, domestic legislation, and international treaties, Voronin and the Communists were able to restrict media freedom by controlling Moldova's two broadcasting regulatory bodies, the Broadcasting Coordination Council (BCC) and the Supervisory Board (SB) of Teleradio Moldova. According to Freedom House the Communists treated Teleradio Moldova "as a part of its press service."²⁰ Consequently, biased coverage favoring the Communists became the norm for the public broadcaster Teleradio Moldova, along with a number of other broadcasters, especially during parliamentary election campaigns. At the same time, media that did not speak highly of the Communists periodically endured harassment, "heavy political and financial pressure," verbal and occasionally physical abuse, restricted coverage of broadcasts, and even "arbitrary license annulments and distribution of licenses according to political loyalty."²¹

The AEI, however, made a freer media another one of its top priorities. The AEI, with the advice and coaching of the EU and NGO's, has made substantial progress in bringing Moldova into conformity with international journalistic standards. These included a shakeup of Teleradio Moldova and its Supervisory Board and the passage of a Law on Freedom of Expression.²² In the 2010 RWB Press Freedom Index, Moldova rose to a world ranking of 75 from its bleak 2009 ranking of 114, and in the 2011-2012 RWB index improved to a world ranking of 53. Moldova's 2011 Freedom House independent media score also improved to 5.50 from 5.75 in 2010. The Independent Journalism Center in Moldova reported that the broadcast media in the fall 2010 parliamentary election was "more objective than in previous campaigns."²³

Unfortunately, the relevance of a freer media to Moldovans is far less clear. For example, trust in the mass media increased from 51.3% in the July 2009 BPO poll to 61.5% in the November 2009 poll, the first BPO poll conducted under the new AEI government. Yet, a year later in November 2010 trust in the media had slipped back to 56.8%, which exactly equals the numerical average for public trust in the media compiled by BPO polls for the entire Voronin era despite a less biased media.²⁴ A year later, in the November 2011 BPO poll, media trust was still only 57.3%.²⁵ Equally revealing, BPO polls consistently show that the most trusted and popular source of information for Moldovans is television, far in front of the radio, newspapers, and the fast growing number of internet users.²⁶ During both Voronin's second term in office and the current AEI governance, Moldova 1 and Prime TV have remained by far Moldova's two most popular television channels for BPO respondents for whom television is a major source of information. Both channels previously favored the Communists, especially Moldova 1, when Voronin was at the helm, but since have adopted a less biased view due to the changing political times.²⁷ Based partly on the above, there seems little to indicate a sustained public appreciation of increased media freedom by Moldovan, so far. Of course, with the Communists out of office since the July 2009 parliamentary election, they have not been able to utilize the mass media to their advantage. No doubt, this partly accounted for their slip in overall support from 45 to 40 percent of the total vote in the November 2010 elections. Yet, as RWB summed up the situation, "Relations between the media and the

authorities in Moldova have improved since the departure of President Voronin and his family in 2009. But the authorities still try to keep the press under control. They have not used force, but they offer tempting posts to journalists who have long been independent.”²⁸

One area where the EU and the Moldovan people are in full agreement is combating corruption. Unfortunately, in fighting corruption both the Voronin and the present governments have been sadly remiss. In spite of a number of measures taken by the AEI working with the EU to combat Moldova's systemic corruption, little noticeable success in reducing corruption has been achieved so far. A recent report by Transparency International-Moldova concluded that “the legislation on the prevention and combating of corruption...is largely nonfunctional” because of the lack of an “efficient mechanism” for its implementation and accountability among office holders responsible for the implementation.²⁹ In response to the question what are you most concerned about at present Moldovans ranked corruption generally fifth out of thirteen categories in BPO polls compiled since March 2002.³⁰ Moldovans see reducing corruption as vital in improving the socio-economic situation of their country. A more detailed breakdown of BPO polls by categories back to Voronin's first term in office showed that the most consistent advocates of fighting corruption are those in the highest educational, income, and socio-economic brackets and people living in urban areas as opposed to rural dwellers.³¹ With the coming to power of the AEI, BPO polls showed that Moldovans' concern over corruption declined from 26.6% in July 2009 to 20.5% in May 2010, perhaps in the expectation that the new government would make a substantial difference in combatting corruption, but in the following November 2010 BPO poll the figure rose to 26.9% again.³² The 2010 Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for Moldova also revealed a similar U-shaped curve: from a ranking of 109 out of 180 world countries in 2008, to a ranking of 89 in 2009, and then back up to 105 in 2010. In 2011 Moldova did even worse with a Corruption Index of 112, which placed Moldova in the red zone, one group above the most corrupt countries in the world.³³ In the 2011 BPO poll 43.3% of those surveyed responded that the corruption level has remained the same under the AEI, 33.7% felt that it had increased and only 8.7% decreased.³⁴

Like Moldova, Ukrainians also see corruption as “one of the most serious problems facing Ukraine”. According to USAID, from June 1999 to September 2010, 89-96% of Ukrainians saw corruption as being very or somewhat common.³⁵ Both Moldovans and Ukrainians remain dissatisfied with their governments' efforts to address the corruption issue. Ukrainians also gave the judiciary a poor rating. In a poll taken in April 2011 by the Ukrainian Razumkov Centre (RC) 57.1% of Ukrainians said they did not trust the judicial system. Ukrainians have given the judiciary poor grades in RC polls back to 2005.³⁶ The media in Ukraine, as in Moldova, scored well in public trust. According to a 2010 poll by USAID, the media received a rating of 54.2% in public trust while other select institutions failed to reach 50%.³⁷

In addition to depoliticizing the judiciary, reforming the media, and clamping down on widespread corruption, the EU has also made mandatory reforms in the areas of regional government, law enforcement, and correcting various human rights abuses in order for Moldova to fulfill the basic EU requirements for a functioning democratic state.³⁸ Regional government reforms consistently rank at the bottom of BPO polls of necessary measures to improve the countries socio-economic situation taken from 2002 to November 2011.³⁹ Just the opposite is law enforcement. The two categories fighting crime in the economy and improving the tools for law enforcement scored at or close to the top in BPO polls of necessary measures to improve the country's socio-economic situation from 2002 to November 2011.⁴⁰ The

police scored poorly though in BPO polls of trusted institutions, while the army consistently ranked third or forth in the same BPO polls, being outscored only by the church, the mass media, and during much of the Voronin presidency, by the president himself, respectively.⁴¹ The human rights abuses that the EU requires to be amended include ill-treatment and torture by the police, gender equality, freedom of religion, human trafficking, and minority rights and discrimination. Moldovan politicians have been especially sensation to backlash by supporting legislation combating discrimination against Roma, Gays, and persons with HIV/AIDS.

A BPO poll of November 2009 asking Moldovans to compare life in Moldova today with life in the former Soviet Union provides further insight into the mindset of Moldovans. Moldovans rated the Soviet Union better in comparison with Moldova today in the following categories: living standards 56.9%, dwelling conditions 51.1%, employment 68%, corruption level 50%, educational system 52.1%, health care 55%, pensions 50.8%, general order 55.4%, food 53.2%, and relationship among people 50%. Human rights enforcement, though closer, still saw the USSR getting 36.5%, while Moldova received 23.9%. Surprisingly, this included almost all categories of respondents, including those with a higher education, in the highest income bracket, and those between the ages of 18 and 29, the latter often thought of as being more liberal and open to new ideas, although it must be kept in mind that a sizable number of young people in this age bracket has been forced to leave the country for work. The only exceptions to the above were under human rights enforcement those between the ages of 18 and 29, those in the highest income bracket, and those living in municipalities who ranked Moldova better today than the Soviet Union, and under food, young Moldovans and those in the highest income bracket also ranked Moldova better. On the other hand, Moldova outscored the Soviet Union in the following categories: freedom of speech 44.6%, freedom of religion 46.5%, public access to information 42.1%, and freedom of movement 37.3%.⁴²

To the question do you regret the disintegration of the USSR, 48.6% of Moldovans answered in the affirmative while 32.4% negatively in the above November 2011 BPO poll. Asked why they regretted the disintegration of the Soviet Union, by far the two most popular responses were life was easier/better and there were jobs. In the same poll, 40.3% of Moldovans favored the reestablishment of the Soviet Union and former socialist system with 32.2% opposed, and 43.7% of Moldovans favored the return of Moldova to a totally or partly restored USSR with 29.9% opposed.⁴³ Young Moldovans, those living in municipalities, and those with the highest education and in the highest income bracket answered in the negative to both questions. In the November 2011 BPO poll to the question what political system is the best for Moldova the Soviet system came out on top with 35.2% while the present Russian governmental system received 19.4%. Western democracy came in second to the Soviet system with 31.1%, but the current Moldovan system only received 13.1%.⁴⁴ Taking into account such factors as nostalgia, the current economic recession in Moldova, along with Moldova's plethora of troubles for the last twenty years, the above is a sad, but probably not surprising, commentary on Moldova's transition to democracy.

In response to the question of trust in political personalities Vladimir Putin and Dimitrii Medvedev beat out the competition by a sizable margin in various Moldovan polls. For example, in the November 2009 BPO poll, Vladimir Putin received a score of 73.3% and Dmitry Medvedev 71.9%, while Vladimir Voronin received a 39.3% and Marian Lupu, Speaker of the Parliament under the Communists who changed his political allegiance to the AEI, scored the highest among Moldovan politicians with 50.6%.⁴⁵ A BPO poll of May 2010 showed approximately the same results with Putin getting 69.7% and Medvedev

67.4%.⁴⁶ In both of the above polls Moldovans between the age of 18 and 29 also overwhelmingly favored Putin and Medvedev.⁴⁷ In short, in a speech in June 2011, Mihai Ghimpu, the leader of the Liberal Party, succinctly summarized Moldova's underlying dilemma: "It's not possible to replace the Soviet foundation with a European one overnight."⁴⁸

In spite of the daunting challenge, the AEI government has held fast to its goal of a democratic Moldova in line with EU requirements, made all the more difficult by being a coalition of three rival political parties, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, and the Liberal Party. Strongly backing the AEI with extensive financial aid, advice, and the promise of greater integration, the EU sees Moldova as its best chance to establish a democratic foothold in Eastern Europe that was part of the former Soviet Union. In addition, financial aid has been pouring into Moldova from international institutions and donors, the United States government, and, of course, remittances from Moldovans living abroad, the latter alone accounting for 30 percent of Moldova's gross domestic product according to the World Bank.⁴⁹ Due largely to the unprecedented financial support coming from abroad, Moldova's economy is rapidly rebounding from the current world recession. In 2001, when the Moldovan economy began to recover from the recession of the late 1990s, in part due to the market economic reforms of the governing Alliance for Democracy and Reforms, the Communists took the credit. This time the credit has gone to the AEI.

In the parliamentary elections of November 2010, the AEI not only retained its control of parliament but increased its number of seats in parliament from 53 to 59. Yet it still fell short of the 61 seats in parliament necessary to elect the next president. Thanks to the Liberal Democratic Party, whose seats in Parliament almost doubled in the November 2010 parliamentary elections, jumping from 18 seats in the July 2009 elections to 32 seats in November 2010, the AEI was able to offset the inability of the plummeting popularity of former coalition member Our Moldovan Alliance to clear the 5% parliamentary hurdle. These AEI electoral gains came at the expense of the Communists who slipped from 48 seats in the July 2009 parliamentary elections to 42 seats in the November 2010 elections, but still remained the largest single party in the country.

It was more of the same in the Moldovan local elections in June 2011. In the local elections for district and municipal councils the number of seat won by the Communists dropped from 41.44% in the June 2007 elections to 38.75% in the June 2011 elections, for city and village councils the number of Communists dropped from 39.73% in 2007 to 32.37% in the 2011 elections, and for mayors the number of Communists dropped from 37.35% in June 2007 to 22.61% in June 2011. The parties making up the AEI won most of the remaining seats in the local elections, including mayors. One positive outcome for the Communists was Chisinau, normally a liberal stronghold, where the Communist mayoral candidate lost by only 1% of the total vote in a run-off election with the popular up-and-coming Liberal Party incumbent Dorin Chirtoaca, the nephew of Liberal Party leader Mihai Ghimpu. In the previous 2007 race for mayor of Chisinau, the Communist candidate only managed to get 38.83% of the votes in a run-off election against Chirtoaca. The Communists also won 26 seats in the Chisinau June 2011 municipal council elections, just enough to form a majority, a significant gain over the June 2007 elections when they won only 16 seats.⁵⁰ Similar to the November 2010 parliamentary elections, in the June 2011 local elections the Liberal Democratic Party received the most votes among the AEI coalition parties. Founded in 2007 by Vlad Filat, Filat has rapidly become one of Moldova's most popular and trusted political leaders

according to public opinion polls, recently surpassing Vladimir Voronin in BOP polls. Yet, the most popular answer by respondents asked to rate trust in leading politicians is by far – nobody.

Freedom House's annual assessment of democratic development in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union for 2011 reflected the continued progress of the AEI in establishing a democratic Moldova. Although the changes in Freedom House's ratings in 2011 compared to 2010 were minimal, it was a step toward greater democratic governance and openness. For example, Moldova's performance in the area of civil society improved, receiving a rating of 3.25 in 2011 compared to a 3.50 in 2010; independent media scored a 5.50 in 2011 compared to 5.75 in 2010; electoral process improved to 4.00 in 2011 compared to 4.25 in 2010; judicial framework and independence improved to 4.50 in 2011 compared to 4.75 in 2010; and national democratic governance 5.75 in 2011 compared to 6.00 in 2010. Only two areas remained the same, corruption which scored a 6.00 in both 2011 and 2010 and local democratic governance which scored a 5.75 for both years also. Moldova's overall democracy score for 2011 was 4.96 compared to 5.14 in 2010. Comparing Freedom House's 2011 ratings with their annual ratings going back to 2002, however, show a rather different result. In all but one of the categories rated annually from 2002 to 2010 - keeping in mind that Voronin was president and the Communist controlled parliament until the July 2009 parliamentary elections - the annual Freedom House ratings, for the most part, were better or the same as the 2011 ratings. The sole exception was civil society, which scored a 3.25 in 2011, the lowest rating for civil society during the entire ten year period.⁵¹ Still, considering that the AEI has been in power for only over two-and-a-half years and that the coalition parties have different views on important issues, such as Moldova's national identity, Russia, the power structure of the coalition itself, and, until recently, who will be the Moldova's next president, the AEI has made commendable progress toward a democratic Moldova.

Moldovans' comprehension of Western democratic norms has been largely molded by the legacy of being part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union for the last two centuries. With the exception of the interwar period, in Moldova a multi-party political system only goes back to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In every BPO public opinion poll back to 2002, political parties rated as the least trusted among 13 public institutions, while trade unions consistently ranked second from the bottom, except in the November 2004 BPO poll when second place honors went to the judiciary.⁵² Moldovans have little trust in politicians. In the November 2011 BPO poll 65.2% of Moldovans viewed Moldovan elections, in general, as not free and correct.⁵³ In a poll following the June 5, 2011, local elections in Chisinau, 47.5% of the respondents saw the results as being rigged.⁵⁴ In the November 2011 BPO poll, 65.2% of Moldovans responded that the government of Moldova did not represent the will of the people, while only 21.7% answered in the affirmative, and in the May 2011 BPO poll 75% of Moldovan said there was little or nothing people could do to influence decision making on important issues by the national government.⁵⁵ Not surprising, in the November 2011 BPO poll, less than 30% of the respondents expressed an active interest in politics.⁵⁶

Like Moldovans, Ukrainians have little trust in political parties and politicians.⁵⁷ In the 2010 USAID poll, 52.1% of Ukrainians said that the results of elections did not "accurately reflect the way people voted in the election," and that 71.7% of Ukrainians disagreed with the statement that "people like you can have influence on decisions made by the government." In the same poll, only 16% of Ukrainians said they were "very interested" in politics, although 46% professed they were "somewhat interested."⁵⁸ Twenty years

after more than 90% of Ukrainians who voted chose independence instead of remaining with the Soviet Union, today many would vote for the Soviet Union. In a poll by the Razumkov Center, today 62% would vote for independence and in another poll by the Research & Branding Group only 52% would support independence.⁵⁹ Also, according to a poll taken by the Razumkov Center, 45.2% of Ukrainians said that they mainly lost as a result of Ukraine voting for independence, while only 23.2% believe that Ukraine is better off.⁶⁰ In a recent USAID poll, only 34% of Ukrainians said democracy was “preferable” to any other form of governance, while 46% answered that economic development should be “prioritized even at the expense of some democratic rights.”⁶¹ Ukrainians’ meaning of democracy, like that of Moldovans,’ is more typical of former republics of the Soviet Union than democracy as defined, especially in the West. In a survey asking Ukrainians to select five factors from a list which “best defined a country as a democracy,” respect for the “rule of law and economic guarantees” topped the list.⁶²

In spite of the recent rise in popularity of the AEI among Moldovan voters in political elections, this increase has yet to be reflected in opinion polls measuring the government’s handling of major issues. In the November 2011 BPO poll, Moldovan voters rated their satisfaction with the current political leadership in twelve key areas. The respondents gave an overwhelmingly negative rating for most of the categories, especially those dealing with the economy. The only categories in which the current leadership fared somewhat better were education, foreign policy, culture, and medical assistance, the latter probably due to the leadership’s response to the floods of the summer of 2010. In the same poll, in another question rating satisfaction with the AEI government, the category political life of the country received hands down the most negative rating.⁶³ On the other hand, in the November 2011 poll rating how Moldovans viewed the coalition government under the leadership of Prime Minister Vlad Filat, 43.8% of Moldovans gave him a rating of neither good nor bad, while 26.2% rated him good and 23.5% bad.⁶⁴ When compared to the former Communist government, 23% of the respondents rated the AEI government better, but 37% rated it worse, and 26% the same according to the May 2011 BPO poll.⁶⁵ Based on the above, opinion surveys indicate just how precarious the current popularity of the AEI really is.

Eventual membership in the EU has been a major reason why the EU has been able to play an influential role in Moldova, especially since the coming to power of the AEI. In the May 2011 PBO poll, 64% of Moldovans responded that they would vote for EU membership if a referendum were held Sunday, down slightly from the years 2007-2008 when the figures were above 70%.⁶⁶ In the November 2011 BPO poll, however, those favoring EU membership had slid to 47%, probably largely due to the current debt crisis plaguing the EU.⁶⁷ This is by far the lowest this number has been since 2003. In the same November BPO poll, when asked who they think should be Moldova’s principal strategic partner, 60.5% of Moldovans responded Russia, while only 23.2% said the EU.⁶⁸ Also, according to the November 2011 poll, 61.9% of Moldovans supported neutrality in foreign affairs, and, to no surprise, only 20.4% of Moldovan’s favored joining NATO.⁶⁹ Interestingly, from April 2003 to December 2005 the largest number of Moldovans favoring neutrality recorded by the BPO was 21%, but in the November 2007 BPO poll the number jumped up to 61.8% and has remained in this range since.⁷⁰

Like Moldovans, polls show that Ukrainians support neutrality in foreign affairs and also strongly oppose joining NATO. In a Gallup poll more than twice the number of Ukrainians saw NATO as a threat (40%) than as a potential ally (17%), a reflection of Ukraine’s ethnic make-up.⁷¹ Although roughly 50% of Ukrainians favor EU membership in polls going back to 2002 according to the Razumkov Center, in

Moldova the percentage is considerably higher, as two thirds back EU membership in BPO polls for the same ten year period.⁷²

In order to better understand the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, scholars have divided the area into three zones of democratic transition. The first zone consists of former Communist countries in the northern tier of Eastern Europe, including the three former Soviet Baltic republics, which were in the forefront of countries making the transition to democracy in the 1990s and, subsequently, became members of the EU. The second zone consists of countries in the Balkans, excluding Greece, usually classified as a Mediterranean country, where, until now, only Romania and Bulgaria have reached the stage of democratic development that allowed them to become EU members. The third zone consists of the former republics of the Soviet Union, where, minus the Baltic Republics, none of the countries have reached a transition to democracy that would allow them EU membership, including Moldova.⁷³

There are numerous theories and explanations by scholars that help to explain democratic transitions, but, to a historian, part of this slow, tortuous democratic transition, at least in the case of Moldova and probably other republics of the former Soviet Union as well, can be attributed to the weighty baggage of the Russian/Soviet legacy that has helped to mold these peoples' mindsets. Undoubtedly, this inheritance, helps to account for the difficulty to change Moldovans' ingrained thinking about democracy and politics in general. Until Moldovans' ideas about democracy and politics begin to change, the future of democracy in Moldova will probably remain highly precarious.

Notes

1. Institute for Public Policy, *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, Chisinau, p. 7, www.instituteforpublicpolicy.moldova.
2. *Barometer of Public Opinion, July 2009*, p. 69.
3. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 16.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 83; *Barometer of Public Opinion, July 2011*, 70.
5. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 11.
6. The International Republican Institute, *Moldovan National Voter Study, February 14-March 2, 2010*, Baltic Surveys/Gallup Organization, p. 10.
7. U.S. Agency for International Development, *Transition and Trepidation; Public Opinion in Ukraine 2010*, pp. 41-43, 13-14.
8. *Moldovan National Voter Study*, p. 14.
9. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p.20.

10. Ibid., p. 84; *Barometer of Public Opinion, July 2009*, p. 71. The average income figures for the period beginning with the November 2001 BPO poll to the latest BPO poll of November 2011 are as follow: just enough income for essentials 42.1%, not enough income even for essentials 31.8%, enough income for a decent life, but not enough to buy anything expensive 19%, enough income to buy some expensive items after cutting spending in other areas 5.1%.

11. See Paul D. Quinlan, "Back to the Future: An Overview of Moldova under Voronin," *Demokratizatsiya*, 12, no. 4 (Fall 2004), pp. 485-504; William Crowther, "Moldova, Transnistria, and the PCRM's Turn to the West," *East European Quarterly*, 41, no. 3 (Fall 2007), pp. 273-304; Lucan A. Way, "Weak States and Pluralism: The Case of Moldova," *East European Politics and Society*, 17, no. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 454-482. An excellent summary of the Voronin regime can be found in Luke March, "The consequences of the 2009 parliamentary elections for Moldova's domestic and international politics: a narrow window for Europeanization." Paper delivered at the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Annual Convention, Boston, MA, 13 November 2009.

12. *Barometer of Public Opinion, July 2009*, p. 69.

13. Ibid., p. 71.

14. Ibid., p. 75.

15. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 87.

16. Ibid., p. 40.

17. Independent Journalism Center, *Report on the Situation of the Press in Moldova in 2009*, p. 3, http://ilc.md/Publicatii/mlu/raport_FOP_2009_en.pdf.

18. Reporters without Borders, *Press Freedom Index 2009*, <http://en.rsfs.org/press-freedom-index-2009,1001.html>, accessed February 21, 2012.

19. Reporters without Borders, *Press Freedom Index 2005*, <http://en.rsfs.org/press-freedom-index-2005,549.html>, accessed February 12, 2012; Reporters without Borders, *Freedom Index 2009*, accessed February 21, 2012.

20. Liliana Vitu, "Moldova," in *Nations in Transit 2010*, Freedom House, p. 364, www.freedomhouse.org.

21. Ibid., pp. 364, 371-372; Liliana Vitu, "Moldova," in *Nations in Transit 2009*, Freedom House, pp. 369-370, 377-379. See also Independent Journalism Center, *Press in Moldova in 2009*, pp. 1-25.

22. Ibid., p. 12; William Crowther, "Moldova," *Nations in Transit 2011*, Freedom House, pp.379-380.

23. Reporters without Borders, *Press Freedom Index 2010*, <http://en.rsfs.org/press-freedom-index-2010,1034.html>, accessed February 21, 2012; Reporters without Borders, *Press Freedom Index 2011/2012*, <http://en.rsfs.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html>, accessed February 21, 2012; "Republica Moldova a urcat 39 de pozitii in clasamentul libertatii presei, realizat de RSF," *Moldova Azi*, October 20, 2010, <http://www.azi.md/ro/print-story/14181>, accessed October 20, 2010; *Nations in Transit 2011*, pp. 369, 379; "Broadcast media is more objective than in previous election campaigns," *Moldova Azi*, November 2, 2010, <http://www.azi.md/en/print-story/14442>, accessed November 2, 2010.

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24. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2010*, p. 7; *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 87; *Barometer of Public Opinion, July 2009*, p. 75.
25. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 87.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
27. See *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, pp. 27, 30; *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2010, Final Report I*, slide 13; *Barometer of Public Opinion, May 2010, Public Presentation*, slide 10; *Barometer of Public Opinion, July 2009, Public Presentation*, p. 19; *Barometer of Public Opinion, October 2008, Questionnaire*, p. 5.
28. "Moldova: Where is it? What is it," *Reporters without Borders*, May 18, 2010, p. 3, <http://fr.rsf.org/moldavie-moldova-where-is-it-what-is-it-18-05-2010-37499.html>.
29. "State institutions do not efficiently promote anticorruption policies," *INFO-PRIM NEO*, January 12, 2012, <http://www.info-prim.md/?x=22&y=43741>, accessed January 19, 2012.
30. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p.83.
31. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 56; *Barometer of Public Opinion, May 2010*, p. 59; *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2009*, p. 90; *Barometer of Public Opinion, July 2009*, pp. 8, 60; *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2004*, p. 8.
32. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011, Final Repot II*, slide 2.
33. Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index 2011*, <http://www.transparency.org>; Transparency International, *Corruption Index 2010*; Transparency International, *Corruption Index 2009*; Transparency International, *Corruption Index, 2008*.
34. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 58.
35. USAID, *Public Opinion 2010*, pp. 16-17.
36. "Do you support the activity of the courts in Ukraine? (recurrent, 2005-2011)," *Sociological poll*, Razumkov Center, http://www.uceps.org/eng/poll.php?poll_id=169, accessed September 12, 2011.
37. USAID, *Public Opinion 2010*, pp. 7, 53.
38. European Commission, "Implementation of the European Policy in 2010 Country report: Republic of Moldova," *Joint Staff Working Paper*, May 25, 2011, pp.3-8, <http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2011>.
39. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 83.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, p. 87.
42. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2009*, pp. 47-65.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63, 66-67.
44. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 52.
45. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2009*, pp. 76, 113, 116.
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46. *Barometer of Public Opinion, May 2010*, p. 90.
47. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2009*, pp. 113, 116; *Barometer of Public Opinion, May 2010*, p. 91.
48. "AEI leaders sign statement to support Dorin Chirtoaca in second round of voting," *Moldova Azi*, June 9, 2011, <http://www.azi.md/en/print-story/18935>, accessed June 9, 2011.
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52. *Barometer of Public Opinion, November 2011*, p. 87.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
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62. USAID, *Public Opinion 2010*, p. 22.
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65. *Barometer of Public Opinion*, May 2011, p. 73.

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SOCIOLOGY

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**Changes in the Institution of Marriage in Uzbekistan
from Pre-Soviet to Post Independent Era**

Abstract

Culture is one of the most important concepts in social sciences. It is considered as a design for living or a roadmap that guides the behaviour of the members of a society. However, culture does not remain static and adopts changes in material as well as non material aspects. The Central Asian societies and their cultures flourished because of the great silk route which benefits the people of Central Asia both materially and culturally. Some new customs are assimilated in the culture at the cost of old ones but without force. In Central Asian societies, whether sedentary or tribal, marriage was considered one of the most important institutions of culture and performed according to customs and traditions of the land. In pre-Soviet era marriages were performed with lavishness, customs and traditions. As the Soviets under the banner of communism were averse to these things, they introduced changes in the marriages and other institutions of culture of Central Asia. The Soviets were successful in introducing change in the institution of marriage either by force or persuasion and the indigenous people resisted against this cultural change one way or other. After the fall of USSR a process of cultural revivalism started in Uzbekistan but the revivalism is not of such intensity and magnitude that it would be a blue print of pre-Soviet Uzbekistan. It is with the aim to create the atmosphere that would guarantee the state control affairs at all levels of life.

Key words: kalym, souch kahtin, parandzha, chachvan, gaytarma, fathe toy, karnah, mullah, Kujven, yuzotchi, nikah.

Marriages carried a special significance for every Central Asian family in pre-Soviet times. Once the children grew up, the parents seriously started the preparations for their marriage. These were typically arranged by the parents of the children before their maturity and sometimes were set up in infancy and even prenatally and no consideration was given to the sentiments of prospective couple as Centre Asian society lived in joint families which were patriarchal in order¹ and women were totally subjugated by their men folk and treated as semi slaves. Girls were generally considered marriageable between the age of 11-15, where as a boy was married at the age of 15 to 16, although sometimes they remained bachelor even up to the age of thirty years,² since, some poor families could not afford to raise the *kalym*³ or the

¹ Lawrence Krader, *Peoples of Central Asia*, (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1963), 142.

² Elizabeth E. Bacon, *Central Asians under Russian rule, A Study in culture change*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1966), 70.

dowry to be paid by the groom to his bride, which was a must for marriage in Central Asia. Paid both in kind and cash, it determined the status of the family as well as respect for the bride and was obligatory for the groom's family. This (*Kalym*) bride price was also a key factor for marriages within the tribe or a clan⁴ although in tribal areas marriages also took place outside the tribe or clan which was simply motivated by political or economic reasons.⁵

It was in custom of the Uzbek society that the initiative for marriage was taken on behalf of the family of the groom, who deputed two women, *soutch kahtin* to ask the girl's family formally to have their daughter. The parents of the girl, mostly pre-informed, received the women with honour. After this the groom was allowed to see his future wife without veil.⁶ In urban societies like Uzbekistan there were separate courts for girls and women to live segregated life from men and their contact with males was restricted. In the extended or joint families they could, thus hardly meet freely with their close relatives like cousins etc. When they went out, they wore a cloak like over garment (*parandzha*) and a waist length horsehair veil (*chachvan*) which covered their faces.

Once approved, the two families started to bargain *Kalym*, and then that was to be paid in kind, including in the form of domesticated animals and ornaments. Although it was not necessary to pay the *kalym* before the marriage actually took place yet it was obligatory for the groom to pay it and the wife had every right to refuse consummation of marriage with her husband till *kalym* was not paid.⁷ In case of deficient payment the bride used to be called back by her parents and retained for a period called *gaytarma* till the payment was made. It was also a custom in Uzbekistan that during the period of *gaytarma*, the couple could not meet each other. After finalizing an agreement on the amount of *kalym* and dowry all neighbours and relatives were invited to *fathe toy* (feast of promise) which was celebrated in the home of the bride for two days and for the next two days in husbands home.⁸ This shows that the institution of marriage in Uzbekistan was full of customs and tradition which were followed strictly and any one whether poor or rich had to keep the cultural heritage intact. It was a custom that the marriage had to be announced by the father of groom when in the morning of the day of wedding he arrived at the residence of the bride and blowing loudly a long brass horn/*karnah* in order to inform the bride of her acceptance by their family.⁹ After several hours a *mullah* used to conduct the marriage ceremony in presence of the witnesses from both the sides. In traditional marriages, the bride and groom were not

³ It was generally believed that the *kalym* was bride price given by the husband to the father of the bride and it was in nature of the purchase money. However, Schuyler has clearly pointed out that *kalym* was absolutely the property of the bride and remained with her as a sort of financial support in case of divorce, *kalym* was paid in the form of cash or kind (like live stock goods)etc; Eugene, Schuyler, *Notes of a journey of Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja*, (New York: Charles Scribner, 1885), 78.

⁴ It is believed that sedentary people disliked misalliance and emphasized that marriages must be settled on the rules of descent and exogamy; Schuyler, 78.

⁵ Rafiz Abzov, *The Culture and Customs of Central Asian Republics*, (U.K: Green Wood Publishing Group, 2007), 217.

⁶ According to Fred Burnbay this practice was common only among Kyrgyz where as among sedentary people a boy was not permitted to meet his future wife till marriage; Fred Burnaby, *A ride to Khiva, travels and adventures in Central Asia*, (New York: Cassell Peter & Galpin, 1876), 179; Yet E Schuyler pointed out that in Tashkent a young man was permitted to see his future partner before marriage; Schuyler, 78.

⁷ Schuyler, 78.

⁸ *Sketchs of Central Asian among the Turkomans* by Arimnius wembrey. [http:// www.Tcoletribalrugs/art](http://www.Tcoletribalrugs/art)

⁹ Abzov, 217.

present at the actual ceremony, so they were represented by their male relatives. The witness on the part of women was generally her father or uncle or some elder one, having a special power of attorney. The marriage contract was then handed over to the bride or her witness. On this day a grand feast was held at the residence of bride in which all friends and relatives of both parties were invited. The marriages were as lavish as the families have to give a *fathe toy* (feast of promise) to neighbours and relatives for which poor families used to take money on high interest rate. The wedding guests were entertained in their respective courts by singing, dancing¹⁰ and other diversions like wrestling, horse jumping etc. The society during the pre-Soviet period was so conservative that men and women could not mix with each other even at the time of marriage ceremonies.

Against this generalized pattern the marriage ceremonies among nomads, semi nomads and sedentary people differed in formalities and rituals like married couple jumping or circling around a bonfire.¹¹ In tribal and rural areas the bride was taken to the grooms' house in *Kujven* (kind of pannier arranged on pair of camel or mules), and 30 horsemen riding along each side with a piece of cloth 1.5 metres long, which indicated the strength of their tribe. Once a bride mounted *kujven* her mother sprinkled white floor as a sign of good luck in her married life.¹² Soon after the bride reached the grooms' house the bride was introduced to the members of the family in a ritualistic way in the ceremony called *yuzotchi* "show her face".¹³ Thereafter a party was thrown in the groom's house to celebrate the marriage, often requiring guests to bring gifts. An Uzbek girl thereafter started her new life with her husband, often reconciling with the situation that arose in her new life and the married couple took full charge of their family in a course of time. Divorce was rare, if there was any kind of dispute on account of lack of facilities, the wife could raise complaint with a *Qazi* (judge) who allowed her to borrow money on account of her husband if he was not in the town or even ordered the sale of some proportion of the husband's property in order to provide her money. It is argued by many scholars that in sedentary areas of Uzbekistan the role of religion was stronger than tribal and other tribal areas like Kyrgyzstan. It may be partially true, however, people did not give up the previous customs and traditions which were seen in their institutions, and the same is the case with institution of marriage.

The custom of levirate was traditionally followed by the nomadic people. Widows often had to agree to leviratic marriages for the sake of their children and to avoid being ostracized. These customs of levirate and surrogate were present in the society because of the *Kalym*. A marriage under levirate resulted in great difference in ages between the spouses, for example thirty year old women could become the wife of a seven year old boy, if he was the brother of her dead husband¹⁴. Even if the Uzbeks were not accustomed to the practice of levirate and surrogate, other people like the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Karakalpaks were not averse to it.¹⁵

¹⁰ Bacon, 70.

¹¹ Bacon, 69.

¹² Iran Daily-Irania, May 23, 2008, *Attractive customs*

¹³ Bacon, 70.

¹⁴ Eds. S Moosvi, and A Tabashalieya, Society, Eds. Chahryar Adle and Irfan Habib, *History of Civilization of Central Asia*, (Vol. V, UNESCO, 2003), 358_359.

¹⁵ Adle and Habib, 358.

The establishment of Soviet rule in 1917 resulted in the formation of the Turkistan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) and establishment of Bukhara and Khawarizm peoples Soviet Socialist Republics. Consequently in 1924 the Uzbek SSR along with other four republics came into existence on October 27, 1924. Although the first priority of the Soviet government was to revive the economy of the U.S.S.R, yet it was also the policy of the central government to wipe out the traditional rituals and customs of Central Asian societies, since they were detrimental to the new ideology. In the institutional changes that took place in these five republics, the Uzbek SSR was the first to adopt Russification quickly. A number of legislative changes like separation of religion from state, collectivization, industrialization, liquidation of literacy and emancipation of women were adopted and implemented to achieve actual success in this direction. Under the influence of communist ideology, many changes were introduced in the traditional institute of marriage.

Once the Soviets gained fuller control of the things, the religious rites were thereafter transferred to secular civil administration and *nikah* was deprived of legal recognition and as such marriages which were registered in the marriage bureaus had legal effect and those according to religious rites (*nikah*) were considered illegal.¹⁶ People were forced to register their marriages as per the civil law, and only then they could get the benefits of life, like to get apartment for which one was required to show the marriage registration certificate before the authorities.¹⁷ These economic benefits like the facilities of apartments could not produce desired changes in the institution of marriage, as people were resistant to the forced change of the Soviet government. On the one hand, they conducted *nikah* secretly at their homes as a past practice and thereafter went for the legal registration or else did vice versa.¹⁸ This practice continued even though not all could do it for one reason or the other. However, after the 70s and 80s the system relaxed somewhat as the Soviets were in search of allies for the socialistic bloc in other Muslim countries. There was an overwhelming response from people of Uzbekistan to perform the religious ceremony (*nikah*) either before the civil registration or thereafter, and out of 3180 marriages registered in Tashkent in 1980, over 90% of the couples including students, academicians and people in government offices underwent to perform religious marriage.¹⁹

Islamic law allows women to seek divorce from their husbands on certain grounds but traditionally it was hard for them to get it in Central Asia. Therefore what the Soviets did was to introduce in the civil law a provision to get a divorce easily in the court once she moved an application for it,²⁰ which usually sided with women.²¹ Accordingly, women were released of the pressure they were subjected by the traditionalism of the Uzbek society, and were found to be free to live a life of their choice. Added to it they were given economic freedom that also led them to seek divorce in the courts once the living together was not happy.

¹⁶ W. K. Medlin, W. M. Cave, F. Carpenter, Education and Development in Central Asia: A Case Study of Social Change in Uzbekistan, (Netherlands: Lieden, 1971), 64.

¹⁷ Alexander Andreyev, Housing in U.S.S.R. Today and Tomorrow, (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, 1979), 2-16.

¹⁸ "Women In Uzbekistan", Central Asian Review, Vol. VXi, No. 2, 1968, 48.

¹⁹ Yaccovi Roi, Islam in Soviet Union, (New York: Colombia University Press, 2000), 534.

²⁰ Medlin, Cave and Carpenter, 64.

²¹ Abazov, 222.

Many more civil laws were framed to bring in change in the marriage; polygamy, marriages of girls under 18, *kalym* and *gaytarma* were forbidden by law,²² and were considered criminal offences liable to severe punishment.²³ The result was that in the late 30s *kalym* practically disappeared, especially in urban areas. Instead, people started to pay gifts in lieu of what was earlier *kalym* either in kind or cash so that a kind of security was provided to the newly married to live an independent living. Therefore what has been found was that it never disappeared from the actual life of the people and by the 1980s marriages were rarely performed without the payment of *kalym*. What the Soviets believed a “feudal custom was defended by girls themselves, who would feel themselves dishonoured, suspected of sexual misbehaviour or of some shameful illness if their parents were not offered a substantial amount of *kalym*”.²⁴ A significantly higher expenditure on *kalym* was obtained in rural areas for the girl who had not completed her education as is indicated in the following table.²⁵

Social Group	1950s	1970s	1980-1994
Rich	500 Robles	700	1000
Middle	300	500-600	700-800
Poor	100	200	300

Source: Z. Arifkhana, “Post Soviet Transformation In Ritual Life”, *The Journal Of Central Asian Studies*, Vol. XVI, 2006, 7.

Nevertheless, the Soviets were successful in changing the centuries old custom of match makers who disappeared and marriages were fixed by the parties themselves in a formal way. The *khajuven* was replaced with modern transport facilities²⁶ and many superstitious rituals came to an end.²⁷ Similarly the traditional Uzbek wedding ceremonies underwent many changes, new rituals and customs formed the continent of old rituals changed and many of them disappeared entirely.²⁸

Endogamy was not actually made illegal but was made the subject of vigorous propaganda campaigns.²⁹ With the success of nationalist policy³⁰, marriages between different ethnic groups showed

²² Geoffrey Wheeler, *The Modern History of Soviet Central Asia*, (London: Praeger Press, 1964), 183.

²³ Abazov, 218.

²⁴ Alexander Benningsen, “Islam in Retrospect”, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol.8, No.1, p. 95.

²⁵ Tamara Dragadza, *Kinship Marriages in Soviet Union*, (New York: Rutledge, 1986), 90.

²⁶ Now bride and dowry was taken to husband’s house in a car; Dragadza, p.70.

²⁷ Once a bride mounted *kujven* her mother sprinkled white floor as a sign of good luck in her married life; Iran Daily, *Attractive customs*.

²⁸ Dragadza, 70.

²⁹ Wheeler, 183.

a tendency to increase in the pre-war period; the statistics for Arabs living in Uzbekistan who had been strictly endogamous in the past, show that out of 487 families investigated in the 1936-38, 82 marriages were mixed.³¹ In 1939 it was noted that Uzbeks were very eager to marry to Tartar girls as they were considered more cultured. There are many cases that show Uzbeks married Arab girls and even non-Muslim during the war³² because of the large immigration of non-Muslims to Uzbekistan. A Soviet census of 1959 shows that the percentage of inter-faith, which Soviets called "mixed marriages" was quite high.³³ By the 1970s and 80s communal and ethnic ties influenced the choice of partner to a lesser degree, and inter-ethnic marriages remained relatively low and did not exceed 12-18%. The mixed marriages were common between locals e.g. between Uzbeks and Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kazakhs and less frequent between the locals and newcomers, like Germans, Russians, etc.,³⁴ as the religious and interethnic ties still remain strong in Uzbek society. The other factor responsible was the strong family control over the girl's choice, despite the many soft corners and freedom given to women by Soviet authorities.³⁵ However, the Uzbek men used to marry Russian women as they were working in other parts of the former USSR as against the rare cases of Uzbek women marrying Russian men.³⁶

Due to the efforts of the Soviets, the marriage age in Uzbekistan changed as compared to previous. The table below gives information.

Age Group	1937		1946		1957	
	Men %	Women %	Men %	Women %	Men %	Women %
18 yrs & under	2.2	35.5	4.0	16.8	2.5	12.8
19-22	19.0	27.7	16.4	37.7	19.4	36.3
23-26	31.1	17.1	19.0	19.0	28.5	15.3
27 and above	48.1	20.1	60.6	26.5	50.0	35.6

Source: A G Kharchev, "On some results of a study of motives for marriages", *Soviet Review*, Vol.5, No. 2, (1964), 9.

³⁰ The altered social and economic conditions affected the attitude towards marriage between members of different ethnic groups and such marriages received the support of the Soviets; S. M. Abramzon, "Marriages in Central Asia and Kazakhstan", *Central Asian Review*, Vol. Xi, No.1, 1959, p, 7.

³¹ Abramzon, "Marriages in Central Asia and Kazakhstan", 7.

³² Abramzon, "Marriages in Central Asia and Kazakhstan", 7-8.

³³ Paul Froese, *The Plot To Kill God*, (California press, 2008) 99.

³⁴ Abazov, 224.

³⁵ M. A. Tolmacheva, "The Muslim Women in Soviet Central Asia", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 4, (1993), 545.

³⁶ "The People of Central Asia: Social Customs", *Central Asian Review*, Vol. II, No.1, (1959): 216- 217.

The change in the age of marriage was because of the introduction of modern education, feminist movements started by the Soviets and other avenues provided to women of Uzbekistan. The other factor responsible for this was the medical facilities by which people became aware about the harmful effects of early marriages. Although the age of marriage was changed by Soviet efforts and endogamy disappeared, arranged marriages did not wither away; parental consent was necessary for both, although boys were free, to some extent, as compared to girls.³⁷ However, during the Soviet period there was freedom to both boys and girls to meet one another before the parental consent. Soviet surveys of the 1970s and 80s show that 88% of urban Uzbeks and 92% of people living in rural areas were insisting on parental consent for marriages.³⁸ The table below shows the preference of different peoples for parental consent/authority in 1980.

Nationality	City dwellers	Rural Areas
Estonian	22.0	24.9
Russian	34.7	34.4
Maldivian	40.7	52.4
Georgian	61.2	71.1
Uzbeks	87.6	92.0

Source: Ellen Jones, Fred W Gupp, *Modernisation Value, change and fertility in Soviet union*, (London: Cambridge university press, 1989), 169.

The post Soviet period registered the revivalist trend not only in religion but emphasis was also given on the old customs, traditions and rituals, too. The revival of the Uzbek ethno-national traditions was one of the state's main priorities in independent Uzbekistan. Since then the country revived the age-old customs and traditions as it has remained the central seat of empires from ancient times. In other words, the earlier customs and traditions, which were undermined by the Soviet authorities were used in order to fully comprehend a national self-identity, to restore the broken links between generations by applying to the past and the history of the soil in order to facilitate solidarity, play a positive role in state-making and form a base for the participation of the people in politics, economy and other social institutions of the state. In the post-independent era the institution of marriage has witnessed the extrication of Soviet policy and the revival of the pre-Soviet era system. The first thing to disappear was the mandatory registration of marriages in the civil courts. Since *nikah* was still performed by the people, either before or after the registration in Soviet era, it now is performed freely, openly and even in certain places the

³⁷ The power to influence on sons and daughters was very strong, as it relied not only on customs and traditions but also on economic and social initiatives as the parents have to pay for wedding, honeymoon and also help young couple to make new house; Abazov, 224.

³⁸ Mark Dickens, *The Uzbeks*, (1990), 36.

young couple performs it in a mosque. *Nikah* is now a legalized act performed with the approval of the government.³⁹ With the legalization of *nikah*, the institute of *mehar* was also restored.⁴⁰ Another tradition that has reappeared is *kalym*, and people believe that it lessens the expenses of the bride's family on arranging wedding feasts. This is in spite of the fact that the practice of *Kalym* has been criticised by some women as they protest against being "sold" in marriage for this age-old custom.⁴¹ The practice reappeared during the latter years of the Soviet period but since independence it has assumed new heights. In fact the amount of *Kalym* has increased after independence due to the inflation and hikes in the prices of clothes and introduction of new clothes. The following table shows the gradual increase in the amount spent on *Kalym*.

Social group	1980-1994	1995-1998	1999-2003
Rich	1000 roubles	20,000-50,000	500,000 or above
Middle	700-1800	15,000-20,000	300,000-400,000
Poor	300	5000-10,000	100,000 or above

Source: Arif khanova, 7

The *Kalym* had also created many new problems like new social classes in the Uzbek society as indicated in the table given above. To counter the payments of *Kalym*, some grooms also revived the earlier tradition of abducting brides in Karakalpakstan.⁴² It has also been noticed that even though the Soviets had abandoned and banned the act of polygamy, yet it was visible at places during the Soviet period, in particular after World War II and thus not altogether forgotten this has restarted at places when the husband is not required to pay any or little *Kalym* to the parents of a subsequent wife.⁴³ Since

³⁹ M Tokhtakhodjaeva, *Between the Slogans of Communism and the Laws of Islam; The Women in Uzbekistan*, (Pakistan, Lahore: 1995), 96.

⁴⁰ Property allotted by the groom to a bride is considered to be her own property, constitutes a house or apartment or some gold ornaments'; Arifa khanova, 6.

⁴¹ In Uzbekistan 270 women had burnt themselves in the republic over a two year period (1986-1987) to protest against being "sold" in marriage in exchange for bride price, a practice which is not Islamic, is considered by many to be part of the traditional Muslim culture; Angus Rexburg, "Soviet scandal that must go away" *The Sunday Times*, Feb. 1989, p. 6. Such cases also exist after independence in rural areas; Human rights watch, (May 2000), Tashkent.

⁴² Report on the Status of Women in Uzbekistan, 1999, p. 14.

⁴³ The family code also made polygamy illegal and to curb the polygamy all the marriages were to be registered, yet it is not easy to eliminate the age old custom. The men went for polygamy by not registering the other marriage; it happens mostly in rural areas; Tokhtakhodjaeva, 96.

the wedding in the post-Soviet period is sermonized with traditional rituals there have crept in certain pre-Islamic beliefs like purifying the newly wedded couple by burning the fire.⁴⁴

Marriages are still arranged by parents, but it is also true the dating is becoming fashionable and young girls are encouraged to meet with young men to indicate their likes and dislikes, and are not blindly led into marriage.⁴⁵ Parents support early marriage because it relieves moral societal pressure on them and it follows the logic of traditional society, ensuring greater acceptability to the traditional norms. Although as per the Family Code (1998) the minimum age for marriage is set at 17, and in some cases at 16,⁴⁶ a traditional logic is applied to the marriage of women for their early marriage. For instance in 1991 only 42.7% of girls were reported to have got married at around 19 years of age and by 1994 it constituted 49.7% although there is a difference in rural and urban areas. While in 1991 and 1994, 85% of marriages in rural areas involved men in the age group of 18-24. The proportion of the same age group in urban areas is 65%.⁴⁷ The factors responsible for the emergence of early marriages in the Uzbek society were the economic factors like unemployment during the transitional phase from socialist economy to market economy after independence, as factories were closed and tea clubs were stopped since there was scarcity of funds in the newly formed independent Uzbekistan.

Wedding *toys* are held either on the street in front of the host's house or in open-air restaurants and in rural areas it is held in the courtyard of the host.⁴⁸ The tables are prepared in advance and filled with food and drinks. The bride and groom sit at a table placed centrally without much talking or eating and definitely without any dancing throughout the whole evening. According to the old customs women together with other participants of the wedding procession accompany the bride to her new home. They stay there until next day to conduct the rite of *yuzotchi* "show her face", a custom that has come again in vogue after 1989.⁴⁹ After the wedding rites, elder women accompany the newlywed couple to visit the shrines, to perform the rites in a proper way.⁵⁰ As most of the young couples do not know how to perform these rites they are accompanied by elderly women to help them in such practices.⁵¹ Most of the newlywed couples settle to live with the groom's family. Newlywed young women wear a special costume, or at least its head gear, for a period between one to three months after their wedding,⁵² which according to some scholars it is the revival of the veil.

⁴⁴ Elif kale lostuval, "Summer in Samarkand", *Newsletter of Institute of Slavic, East European and Eurasian studies*, Berkeley, Vol. 24, No.1, 2007, 8.

⁴⁵ Jeff Sahadeo and Russel Zanca, *Everyday Life in Central Asia, Past and Present*, (U S A ,Bloomington, 2007) 121.

⁴⁶ Wendy Mee, Wendy Mee, *Women in Republic of Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan in Transition*, Asian Development Bank, February, (2001), 16.

⁴⁷ Timur Dadabaev, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 156.

⁴⁸ Elif kale lostuval, "Summer in Samarkand", 8.

⁴⁹ Feride Acar and Ayse Gunes- Ayata, *Gender and Identity Construction, Women in Central Asia, The Caucasus and Turkey*, Brill Netherlands, 2000, p. 300.

⁵⁰ How to perform prayers at the shrines; Acar and Ayata, 301.

⁵¹ Acar and Ayata, 236.

⁵² Elif kale lostuval, "Summer in Samarkand", 8.

The wedding ceremonies have become more lavish because of new dishes served at these parties and the goods given that are costly to new couple.⁵³ There is a difference in expenditure on the weddings among different strata of society. Rich perform all rituals on large scale and sometimes transform simple ritual into a mini wedding; this had made the custom of marriage more cumbersome.

Since medieval times both husband and wife can apply for divorce, and can be legally concluded by mutual consent,⁵⁴ in divorce, property is split jointly between the husband and wife and those who are pregnant or caring for common children have the right to receive alimony.⁵⁵ Whatever is provided in law Uzbeks nevertheless stick to the first marriage as not too many divorces can be found. The old customs, traditions and factors like economic hardship, rise in the expenditure of *Kalym*, and the lavishness in the ceremonies of marriages ensure that the divorce rate was 13% in 1991 and in 1995 it even fell to 11.4%⁵⁶ and still dipping down and reached 8.8% according to national statistics in 2001.⁵⁷ In ethnic terms the divorce rate among Uzbeks remains at the lowest level with 7.8% against Kazakhs 16.7%, Russians 19.7%, Tatars 15.7% and Tajiks 11.1%.⁵⁸

Central Asia has been a susceptible and sensitive area since, for diversified changes took place in its area. The region proved to be a melting pot due to various cultural changes sponsored either deliberately by regimes or gained ground by the forces governed by the societal environment. Changes in culture are involuntary phenomena and cannot be arrested, as society is always swinging between two poles. In Central Asia, and particularly people in oasis areas (Uzbekistan) put up stout resistance not to allow the Soviet changes to trickle down to their native social layers. They were seen with main and might to counter or negotiate the changes that were due to mitigate or dilute the originality or purity of their own culture. However, the Soviets, in order to make this lot quite in line with their needs, grounded new social institutions at such a locus in the region that the people succumbed in one way or the other to the Soviet innovations with great ease. This without an iota of doubt was not a conscious move, rather society soaked with newly adopted social pillars which culminated into a new 'Soviet Man' which guaranteed Soviet Cultural expansion in the social ladder of Central Asia.

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LITERATURE & ARTS

EKUKLU, Bülent

Yeraltı

"Akıllı bir adam, kendine karşı acımasız değilse gururlu da olamaz."

Muharrem, nefret ettiği ve edildiğini bildiği halde eski arkadaşlarının yemeğine kendisini zorla davet ettirir. Masum didişmeler, ufak kişilik gösterileri ile başlayan yemek, giderek dumanlanan kafaların etkisiyle utanç dolu geçmişe doğru yol almaya başlar. Defterler açılır, hesaplar ortaya dökülür. Gece pişmanlık, gözyaşları ve öfkeyle dolarken, rezillik, karanlık sokaklara, fuhuş kokan otel odalarına taşar.

Onlar hep birlikte, Muharrem tek başına olsa da kararlıdır. Pislik ya o gece temizlenecek, ya da geberip gidecektir. Yoksa sonsuza kadar kurtulamayacaktır bu utançtan.¹

Türk sinemasının son dönemdeki en yetenekli auteur yönetmenlerinden olan Zeki Demirkubuz, Kiskanmak'tan 3 yıl sonra çektiği ve Dostoyevski'nin *Yeraltından Notlar* adlı kitabının serbest bir uyarlaması olan yeni filmi *Yeraltı*'nda, Ankaralı bir memurun hikayesi üzerinden insanoğlunun yalnızlığına ve çelişkilerine bakıyor.

Filmografisi boyunca sık sık değindiği temaları; yalnız ve kendi iç dünyasında ve akıl dışılığında yaşayan karakterleri, sıradan insanların çıkmazlarını ve hayatımızın gündelik normalliklerine derinden sirayet etmiş "kötülük"ü bir kez daha, ama öncekilere oranla daha derin bir anlatımla veriyor.

Demirkubuz, tümüyle bir iç monolog biçiminde akan ve Saint Petersburg'da 19. yy'ın ortalarında geçen kitabı günümüz Ankara'sına uyarlamış. Edebiyattan uyarlanan her filmde olduğu gibi gerçeklik ve inandırıcılık duygusu kitaptakine oranla daha da büyük bir meydan okumayla karşılaşır ve seyirci, perdede gördüklerinin sahiciliği konusunda daha da acımasızlaşır. Zeki Demirkubuz, filmde kitaptan alıntıları dış ses biçiminde kullanmış olmasına rağmen Dostoyevski'ye ve kitabın ruhuna sadık kalmış ama bir yanıyla da tümüyle özgün bir evren kurmuş. Demirkubuz'un önceki filmleriyle benzerlikler taşıyan bu evren de -Muharrem'in yaşadığı boğucu ev ortamı, işten çıktığında ne yapacağını bilememesi, balkonundan görünen şehir atmosferi vb- kendi içinde oldukça inandırıcı, tutarlı ve gerçek. Film, Muharrem'in evdeki ve ofisteki günlük hayatına dair onlarca küçük ama anlamlı ayrıntıyla dolu.(Kül hikâyeleri, sürekli yumurta yemesi, televizyonla konuşması, temizlikçi kadının çocukları). Bütün bu ayrıntılar hem bu evreni hem de Muharrem'i daha inandırıcı ve daha insan yapan ayrıntılar. Filmi izlerken birçoğumuza kendi hayatımızın bir bölümünü izliyormuş ya da daha önce defalarca tanık olduğumuz, dinlediğimiz şeyleri seyrediyormuş duygusu veren sebeplerden birisi de bu ayrıntılar.

Demirkubuz'un öteki filmlerinde olduğu gibi bu filminin de odağında karakterleri var. Muharrem, Ankara'da yaşayan bir memurdur. Geçmişte yazmayı denemiş ama daha sonra vazgeçmiştir. Mutsuzdur, hayatından memnun değildir, hatta birçok şeyden nefret ettiği bile söylenebilir.

¹ Filmin resmi tanıtım sitesinden.

Nedensiz kötülüğünü, kibrini, çevresine olan inançsızlığını, yalnızlığını, çaresizliğini kontrolsüzce sürekli dışa vurur. Bazen iç sesler, kendi kendine yaptığı uzun iç konuşmalar eşliğinde, bazen çevresindekilere iğneleyici laflar ederek, bazen de kırıp dökerek herkese ve her şeye karşı duyduğu nefreti gösterir.

Bir tarafıyla da Muharrem, ötekileri çok da rahatsız etmeyen, alışılmış, kanıksanmış hatta onaylanmış şeylerden rahatsız olan, onlara –yanlış (!) biçimde de olsa – itiraz eden kişidir. Bu haliyle belki kendi kötülüğü ile yüzleşmek ve onunla yürümek pahasına da olsa daha sıradışı ve insan olandır.

Dostoyevski'nin kahramanı gibi Muharrem de, en yakın arkadaşları dahil ötekileri küçük görme duygusu ve kibri ile aşağılık duygusunu bir arada yaşar. Bir yanıyla kendisini ötekilerden farklı ve üstün görür. Kendisini aşağıladıkları için onlara öfke duyar, hatta bu anlarda tepkileri ve hissiyatı ile ötekilere oranla daha da insanlaşır. Bir yandan da kendi iktidar alanını kurduğu her anda kötülüklerini saçmaya başlar. Gücünün yettiği tek insan olan fahişe kadına karşı hırlar, köpek sesleri çıkarır. Filmin sonunda kadını aşağılar.

Muharrem'in mutsuzluğunun ve yalnızlığının temelinde uyumsuzluğu vardır. Bu uyumsuzluk onun kendisinden beklenenleri yerine getirmemesinden kaynaklanır ama aynı zamanda bu onun beklentileri yerine getirmesine de engeldir çünkü bu kişiliğinden vazgeçmesi anlamına gelir. O ise kişiliğinden vazgeçmeyi, başka türlü davranmayı gururuna yediremez, zaten belki istese de yapamaz. Çünkü Muharrem kendisini bu noktaya getiren –ve filmde gösterilen zamandan önce başlamış olan- sürecin sonunda kötülüğünü gizlemeyen hatta doyasıya yaşayan, nefret dolu, giderek bu halinden zevk alan ve bunun gururunu yaşayan adama dönüşmüştür.

Film boyunca yaşadıkları da Muharrem'i bu geçmiş üzerinden adım adım doruğa taşıyan olayları oluştururlar. Ancak nihai olarak geldiği nokta –beklenenin aksine- Muharrem'in hayatında bir kırılma noktası oluşturmaz. Muharrem, büyük olasılıkla hayatında daha önce de yaşadığı ve bundan sonra da yaşayacağı zirvelerinden birini yaşar ve hayatı aynı biçimde sürüp gider.

Muharrem çalıştığı dairedeliklerle pek bir şey paylaşmaz. Muhtemelen onları aşağılamaktadır da. Eskiden kalan bazı arkadaşları vardır. Daha önce sevmediğini ilan ettiği ve “Beş para etmez hırsız” dediği Cevat ünlü bir yazar olma yolunda ilerlemektedir. Cevat'ın bir edebiyat ödülünü kazandığını ve İstanbul'a gideceğini öğrenir ortak eski arkadaşlarından. O eski arkadaşlar ki Muharrem'i dışlamakta ve onun yaklaşma çabalarına şüphe ve rahatsızlıkla yaklaşmaktadırlar. Muharrem, Cevdet'in İstanbul 'a uğurlanması nedeniyle düzenlenen ve aslında davet edilmediği yemekte, eski solcu arkadaşlarıyla bir araya gelir. Bu buluşma, o güne kadar halı altına süpürülen bazı sorunların açığa çıkması ve büyük bir hesaplaşmanın yaşanmasına da yol açar. Mükemmel diyalogları, Muharrem'in aslında söylemek isteyip de söyleyemedikleriyle ve kusursuz görsel anlatımıyla bu sahne eşsiz bir 'yemek sahnesi' armağan eder sinemamıza.

Muharrem'in hayatında gerçek anlamda karşılıklı ilişki ve iletişim kurduğu tek kişi evine temizliğe gelen ama asıl derdi alt kattaki yatalak komşusu olan gündelikçi Türkan'dır. Ancak Muharrem'in sorgulamayan kötülüğü sonunda onunla da çatışma noktasına getirir. Birbirlerine küfür ve hakaret edip tehdit ederler.

Muharrem'in tanık olduğumuz ve bu eksenler üzerine kurulmuş hayatı derin sıkışmışlıklar duygusu yaratır içimizde. Bu duygu, aynı zamanda film ilerledikçe birşeylerin olmak üzere olduğu duygusunu ve beklentisini güçlendirir. Nitekim film, bu sıkışmışlık duygusuyla boğulan Muharrem'in hezeyanları ve patlama noktalarıyla ilerler ve son bulur.

Film boyunca kendi iç dünyasında sürekli bir yıkım yaşayan Muharrem kendinden kurtulamayacağını anladığı noktada, istese de değişmeyeceğini, kendi varlığına mecbur olduğunu derinden idrak etmenin krizini yaşayarak son sahnede evini kırıp döker.

Muharrem'in evini yıkması onun adım adım çöküşünde bir tür son'dur ve kendi kişisel yıkımını simgeler. Bu sahne aynı zamanda film boyunca çeşitli boyutlarda tanık olduğumuz "kötücüllük"ün en yüksek seviyede tezahürüdür.

Filmin sonunda Muharrem kadınla baş başa kaldığında "İyi olmak istiyorum ama bırakmıyorlar." der. Burada Muharrem'in değişip değişmeyeceğini beklerken tekrar hayvani hırıltıyı çıkarmaya başlar. Bu yıkımdan sonra bile Muharrem kendine, "aslına" döner. Bu da yaşadıklarının ve yaptıklarının onun karakterinin ve varlığının değişmez bir parçası olduğunu ve bu kısır döngünün sonuna kadar devam edeceğini gösterir.

Filmin 'ana fikri' Muharrem'in "İyi olmak istiyorum ama bırakmıyorlar" cümlesinde gizlidir. Zaten insanın akli olduğu kadar akıldışı bir varlık olduğunu anlatmak üzerine bir roman ve film bu. Bu nedenle film boyunca Muharrem'in bize tanıdık gelen ama kendine zarar verdiği için akli olanla çok ilişkilendiremediğimiz tavırlarını izleriz.

Yeraltı'nda Zeki Demirkubuz'un biçime biraz daha önem verdiği söylenebilir. Görüntüler, renkler, mekânlar, ışık vb filmin görselliğini oluşturan her şey filmin anlattığı meseleleri daha da güçlendiren etkenler olmuş. Demirkubuz'un pek çok sahnedeki mükemmel kadrajları ile birlikte görselliği Muharrem'in ruh halini, insanı düşündüren hatta ürperten yalnızlığını ve hayatını anlatan; filmin görüntüleriyle ruhunun kusursuz bir uyum oluşturmaları sağlayan özelliklerini oluşturluyorlar.

Filmin en önemli unsurlardan biri, Demirkubuz sinemasının alamet-i farikalarından biri olarak sesler ve sessizlikler: filmdeki yalnızlık duygusunu, gerçeklik duygusunu ve hayat duygusunu güçlendiren sesler ve daha da çok sessizlikler.

EKUKLU, Bülent : Underground

"A smart man can not be proud if he is not cruel with himself."

Muharrem, although he knows that he had been reviled, forces a former friend to invite him for dinner in the friend's apartment. The dinner starts with innocent bickering and small-persona shows but with increasing high heads and alcohol, the atmosphere becomes more and more frustrating. Old books are opened and accounts are poured out. The night goes on with regret, anger and tears; infamy overflows to the dark streets, enter hotel rooms which smell prostitution.

An impressive adaptation of Dostoevsky's "Notes From Underground"; Zeki Demirkubuz's existential drama convincingly transposes the novella's action to today's Ankara and allows the Turkish multihyphenate to explore the wild side of human nature deeply and distinctively.

Zeki Demirkubuz, who is one of the most talented auteur filmmakers of Turkish cinema, is looking through the loneliness and contradictions of human beings in his new film which is a free adaptation of Dostoevsky's book "Notes from Underground".

Demirkubuz has some recurring themes; such as the characters who live alone, closed up in their own inner world, the dilemmas of ordinary people and the concept of "evil" which has shoved deeply into everyday life normalities. Once again, in this movie, he explores these themes making it obvious that his filmography goes much deeper than that of its predecessors.

One of literature's most notable and famous antiheros comes to life as indolent public official Mr. Muharrem, a social odd one out who lives in his own obsessive world. Intellectual, smart but oversensitive and offensive, he is disillusioned by the corruption of the society in which he lives.

Demirkubuz, although the film uses excerpts from the book in the form of voice over, remained loyal to the spirit of the book and Dostoevsky, but also established a universe which is entirely original.

Muharrem has also a sense of disdain for others, including close friends and live in a feeling of inferiority with arrogance as the hero of Dostoyevsky's. He sees himself different from the others and also superior.

At the same time he starts to spread his wickedness every time he sets up power of his own. The only person whom he can compete with is the prostitute woman. He grunts at her and barks at her, and at the end of the film Muharrem humiliates the prostitute.

The main message of the film is hidden in the sentence "I want to be a good person, but they do not allow me to be" of Muharrem. Both the novel and the film teach us that human beings are as much rational as irrational.



MURAKEÖZY, Éva Patrícia**Rubens, Van Dyck & Jordaens
— Flemish Painters from the Hermitage —**

The Hermitage Amsterdam has recently shown¹ a remarkable collection of 17th century Flemish art. The 75 paintings and 40 drawings brought to Amsterdam mostly came from the acquisitions of Catherine the Great. The exhibition had a special focus on Peter Paul Rubens who was represented by 17 paintings and many drawings.

Entering the exhibition hall, I was immediately facing one of the centerpieces at the exhibition: *The Union of Earth and Water* from Peter Paul Rubens and his workshop (c. 1618). This masterfully executed work is an allegoric image of the liaison between the city of Antwerp and the river Scheldt which provided the city's prosperity as trading port. On the painting, Antwerp is depicted as a young, beautiful and noble woman, while the river is personified by the river god Scaldanus².



Photo 1. *Union of Earth and Water (Antwerp and the Scheldt)*. Rubens, Pieter Paul. Oil on canvas. 222.5x180.5 cm. Flanders. Circa 1618. Image is used from www.hermitagemuseum.org, courtesy of The State Hermitage Museum of St. Petersburg, Russia.

¹ 17 September 2011 – 15 June 2012

² Varshavskaya, 1975

The theme must have had much personal significance for Rubens. In the beginning of the 16th century, Antwerp was at the center of international economy and accounted for 40% of world trade. Arts and crafts flourished and the city attracted high caliber artists from far and wide. Rubens' father was a prominent lawyer and alderman in Antwerp. However, the Rubens family fled to Germany when fights began against the rule of Habsburg Spain. It was the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648), in which the largely Protestant Low Countries (the current Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg) fought against the Catholic kingdom of Spain for political, economic and religious independence. The city of Antwerp suffered badly in the fights, and finally, it fell back under Spanish control. All Protestant habitants had to leave the city but for the Catholic Rubens family the time of return had come.

Born in Germany, Peter Paul Rubens was ten when he first saw Antwerp. In terms of art, it was the beginning of a new era of prosperity; with much large-scale commissions for churches, as well as for aristocratic courts. A new generation of artists grew up and Antwerp became the center of counter-reformation and the *Flemish Baroque*. However, whatever much had been invested into the bride's dowry, the groom was impeded from arriving to the marriage. The Northern provinces, which the Spanish could not win back, managed to take control of the river Scheldt and closed it for shipping. Antwerp as a port never regained its former importance – despite all the diplomatic efforts of even Rubens himself.

Rubens' carrier was a surprisingly smooth and straight one. In painting, he excelled in almost every genre; portraiture, nudes, drapery, animals, landscapes, historical and biblical scenes... He reached everything a man could aim for; he was the most highly esteemed artist in Europe, he was a learned man and a passionate art collector, he was a diplomat knighted by both Philip IV, King of Spain, and Charles I, King of England, and, last but not the least, he was a loving husband and devoted father³.

At the center of the main exhibition hall, against a red background, hung Rubens' *Descent from the Cross*. The concerted effect of the background, the red carpet leading to the painting and the slightly elevated podium in front of it created the distance and high atmosphere of a church.

³ C.V. Wedgwood, 1982: The World of Rubens, 1577-1640. Time-Life Books Inc., 1982 (1967).



Photo 2. *Descent from the Cross*. Rubens, Pieter Paul. Oil on canvas. 297x200 cm. Flanders. Circa 1617-1618. Image is used from www.hermitagemuseum.org, courtesy of The State Hermitage Museum of St. Petersburg, Russia.

The painting caught my eyes from the distance and invited for long observation. My eyes kept wandering between Mary Magdalene's brightly colored, shining dress, her long, fair hair and the strikingly simple appearance and pale complexion of Maria. The dark clothes of Maria, the gentle movement of her arm as she reaches out for her son for the last time, her young but tried features, all confer the ideas of pureness and of resignation. Mary Magdalene, depicted in the traditional way, fallen to her knees, personifies repentance. (Her traditional presence allows the painter to add a beautiful woman and a colorful dress to the otherwise somber scene.) The dead body of Christ, gently guided by St John (on the ladder), Joseph of Arimathea (at the top), and Nicodemus, seems to slide downwards under its own weight.

What surprised me was the humanness of Christ. Christ does not appear here as the son of God, crucified for the salvation of humanity, but as the dead body of a muscular, middle-aged man. The religious mysticism pervading the art of the Flemish Primitives, the painters who worked in the Low Countries hardly a century before Rubens, is completely missing here. Rubens' paintings, even his religious paintings, talk most of all about man.

The leading spiritual movement of the time was humanism. Rubens himself received a humanist education and showed much interest in classical studies. His beloved brother, Philip Rubens, was a follower of the famous philologist and humanist⁴ Justus Lipsius. Humanism is characterized by the recognition that human beings form an essential part of creation; that humans develop and sustain the God-created world. Thereby individual human experience gains importance. Humanists promoted the study of original sources (mostly, ancient Greek and Latin classics and the Bible) in opposition with scholastic learning principles. Empiricism began to flourish and provided the foundation to modern science. In parallel with the scientific achievements a new artistic ideal emerged: that of the intellectual artist who is well versed in the classics as well as in mathematical principles.

Rubens was such an intellectual artist. And much more: he was a genius with enormous creative potential. His figures seem to burst of life. With only a few brushstrokes he could impart life to anything. However, it is the gest of the body that interested him and not the movement of the soul which stirs the body. Rubens enlivened the surface, the texture, the appearance of things and, most of all, that of the human body. He could feel and could show how a rope bites into the skin, how a piece of textile moves around the body, how the cushions of fat tremble, how the skin changes of color in cold... In all this, he is unsurpassed. However, it is in vain to seek in his figures signs of deep feelings, emotions, the understanding and the reflections of an ingenious individual - his figures are perfect but indifferent; there is no inner movement behind the faces.

I felt quite depressed for all this monumental impersonality for a great part of my visit. The painting that suddenly brought ease and actually made me laughing was the *Kitchen* of David Tenier II.

⁴ The term *humanism* first of all signifies the predominant philosophy and intellectual current of the period between 1400 and 1650



Photo 3. *Kitchen*. Teniers, David II. Oil on canvas. 171x237 cm. Flanders. 1646. Image is used from www.hermitagemuseum.org, courtesy of The State Hermitage Museum of St. Petersburg, Russia.

Suddenly, there was this enormous kitchen, in which the people seemed to move as midgets. There were all kinds of aliments, often in strange arrangements, scattered around the floor or hanging from the ceiling like lamps. In contrast with all this disorder, the unleashed dogs and the busy people concentrating at their job, there stood a falconer, in a majestic pose, looking straight upon us. *Kitchen* is painted with much attention to the details, and yet, with a certain humor and distance.

This painting, similarly to other works of Teniers, is conceived in the best traditions of 16th century Dutch painting. Instead of the monumental Baroque works of his contemporaries, Teniers specialized in everyday scenes. This choice was sealed when he married Anna Brueghel, granddaughter of Pieter Brueghel I and daughter of Jan Brueghel I. (Interestingly, Rubens was Anna's ward and witness at her marriage⁵, Teniers developed his own genre paintings. His peasant scenes were masterly arranged, detailed and colorful. In several paintings he seemed to be preoccupied with problems related to the temptations of the flesh. His mature works are increasingly bright, with a certain golden or silvery reflection. Teniers enjoyed considerable success and worked as the court artist of Archduke Leopold Wilhelm.

⁵ Natalya Babina, 2012



Photo 4. *Self-Portrait with parents, Brothers and Sisters*. Jordaens, Jacob. Oil on canvas. 175x137.5 cm. Flanders. Circa 1615. Image is used from www.hermitagemuseum.org, courtesy of The State Hermitage Museum of St. Petersburg, Russia.

“Jordaens is now the most important painter of Antwerp” wrote Balthasar Gerbier⁶, an Anglo-Dutch artist, diplomat and courtier, a couple of days after Rubens’ death. Although Jordaens was almost equally talented in depicting human figures, and very well recognized by his contemporaries, his compositions appear very different from those of Rubens. His paintings are overloaded with figures or filled with decorative elements in a way that they can become unpleasant.

In accordance with the increased social rank of the painter in the Spanish Netherlands (several artists got knighted in this time) we find many family portraits in which the artist depicts himself as a wealthy citizen, surrounded by his elegantly dressed family members. This beautiful example here below is from Cornelis de Vos, where especially the children’s vivacity catches the eye.

⁶ Wedgwood, 1982



Photo 5. *Self-portrait of the Artist with his wife Suzanne Cock and their Children*. Vos, Cornelis de. Oil on canvas. 185.5x221 cm. Flanders. 1630s. *Image is used from www.hermitagemuseum.org, courtesy of The State Hermitage Museum of St. Petersburg, Russia.*

Once again, the Hermitage Amsterdam brought together a wonderful exhibition. How much Flemish Baroque painting and Rubens' work in particular resonates with the ideas of the contemporary viewer is another concern. It is certainly much less admired now than at the time it was made. The corpulence of Rubens' women is often blamed in this context. In brackets, I have never heard any complaint about the over-emphasized muscularity of Rubens' male figures... In order to promote the engagement of the visitor, a documentary was presented in which Philip Akkerman, a contemporary Dutch painter, gave reasons for his interest in Rubens' paintings. What Akkerman emphasized was the technique, the unique ease with which Rubens handled the brush and his perfect anatomical knowledge. I could agree with him when he said that never had painting reached such a technical perfection as in Rubens' time.

The intellectual approach, which breathed new life into art in the Cinquecento and reached fullness in the 17th century Baroque art, got solidified in 18th and 19th century academism. It is only by throwing out all the intellectual achievements that art could get free from its pressure. (The current exhibition of the Hermitage Amsterdam; entitled "Impressionism: Sensation & Inspiration" shows the first steps of this revolution.) Nevertheless, this movement has reached its endpoint and actually we see more and more performers on the art scene who seek a compromise between intuitive impulsiveness and intellectual reasoning.

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Subjectivation: The Two-headed Symptom

1. Introduction: Denial of subjectivation

It was years before the red wall of West Bengal would fall that I was waiting for the girl who would become my wife, ex-wife, and one of my best friends for life. I was standing in front of my college in the middle of so called College Street or the book alley. It was November, no chill in the air though, as is the general custom of Calcutta (not Kolkata). I had just come out of a meeting of the student political organization I owed allegiance to. We had discussed mainly the immediate, how many new recruits, what the obvious scumbags from our rival organization was doing – their underhanded technique of luring away boys with fashionable girls we secretly wished were with us. However, standing there in the middle of the commerce of ink and paper, I remembered something as a fleeting memory. On the roof of our canteen, during the twilight hours, while smoking contraband, a brilliant physics student had confessed to me that his aim in life was to be a full-timer for the communist party in the state. Weren't we from a post-ideological state? After all globalization and fall of Berlin wall were a decade old for us. Woodstock was just a video. Che Guevara was a cool face on the T-shirts. Revolution was the word we shouted with vague unease or complete certainty of non-believers. We all were struggling to polish our excuses for conforming through all our struggles, so that we can laugh and shake our heads later at our own youth.

What was ideological in our stance was not the overt complicity with the systems of thought. However, it was ideological stance that allowed us to gloss over the truly revolutionary moment in all of our lives – when we finally are able to confess even to ourselves what is truly absurd and thus truly revolutionary in its domain of illogical. Our subjectivation denies our subjectivation itself.

2. The “virtual” point of the subject

We would, perhaps, have been Foucauldian –skeptical of the totalizing absolute morals and answers, searching for the resistance in the specifics and in the limits of our politics. It is, perhaps, to be Foucauldian, I looked at reality with a critical microscope aimed at the specificities. However, here I would like to speak of the Foucault that could have been, but never was. Both the Foucaults –would have been and also one that never was –are represented in Italo Calvino's story, *The Man Who Shouted Teresa*. It was the man who kept shouting the name of Teresa in spite of the whole exercise of shouting for Teresa being a sham (Raymond Roussel was the inspiration of both Foucault and Calvino). The Foucault that could have been appears briefly in his *History of Sexuality* Vol. III trying to find the source of resistance from his own discourse imperialism. Why could he not find the resistance that he was looking for? What was the truth to Foucault's Real? Let us remember that Foucault's *The order of things* begins with the painting of a painter painting a painting to explain subjectivity; a subjectivity which is already an imitation of an imitation – isn't painting itself an act of imitation? It is this notion of subjectivity that truly

captures the production of objective scientific knowledge (for human sciences and beyond). Even the earliest photographs are touched up even before the invention of Photoshop. Isn't the display of artifacts, in the recordings of a museum, already touched up in the sense that they were taken from their original contexts and sources to be placed in a timeline that fits our scientific knowledge¹? It is well known that even pictures from the Hubble space telescope are paintings from numbers.

However, all these specificities of reality cannot be analyzed until we understand the symptom. If the evidences for the real are somehow touched up for the sake of a future vantage point, then our reality itself is constructed around a virtual point of reflection. However, as Žižek says in his book, *For They Know not What They Do*:

... the subject designates the virtual point in which reflection itself is reflected back into "reality" - in which for example, (my perception of) the possible future outcome of my present acts determines what I will do now. What we call "subjectivity" is at its most elementary this self-referential "short circuit" which ultimately invalidates every prognosis in intersubjective relations: the prognosis itself, as soon as it is uttered, bears upon the predicted outcome, and it is never able to take into account this effect of its own act of enunciation.

Thus, Foucault himself missed this network of virtual points that define the real and its image. It is not that the individual subject is constituted and is constitutive of the network of power. But it is the minimum necessary virtual points that serve as the support of our intersubjective relation which produces the power relation through its own prognosis. However, isn't there a possibility of a prognosis with no action possible? Isn't there a possibility of a prognosis with no future possible? What happens to our subjectivity when we mirror it back from the perfect abyss? Probably, this is the virtual point of Nietzsche –to be nothing is to have no future (to be) to reflect your past back to your present. And what if this possibility of no possibility is omnipresent? Only then we can understand the two-headed nature of subjectivation².

3. Mann and Kafka

The dance had happened many times before. But, for a reason I could not fathom, my thoughts drifted to it that day. The maidens danced again, the musicians played their instruments once more, as 'Shad Suk Mynsiem'³ became a poem through the emptying of my memory. I did not know then, as I do now, about how much of the poem's narrative I was subject to –from the description of the dance in the opening lines to the invocation of my mother, and so forth. It was not the uniqueness of the events in themselves that caused me to write. But rather, that I chose, even allowed, them to speak on my behalf.

¹ Anthropologists like Luschan understood the importance of colonial expansion for the sake of getting authentic artifacts. See *Scientific Seeing: Commodities, Curiosities, and Anthropological Objects* by Andrew Zimmerman in *Visual Sense* edited by Elizabeth Edwards and Kaushik Bhaumik.

² The term 'subjectivation' has been discussed in more detail in the article *Subaltern's image and the real: an inquiry* submitted to Social Text on Apr, 2012.

³ <http://kanvasbox.com/2012/03/03/shad-suk-mynsiem-by-jobeth-ann-warjri/>

The subject position that I took through the writing and reading of my poem is one that I would scarce give away. It offers, I think, the key to understanding why we choose certain moments in our lives to illuminate who we think we are, and why these moments reveal to us what we could become. This subjectivation process holds true even for our reading of art –paintings, literature, and music –where we make the artwork stand and speak on our behalf. Be it Catherine confessing her love for Heathcliff, or Mersault shouting out his truth to a chaplain, what is it in a work of art that causes us to cling to certain memories of it and not others? What is it that grips the pivot of our desire so strongly that, without it, our lives seem meaningless?

Aschenbach, of Thomas Mann's *Death in Venice* faces this situation upon meeting Tadzio. On Tadzio, Aschenbach transfers elements of his desire –the perfection of art encased in the body of youth. In effect, he makes the boy stand as a symbolic reflection of himself –Aschenbach as youth. But like the fictional characters of a novel, or a painting come to life, or even a dream, it is a self that cannot be realized. It is a form emerging out of the very narrative that stands in the way of Aschenbach's desire, as also the one that makes it possible.

Throughout the novel we see an Aschenbach whose place in life is framed by a narrative that prevents him from becoming one with his desire. Only once, in the beginning of the novel, we have a moment where there is the possibility of our hero transcending the limits of the narrative; where the encounter he has with the traveling stranger causes him to 'awaken' in a moment of self revelation. However, what follows the traumatic event is no more than Aschenbach affirming the necessity of the narrative that provides the support for his life. It is where even his displacement is one of the search for his place within that narrative. Aschenbach, in effect, does not surrender to the unreason behind the reason that provides meaning for his life. He relinquishes his will to act –one that will allow him to be one with his desire. This causes a distance between him and Tadzio so that the latter remains no more than a fetishized object, always out of reach. The artist is one with his craft in so far as the artwork necessitates a narrative to stand in the way of desire. In as much as the narrative provides the basis for how the subject thinks and acts, desire is transferred onto something outside of ourselves (object) so that the latter reflects upon the symptomatic of our reality buttressed by a symbolic network.

The symbolic network is the narrative that provides meaning to our lives, the reason behind our struggle to become and our coming to being. And yet, this same narrative comes to us in many names. Its manifest content is seen in the fanaticism of religion, the devotion to art, the pursuit of science, and so on. Should its manifest reason crumble, we come face to face with the void –a void that is not unlike the one faced by Josef K. of Franz Kafka's *The Trial*.

The same narrative that pervades *Death in Venice* is also to be found in *The Trial*. However, where in the former, the manifest content of the narrative (the day-dream, as it were) appears reasonable to the subject, in the latter, it foreshadows unreason. In a certain sense, Josef K. steps into the unreason behind the symbolic narrative which Aschenbach chose not to do. Kafka's *The Trial* is a story of our negation of the symbolic order, of where the symbolic order fails to provide the support of meaning for our lives. Should it happen, we, like Josef K., would search for the affirmation of our existence in the continual utterance of our names, our designations which, in themselves, are but hollow representations of who we are. But the story is also of resistance in spite of our effacement.

Josef K's trial exemplifies that moment of trauma where the symbolic order can no longer speak on our behalf. Throughout the course of the novel, we find Kafka's protagonist seeking to represent his cause to no avail. The same symbolic network that causes many of its subjects to live as if in limbo renders him silent. Each time Josef K. speaks, he is silenced by the proceedings of the court who holds the power of acquittal; and yet, more likely, condemnation. It is in this silence that we find the kernel of our existence. Forever waiting at the door of the law, we search for signs that will acknowledge our struggle, our entry into the world where the makings of our utopias are realized. This struggle, however, entails that we forsake the pleasure we derive from a mere infringement of its laws (as Aschenbach does in his pursuit of Tadzio). It requires us to turn the symbolic reflection back on itself in the realization of what it truly is –a fantasy masking our real. And when the masks are torn down, to find the place where the Real voices itself in silence –beyond rhetoric, beyond what can be articulated –it has no cause to speak. It is here where we become free of the shackles that bind us to desire; where we realize both the limits and the possibilities of our subjectivation. When Josef K. dies, he is denied the pleasure of want. He is denied the right to go on living. And yet, his death could not speak to us more strongly. For it is there that the authority of the narrative turns on its head; where the subject makes the narrative responsible for his silencing. Thus, it is here where we also find the resistance to the symbolic narrative –the unmasking of our Real as the revelation of our revolutionary potential.

While one cannot escape subjectivation, the same also provides for an existence beyond its framework. As long as man is a thinking being, the symbolic network will exert its influence, just as much as the unreason within reason will allow us to question it. Ironically enough, this same process gives us the truth behind our strivings –that while we all want to die like Aschenbach, 'our heroes die in squalor'⁴.

4. The yellow demon

The Polish woman traveling with Maxim Gorky asked her companion regarding the identity of a woman put up as the Statue of Liberty. As Gorky remembered in *The City of the Yellow Devil*, the woman's companion had replied: 'The American God.' The American God stood upon Her pedestal covered in verdigris with a torch that has lost its light to the smoke coming out of the belly of the yellow devil. Gorky's examination of the city of New York resembles Goethe's proclamation on materialism: 'Grey...like death...without the light and the sun'. But the devil is alive here and the humanity, its food. Gorky imagined the reproach of the statues all around the city that would be spoken to the living –to the living intestinal, digestible that humanity has been reduced to.

This was, indeed, not his first impression. On his first arrival to New York, on what would be a failure of a trip, he was thoroughly impressed. He spoke, rather, of 'a fantasy constructed by crazy giants, monsters longing after beauty, stormy souls full of wild energy.' However, the sketch of the yellow devil was also completed during his stay in Upstate New York. The alienation from his American fellow-literati (including Mark Twain), perhaps made him paint the monstrous picture of New York City.

However, Gorky's devil is already decontextualized. The same devil gives the fantasy of beauty and energy its shape –all the while chewing up the immigrant population coming to the shores of New York

⁴ <http://www.scribesnook.com/2010/01/my-ramblings-on-a-hungry-stomach/chapter/3/>

City in the early twentieth century. The process of digestion/inclusion into the monstrous was already complete about three decades later when Adorno and Horkheimer visited the United States. American labour was already in an ambiguous position by then. Thus, for Adorno, labour did not hold any revolutionary potential. What is this monster, the devil, that we speak of? Gorky's devil was yellow, akin to gold.

What Gorky's revelation showed was the fundamental proleterization process that befell him as well as the dirty, soot-ridden immigrants. And it is also true that Gorky did not recognize his own proleterization - the victim's voice lies in the negation of present articulation. And if we are to regain our voice, we must never play the victim. We must not reduce ourselves in the deathly equilibrium between the symbolic and the substance. If we are to speak of the victims, we must not let their proleterization be a function of our inquiry. The monster is not gold. The monster is not materialism. The monster lies in the inquiry which makes even our most radical champions reduce our existence to a process without subject.

1. The Real of subjectivation

Behind the drive is the want; behind the want is the inquiry: 'What do you want?' or, rather, the object of desire. The twin foils of Aschenbach and Josef K. somehow reproduce the dynamics of desire. In Aschenbach's desire for Tadzio was the denial of subjectivation –reconciliation with the symbolic, enriched in the question: 'Does he desire me?' In K., in his want of reconciliation with the symbolic, he reproduces the core of Freud's *thanatos*: 'Can (the symbolic) stand to lose me?' It is as if the fantasy of Aschenbach's earlier life serves as a fantasy to the Real of his desire. It is the fantasy of the torch that is forever out, which serves as the support of the real of Gorky's Polish immigrants. However, fantasy also needs the meaning, the symbolic. However, in K., there is no support. In his *Sociological Imagination*, C. Wright Mills described how we feel as if we're caught in the currents of history, unable to understand the currents of history, unable to understand the meanings of our actions. And apparently, it fills us with the vague unease at the thought of history. But it is the Kafkaesque universe where the fantasy stops being the support for our Real. This is where we arrive at the Real unmitigated by fantasy. Where our only option is like K. –to be true to our death drives –to make our unreason as the reflection point while in silence; so that when we speak, we will do so through the unmitigated categories of our own revolutionary moment.



TRAVELOGUE

TAPON, Francis

Eastern Germany — Nearly 25 Years after the Wall

When rats experimented on humans

Although humans like to experiment with rats, there was a time when rats experimented with humans. The rats took a bunch of humans who spoke the same language, shared the same history, and looked the same (at least to a rat's eyes). The rats split these nearly identical humans in two groups. The rats were only interested in measuring the impact of one key variable, so they left one group of humans alone as their control group. The rats, however, injected the second group with something called *communism*. Once the effects set in, the rats left the lab, turned out the lights, and would not return for over 40 years.

The results of the rat experiment were remarkable. After just one human generation, the two groups of humans hardly recognized each other. The first group had not changed: they were still competitive, creative, and hard-working. The communism-infected group, however, was nearly the opposite. In that group, state-owned enterprises earned 97 percent of the total net national income. The few non-state businesses were taxed up to 90 percent. The state bore 80 percent of the costs of basic supplies, from bread to housing. The state was everything.

All this altered people's behavior. They got married early because it took less time to get a state apartment if you were married. They also tended to have children at a young age because the state guaranteed childcare and employment. Their lives were steady and predictable, which was comforting, but communism also sapped their motivation and drive. There were often shortages. For instance, they had to wait 13 years to get a Wartburg, a crappy commie car. The industrious, innovative spirit diminished. Paranoia grew. Moreover, the most promising, talented humans usually escaped out of the communist rat labyrinth. The rat scientists spent years studying the data. In the end, they summarized their findings in their lab book. On the last page, they scribbled their conclusion: "Communism sucks."

Women often forget the pain of childbirth and only remember the joy; similarly, today some people reminisce about the "good old communist days." Throughout Eastern Europe, people shared with me their nostalgia for that period. Kasper, a Pole, summed it up well, "About a third of Poland thinks that we're worse off than we were under communism. They say life was better back then, because we didn't have to think about how to pay for our bills. We were all the same. Today, the difference between the rich and poor has grown. Also, under communism, you had no choice, but you had money. Today, you have choice, but you have no money."

Whenever I heard such romanticizing of the past, I always asked, "If it was so great, then why doesn't your country go back? Who's stopping you? Go ahead. Would you like to go back to those days?"

As if I gave them an electric shock, they would wake up and say, "Oh no! I prefer it now. Most people do. Maybe only some of the senior citizens would be willing to go back." However, I found it hard to even find old people who were willing to go back. The few people who would want to go back are those who are lazy (because they like not having to work hard to have their basic needs covered), those who are extremely risk averse (because they like the stability and predictability of communism), or those who value economic equality above all else (because they are willing to sacrifice nearly anything just so that everyone ends up economically equal). Such people are a minority on this planet, which explains why communism has few fans.

In Europe, the rat scientists may have ended their experiment of taking twin regions and separating them at birth, but they have one other similar experiment still going on today. It's been running now for nearly 70 years. In this experiment, the nearly identical people weren't split east-west, but rather north-south. The place is called Korea. Although the results are not yet in, it's probable that the rat scientists will reach the same conclusion.

Although these experiments on twin human societies are the most powerful evidence against communism, there are plenty of other examples. Communism has been tried in big countries (Russia and China), small ones (North Korea and Cambodia), cold countries (Mongolia), warm ones (Cuba), Caucasian countries (Ukraine), Asian ones (Vietnam), Hispanic ones (Nicaragua), and Black ones (Angola). Prior to China's move toward capitalism, there was a vast disparity of living conditions between Hong Kong and Chinese cities just a few kilometers away (another fascinating twin experiment). The communist countries that still survive today are hanging by a thread, forced to adopt a quasi market-based economy. As we've seen, Belarus is a Soviet time capsule that continues only because Russia is keeping it on life support.

No matter where humans have tried communism, the results have been lousy. Neighboring capitalist countries always enjoy a higher standard of living. If you disagree, then ask yourself why capitalist citizens are not sneaking into communist countries. Why are the walls and barbed wire designed to keep the communist people trapped in as prisoners, and not to keep the neighboring people from moving into their utopia? If life there is so great, why do they have to force people to stay? When capitalist countries build walls (like America's silly wall on the Mexican border), it's not to keep people from rushing *out*, but rather to keep them from rushing *in*. In conclusion, people vote with their feet.

Today, it's not fashionable to celebrate the benefits of capitalism. Humans enjoy complaining, so capitalism is an easy target, especially since nowadays nearly every country practices it to some degree. As a result, the grass-is-greener-on-the-other-side syndrome takes over, nostalgia distorts our memories, and it's easy to forget Eastern Europe's most profound lesson. Indeed, the downside of free markets winning so decisively over controlled ones is that today we have almost no more failing experiments to point out to young people. The shocking results of a poll showed that only half of German 18-year-olds agreed that the GDR was a dictatorship and 66 percent didn't know who built the Berlin Wall. Let's not forget the time when the rats experimented with humans.

Lastly, there's absolutely no doubt that capitalism is often brutal, inhumane, and cruel. In fact, it's even fair to say that it also sucks. However, compared to heavy government control, it sucks less.

Dresden's other lesson

When I was in Berlin in 2005, I told three different groups of young locals that I wanted to visit Dresden. The conversation usually went like this:

"Oh my god!" they would say, "Why would you want to go there? That's, like, *East Germany*."

Each time I would resist the urge to pull out a map to show them that Berlin was also in East Germany. Instead, I would ask, "But have you been to Dresden?"

They shook their heads. It was surprising how little Berliners knew about East Germany. It's as if the Wall were still up.

Thanks to Pink Floyd, I knew more about Dresden than some Berliners. In my all-time favorite album, *The Final Cut*, the song "The Hero's Return" has these lyrics: "And even now part of me flies / Over Dresden at Angels One-Five / Though they'll never fathom it, behind my / Sarcasm desperate memories lie." I was 13 years old when this song came out. Being an obsessive teenager, I wanted to understand every lyric. "Angels One-Five" is aviator-speak, referring to an altitude of 15,000 feet (4,573 meters). Now what were these "desperate memories"?

The answer lies near the end of WWII, when Dresden was the only major German city that was still mostly undamaged. It was an important transportation hub with military facilities in its outskirts, which the Allies used as an excuse to bomb Dresden into oblivion. If you lived in Dresden in 1945, your Valentine's Day was full of hate, not love. Hate rained from the sky as 1,300 low-flying heavy bombers dropped 3,900 tons of bombs onto Dresden. The Allies first dropped the bombs to break water mains and create air pockets, then dropped 650,000 incendiary bombs, which created a massive firestorm. People were swept off their feet and sucked into a raging firestorm that was hungry for oxygen. "Desperate memories" haunted some pilots who believed, along with many impartial observers, that the bombing of Dresden was so unethical that it was a war crime. Although the Allies destroyed 90 percent of Dresden's city center, many military facilities were largely untouched. Most of the 25,000 people who died were civilians. The bombing of Dresden remains one of the most controversial Allied military actions in WWII.

In 1985, Dresden's symbol, the *Frauenkirche* ("Church of Our Lady") was still in ruins. That year, Vladimir Putin, Russia's future President, was beginning a six-year assignment in Dresden for his employer, the KGB. After the communists left, the Germans continued rebuilding Dresden. They restored the stunning *Semperoper* (the Saxony state opera house) and the Zwinger Palace. I was fortunate to visit the *Frauenkirche* at its grand reopening in 2005. In 2006, Dresden celebrated its 800-year anniversary. Today, it's one of the most beautiful cities in Europe.

There's a profound, often overlooked, lesson in Dresden. The moral that most people draw from Dresden is that the Allies were also cruel during WWII. However, Dresden's other lesson, indeed, the lesson of all of post-war Germany, is what a remarkable people the Germans are. Imagine that in 1945 you could have one of these five territories that were untouched by WWII: Montana, Spain, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, or Congo. Or you could pick Germany. What kind of fool would have picked Germany in 1945? Its resources were depleted or confiscated. Its cities and infrastructure were ash and rubble. Its people were demoralized and broken. Meanwhile, the other five territorial options had plenty of resources, decent infrastructure, and upbeat people. Germany had nothing. Only an idiot would bet on Germany

over those other options. And yet, that idiot would be a genius. In less than 40 years, Germany (the size of Montana) would rise from the ashes and not only blow past all those other territories, but would also become one of the five most powerful economies in the world. In 2009, Germany was the largest exporter in the world! They exported over \$1 trillion of stuff to the world, which was more than China or America, countries that are vastly larger than Germany. In 2010, China finally became the world's top exporter, but Germany still exported more than the USA.

We Americans like to pat ourselves on the back by saying that Germany bounced back thanks to our Marshall Plan. We flatter ourselves. The Marshall Plan is overrated. It cost \$13 billion over four years. Thanks to inflation, one dollar was worth about 10 times more in 1948 than 2011. Therefore, \$13 billion in 1948 equals about \$130 billion in 2011. Although that's a decent amount of money, we forget that it was spread out over 17 countries. Italy received roughly the same aid as Germany, France got 58 percent more, and the UK got well over twice as much assistance. Of the \$13 billion, Germany received less than \$1.5 billion—that's only \$15 billion in today's dollars. Nowadays America routinely gives \$15 billion to any country with a bank account. In fact, after German unification, West Germany was giving East Germany \$100 billion in aid *annually*, making the Marshall Plan seem like peanuts.

We also forget that instead of helping West Germany immediately after WWII, the Allies kicked Germany while it was down, trying to send it back to Bronze Age. The Allies initially wanted to turn Germany in a pastoral, agricultural state. After WWII, the Allies destroyed 1,500 German manufacturing plants so that Germany's heavy industry would drop to half of its 1938 levels. In 1946, the Allies capped German steel production to 25 percent of the prewar production level and dismantled the "redundant" plants. German car production could not exceed 10 percent of its 1938 level. Germany, the Allies believed, should be reduced to a standard of living equal to 1932—at the low point of the Great Depression. As a result, after WWII, many Germans were without money to heat their house or to eat, froze and starved to death.

East Germany had an even steeper hill to climb: it got the anti-Marshall Plan. It had to give its best agricultural lands and best port to Poland, and was encumbered with \$10 billion in debt to the USSR; that's practically the value of the entire Marshall Plan! That's like saddling Maine (which is a similar size as the GDR) with \$100 billion in debt today. It's as if the Soviets had said to East Germany, "Instead of *getting* a Marshall Plan from us, you're going to *give* us a Marshall Plan. Oh, and please do that with just the ash that you have. Don't worry, our brilliant communist economic system will help out. Thanks."

The pugnacious East Germans said, "OK, if these are the cards we're dealt, let's make the most of it." Within 40 years, East Germany had a higher standard of living than all the communist countries in the world. Appropriately, the GDR's anthem was "*Auferstanden aus Ruinen*" ("Risen from Ruins"). It's as if there had been a marathon and East Germany was told to start one hour after everyone else and was forced to run it with its hands tied behind its back. Despite those handicaps, East Germany still managed to come from behind and win the race.

Some might say, "Yeah, but Germany has a great position being in the center of Europe." OK, let's imagine if Germany and Russia had to swap territories. Is there any doubt that Germans would transform the Russian land and make it by far the most powerful country in the world? Russian writer, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, didn't mention the Germans, but he should have when he wrote, "If only Englishmen or

Americans lived in Russia instead of us! . . . Oh, they would have opened up everything: the metal ores and minerals, the countless deposits of coal.”¹

Imagine shipping everyone from Congo (which is the size of Western Europe and has plenty of resources) and moving them to Germany while making the Germans move into Congo. How would the Germans utilize Congo’s rich land? In a few years, Germans would be pumping out more cars than ever, harvesting the sun’s energy with solar panels, and curing cancer thanks to some exotic plant they find in Congo’s forests. Imagine if they had Argentina, or Saudi Arabia, or Spain. Those countries would be top five global economies. And what if Germans took over Canada? Or the USA? They would work the land and within decades build the mightiest nation the world has ever seen. Transplant any other people onto German lands and they could not equal the output of the Germans.

Some continue to insist, “C’mon, you can’t make such arguments. Germany is the way it is because of its geography. If you moved Germans to another continent, they wouldn’t be the same people.” True, geography molds people, but it is only one factor; otherwise, France, Germany, and Poland would all be nearly identical (since they have similar geographies). However, even though Germany was light-years behind France in 1946, it managed to outperform France in just a few decades. In 1948, the USSR thanked Poland for rejecting the Marshall Plan by giving it nearly half a billion dollars, valuable factories, a lucrative five-year trade agreement, and 200,000 tons of grain. Despite Poland’s huge head start, tiny East Germany passed them too. The point is that Germans were able to make something out of nothing. In fact, they had less than nothing when you consider their debt burdens and all the anti-German feelings after WWII. All Germans really had after WWII were their hands and brains.

The Germans can do this because they have their shit together. They make the rest of us look like bumbling buffoons. Of course, saying such things is terribly taboo, because (gasp!) you might be a Neo-Nazi fascist! Can we be a bit more mature in the twenty-first century, please? Let’s give credit where credit is due and stop censoring people who applaud and admire Germans. Nobody would argue with you if you observed that 4,000 years ago the Egyptians were light-years ahead of everyone else. If you transplanted the Pharaohs and their people to some other part of the world, they would also be capable of making the most out of the situation because their culture was disciplined, organized, and hard-working. Italians like to think they’re descendants of the Romans, but if you consider the extreme organization and industriousness of the Romans, you’d conclude that they had more in common with today’s Germans than today’s Italians. Imagine challenging today’s Italians and Germans to rebuild Rome’s Colosseum from scratch. How long would each take? The Germans would be cutting the ribbon while the Italians would still be in the pizzeria negotiating the design with the mafia.

Countries (and people) are full of excuses as to why they’re so retarded. They’ll blame colonialism, a communist hangover, a heavy debt burden, a lack of resources, a poor geographic location, a tough history, or a crappy childhood. We could all learn from Germany’s attitude: they take whatever conditions they are dealt and make the most out of them. Of course, Germans whine and complain just like anyone, but immediately afterward, they roll up their sleeves and get to work. Other societies roll back into bed and feel sorry for themselves. Moreover, although Germans can be ridiculously stubborn, they also know when to be flexible. That balance is one of the secrets to their success. Germans, who

¹ Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *The Diary of a Writer*, Volume 2, page 1049.

usually look down on East Germans and are a bit sexist, showed their flexibility in 2005 when they elected Angela Merkel, an East German woman, as their leader.

It is nonsense to say that Germans are unable to change. — Angela Merkel, Chancellor of Germany, raised in East Germany

When Veit left me at the Polish train station in Subice, I asked him what he thought Germans do best. He said, “Germans are gut at managing money and their economy.” I smiled. That’s the understatement of the century.

* * *

Francis Tapon’s mother is from Chile and his father is from France. They met in San Francisco thanks to a slow elevator. His brother, Philippe Tapon, is the author of two novels. His family spoke Spanish at home, unless an English swear word was necessary.

Francis was born in San Francisco, California where he attended the French American International School for 12 years. Native French teachers convinced him that France is the coolest country in the universe. He is fluent in English, French, and Spanish. He struggles with Italian, Portuguese, Slovenian, and Russian. If you point a gun to his head, he’ll start speaking other languages too.

He earned a Religion Degree with honors from Amherst College. He also has an MBA from Harvard Business School. After Harvard, he co-founded a robotic vision company in Silicon Valley. Then he decided to change his life forever.



In 2001, he sold the little he had to hike the 3,000 km Appalachian Trail. Then, after consulting for Hitachi, he visited all 25 countries in Eastern Europe in 2004. He consulted at Microsoft before hiking the 4,200 km Pacific Crest Trail in 2006. In 2007, he became the first person to do a round-trip on the Continental Divide Trail—a seven-month journey spanning 9,000 km. In 2008-2011, he visited over 40 European countries, but focused on revisiting all the Eastern European ones. In 2009, he climbed up Mont Blanc and walked across Spain twice (once by traversing the Pyrenees from the Mediterranean Sea to the Atlantic Ocean, and then by hiking El Camino Santiago). He’s backpacked over 20,000 kilometers (12,500 miles) and traveled to over 80 countries.

He is the author of *Hike Your Own Hike: 7 Life Lessons from Backpacking Across America*. This book can be also ordered at: <http://francistapon.com/shop>. He is donating half of his book royalty to America’s three major scenic trails.

***The Hidden Europe: What Eastern Europeans Can Teach Us* is his second book of his WanderLearn Series, was published as ebook on December 12, 2011, and as hardcover on March 4, 2012.**

In 2012-2015, he plans to visit every country in Africa and write a book about that in 2016. His goal is to wander to all 193 countries of the world, see what we can learn from them, and share it with everyone.

Francis’ website is <http://FrancisTapon.com>



BOOK REVIEW


Heritage of Our Future XX. → XXI.

The **Hungarian Heritage House** (<http://www.heritagehouse.hu/>) is a national institution founded in 2001 by the Secretary of State for the Ministry of Cultural Heritage with the purpose of preserving and promoting Hungarian folk tradition.

The Heritage of Our Future XX. → XXI., (<http://www.utolsoora.hu/en/node/21>) is a joint initiative of the *Hungarian Heritage House* and *Fonó Music House* funded by the *EEA/Norwegian Financial Mechanism*. The aim of the project is to publicize and popularize the legacy of folk music and dance, and carry it forward to the 21st century by modern technology.

Of the many book and CD releases a couple of highlights are presented here:

1. PATRIA — Hungarian Ethnographical Recordings 1937-1942 —



Editor: Ferenc Sebő

Publisher: Hagyományok Háza, Budapest

Year of publishing: 2010

Language: Hungarian and English


Number of pages: 174 + CD

ISBN: 978-963-7363-64-1

The idea, from which a series of folklore recordings emerged from all significant parts of the Hungarian language area, was the brainchild of Béla Bartók. Four documented experimental records were produced in 1936. Between 1937 and 1942, 107 78 rpm records were released by the PATRIA label. The series recorded at the studio of the Hungarian National Radio (Magyar Rádió) included folk music, folk tales, materials relating to folk customs as well as religious chants showcasing the characteristics of the dialects from the main Hungarian folk music regions.

The accompanying CD contains truly sensational material: the contents of the newly remastered and so far inaccessible folk tale records.

2. PATRIA — Hungarian Folk Music Recordings 1936-1963 —



Editor: Ferenc Sebő

Publisher: Hagyományok Háza, Budapest

Year of publishing: 2010

Language: Hungarian and English

Number of pages: 199 + DVD-ROM

ISBN: 978-963-7363-65-8

The gramophone recording of authentic performances of peasant songs was the idea of Béla Bartók. In 1936 four experimental recordings were released — accompanied by a detailed manuscript, which contained the melodies, the lyrics, as well as information and photos of the singers and the music expedition — practically an early version of modern-day multimedia CD-ROM.

The recordings of the PATRIA series could start in the studio of the Hungarian National Radio in 1937. In the second part of our two-volume compilation we publish facsimiles of the leaflet of the experimental records from 1936, as well as the handwritten documentation by Bartók and Veress. Accompanying our publication is a multimedia disc that contains the complete sound recordings and documents of the collection recorded between 1936 and 1963.

3. ÚJ PÁTRIA SERIES — 50 CDs



Editors: Gergely Agócs, Péter Árendás, László Kelemen, István Pávai

Publisher: Hagyományok Háza

Year of publishing: 2010

Number of CDs: 50

1/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Turda Region	26/50	Original Village Music from Slovakia's Zoboralja Region
2/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Aiud Region	27/50	Original Village Music from the Vág-Garam Köze Region in Southern Slovakia
3/50	Original Village Music from the Cojocna Area of Transylvania	28/50	Original Village Music from Slovakia's Lower Garam/Hron River Region
4/50	Original Village Music from the Transylvanian Plain	29/50	Original Village Music from Slovakia's Ipoly / Ipeľ River Region
5/50	Original Village Music from the Transylvanian Plain	30/50	Original Village Music from Slovakia's Podpoľanie Region
6/50	Original Village Music from the Transylvanian Plain	31/50	Original Village Music from Slovakia's Felső-Garam Mente Region
7/50	Original Village Music From Transylvania's Csík/Ciuc Region	32/50	Original Village Music from the Fülek/Filakovo Area in Southern Slovakia
8/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Almaş River Valley	33/50	Original Village Music From The Gömör Region of Southern Slovakia
9/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Upper Mureş Region	34/50	Original Village Music from Gömör Region of Southern Slovakia
10/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Szekler Region	35/50	Original Village Music From Slovakia's Upper Bodva River Region
11/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Someşul Mic Region	36/50	Original Hungarian Village Music From Kassa/Košice Area of Slovakia
12/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Someşul Mic Region	37/50	Original Village Music from the Šariš Region in North-Eastern Slovakia
13/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Iernut Region	38/50	Original Village Music from Slovakia's Zemplín Region
14/50	Original Village Music from the Szekler Area of Transylvanian Plain	39/50	Original Village Music from the Bodrogköz Region in South-Eastern Slovakia
15/50	Original Village Music from the Eastern Transylvanian Plain	40/50	Original Village Music from Hungary's Somogy Region
16/50	Gypsy Music from Transylvania's Sfântu Gheorghe Region	41/50	Tambura Music from Hungary's Baranya Region
17/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Someşul Mare Region	42/50	Original Village Music from the Ormánság Region of Southern Hungary
18/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Someşul Mare Region	43/50	Traditional Hungarian Music in Serbia's Voivodina Region
19/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Sălaj Region	44/50	Original Village Music from Hungary's Galga River Region
20/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Sălaj Region	45/50	Original Village Music from Hungary's Heves and Jászság Regions
21/50	Folk Music from Transylvania's Târnava Region	46/50	Original Village Music from Northern Heves County, Hungary
22/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Târnava Region	47/50	Original Village Music from Western Borsod County, Hungary
23/50	Original Village Music from Transylvania's Târnava Region	48/50	Original Village Music from Hungary's Zemplén Region
24/50	Original Village Music from the Csallóköz Region of Southwestern Slovakia	49/50	Original Village Music from Hungary's Szatmár Region
25/50	Original Hungarian Village Music from the Galanta Area of Slovakia	50/50	Original Village Music from Romania's Szatmár Region

One of the focuses of the 'Heritage of our Future' project is to release a selection of the music collected under the 'Final Hour' program (New Patria CD series) and to make the full collection available in the database of Hungarian Heritage House.

Initiated and directed by László Kelemen, Fonó Music Hall completed a project from 1997 to 2001, focused on collecting folk music in the Carpathian Basin, having the largest coverage at the turn of the century. Details of the implementation had been developed by a small group of experts – László Kelemen, József Lukács and János Zsidei.


Starting in September 1997, except for some short periods such as summer and Christmas holidays, music of traditional bands playing in the villages had been recorded. Each band was at the disposal of the researchers for four to five days during which time it was possible to record their repertoires serving several ethnic groups, thus in addition to the vocabulary of melodies, music, dances and textual information related to folk customs could also be recorded then transferred to archival CDs. As far as possible, a pair of dancers and one or two singers arrived with each band, helping to provide the vocal and functional connections to the instrumental music.

The first objective was to try to record the complete repertoire of Transylvanian instrumental folk music, therefore during the first eighteen months, 47 bands and dozens of singers and dancers had arrived from Transylvania. The program also included mapping of traditional Transylvanian recorder music. Key contributors to the collections are László Kelemen, István Pávai, Zoltán Juhász and Péter Árendás (music); Zoltán Zsuráfszki and some members of the Budapest Dance Ensemble (dance). All activities had been electronically documented by Gergely Koncz. The collection resulted in approx. 550 music CDs; and all groups had also been video recorded. Travel of groups from Transylvania was organized by András Tötszegi.

Starting in spring 1999, collection continued with 25 bands coming from the territory of historical Upper Hungary. Gergely Agócs organized and collected the music of Hungarian, Slovak, Goral and Ruthenian bands, this way completing the collection from villages and regions so far under-researched. In addition to video recordings, music enough for further 250 CDs had been recorded.

The third phase of the program started in May 2000, focusing on the rest of bands in Ruthenia, Partium (eastern part of Transylvania), historical Southern Hungary and present-day Hungary. In these regions, we scarcely found dancers and often, musicians of the same band had to be brought together from various villages. András Vavrinecz, István Németh, Péter Árendás and Lajos Pál (Ruthenia) and Anikó Bodor (historical Southern Hungary) made a significant contribution to the preparation and collection of the music of 40 bands. Many styles were represented – musicians, from fiddles and Ruthenian bands to Romanian horns from Banat and tambura players from historical Southern Hungary, as well as Hungarian and Gypsy singers recorded in the studio. Together with the 450 CDs recorded in this phase, music and textual information recorded under the 'Final Hour' program added up to 1,250 CDs.



FARKAS, Flórián**Nomonhan, 1939****Author:** Stuart D. Goldman**Title:** Nomonhan, 1939**—** The Red Army's Victory that Shaped World War II **—****Publisher:** Naval Institute Press
Annapolis, Maryland**Year of publishing:** 2012**Language:** English**Number of pages:** 288**ISBN:** 978-1-59114-329-1

There are books on history that from time to time help fundamentally reassess our understanding of historic events. And there are others that fill the gaps; hence they *enhance* our understanding of history. *Nomonhan, 1939 — The Red Army's Victory that Shaped World War II* — falls into the latter category.

Nomonhan, 1939 — written by Stuart D. Goldman, scholar in residence at the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research in Washington D.C. — is a splendid book that attempts to unearth the details and its global consequences of the limited war between the Soviet Union and Japan at the border of Mongolia and Manchuria on the eve of World War II. This war is well-known both in Russia and Japan, and of course Mongolia. However, it is less known in the west, probably because it was fought in an obscure place, far away from the eyes of the western world. Mr. Goldman's great achievement is based on his unrelenting research efforts: after his initial scholarly work on this subject in the 1960s he continued researching the subject throughout the following decades and kept revisiting next to the Western sources both Soviet/Russian and Japanese archives, and interviewing key players of the conflict. The result is a well-argued, deeply researched volume that clarifies the decisions taken by world leaders before and during World War II, that fundamentally shaped the course of world's history.

The book consists of 7 chapters, supported by 11 b/w photos and 6 maps. The first chapter is a brief, excellent summary of the relationship between Russia/Soviet Union and Japan, going back to 1853 and bringing it up to 1937, the year when international relationships became heated at a global scale. The next chapter continues with a background overview, summarizing the global context, focusing on key events on both the European and Asian sides. Of main importance was the situation of the Soviet Union: desired neither by the western democracies nor by Germany, its leaders needed to produce a fine balancing act in order to secure its integrity.

In chapter 3 the author begins to zoom into the Russo-Japanese conflict itself; the conflict of Changkufeng in mid-1938 at the border of Korea-Manchuria-Soviet Union, the precursor to Nomonhan is presented in great detail. The conflict was basically won militarily and diplomatically by the Soviets and led almost automatically to the next conflict the following year, at Nomonhan. The next two chapters, the main body of the volume are consecrated to the Nomonhan conflict itself. Chapter 4 sums up the road to the conflict while chapter 5 presents the conflict in much detail, highlighting the rise of Georgy Zhukov, the genius Soviet military leader and the honing of Soviet military tactics that would be reused at a much greater scale in the war with Germany. With great skill and particular talent, Mr. Goldman paints the warfare in such a visual style that the reader almost relives the conflict as a bystander.

The main chapters are then followed by two concluding ones that contain two assessments of the conflict: in chapter 6 the short term effects of the Soviet victory at Nomonhan are presented in relation with the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact and the outbreak of World War II. The last chapter, number 7 then goes beyond the outbreak of WW II and examines the impact of the Nomonhan conflict on Japan's leaders, arguing that the Nomonhan had a major effect in turning the Japanese war efforts away from the Soviet Union and towards the US in the Pacific.

All in all, this volume has the potential to become the book of the year in history/military science. It is very well researched, logically argued and presents the topic in an organic way, looking at Soviet foreign and military policies' western and eastern components not as disjointed parts but as the two sides of the same coin. *Nomonhan, 1939 — The Red Army's Victory that Shaped World War II* — is a tour de force that should be a compulsory reading for historians, military leaders and that part of the general public that is interested in understanding the deeper undercurrents of the big global conflict that we call by the name World War II.



CLASSICAL WRITINGS ON EURASIA

VÁMBÉRY, Ármin

From Samarkand to Herat

Ármin Vámbéry (1832-1913) was a Hungarian orientalist and traveller. Based on his extensive linguistic and other studies, travels and other experience, he strongly advocated the theory of a close Turkish-Hungarian linguistic relationship.

Between 1861 and 1864 he travelled from Constantinople, disguised as a Sunnite dervish, through Persia and Central Asia. During his travel he visited among others Trebizond, Tabriz, Zanzan, Kazvin, Shiraz, Ispahan, Khiva, Bokhara, Samarkand, and Herat. This was the first journey of its kind undertaken by a European. He then paid a visit to London, where he was treated as a celebrity because of his daring adventures and knowledge of languages. We present here a chapter from his book *'His Life and Adventures'* published by T. Fisher Unwin (London, 1889).

DID not remain long with my new fellow-travellers from the Khanate of Kokhand. But I attached myself all the more closely to a young mollah from Kungrat by the name of Ishak, who wished to go with me to Mecca. He was a kind-hearted youth, as poor as myself, and looking upon me as his master, he was always ready to serve and oblige me.

The road from Samarkand follows the direction of the road to Bokhara up to the hill whence we saw the city for the first time. The next day found us already in the desert. In truth, however, compared to the other deserts through which I had passed, it might have been more fitly denominated an extensive grassy plain or a prairie. One meets here everywhere with herdsmen, owing to the numerous wells around which nomadic Uzbeks have their tents erected. The wells are for the most part very deep, and near them are tanks forming reservoirs for water, of stone or wood, at which the cattle are watered. To avoid the fatiguing labour of drawing water from the wells with buckets which are exceedingly small, the herdsmen attach the rope of the bucket to the saddle of a mule, passing it over a pulley, making thus the mule perform the work of drawing water. Quite a picturesque scene is presented by such a well, the flocks of sheep wandering or resting near it with their serious shepherds, and I was forcibly reminded by it of similar sights in the Lowlands of Hungary. On the second day after our departure we met a caravan coming from Karshi, near one of the wells. One of this caravan, a young woman who had been sold by her husband to an old Tadjik, and had discovered the infamous transaction after she reached the desert, was tearing her hair, bitterly wailing and crying, and upon catching sight of me she frantically rushed up to where I stood and exclaimed: "My hadji, thou hast read books: where is it written that a Mussulman

may sell his wife, the mother of his children?" In vain I told the Tadjik that to do so was to commit a grievous sin, he only composedly smiled; the judge at Karshi apparently not having shared my views, the buyer felt quite sure as to the validity of the bargain.

We proceeded but slowly owing to the excessive heat, and it took two days and three nights to reach Karshi. Nakhshab was the ancient name of *Karshi*, and as a city it ranks second in the Khanate of Bokhara in extent and commercial importance. I went in search of an Uzbek by the name of Ishan Hassan, to whom my friends had given me a letter of introduction. I found him and was very cordially received by him. He advised me to buy an ass, cattle being very cheap in Karshi, and to purchase with my remaining money knives, needles, thread, glass beads, Bokhara-made pocket-handkerchiefs, and particularly carnelians brought here from India, and to tread with these articles amongst the nomadic people we should meet along our road. All the hadjis do the same thing. In exchange for a needle or a couple of glass beads you get bread and melons enough to last a whole day. I saw that the good man was right, and went on the very same day with the Kungrat mollah to make the intended purchases. One half of my khurdjin was full of my manuscripts, mostly of literary and historical contents, which I bought in the bazaar of Bokhara; the other half was used by me as a storehouse for my wares, and thus I became at once an antiquarian, a dealer in fashionable articles, a hadji and a mollah, deriving an additional source of income from the sale of benedictions, nefesses, amulets, and similar wonderful articles.

After a stay of three days I left, in company of the mollah Ishak and two other hadjis, for Kerki, about fifty-six miles distant from Karshi. After three days' travelling we reached the Oxus in the morning, at a place where there was a small fort on our side of the shore, and on the opposite side on a steep height the frontier fort surrounded by the small town of Kerki. The Oxus flowing between the two forts is here nearly twice the width of the Danube near Budapest, but owing to its rapid current, which drove us considerably out of our course, it took us fully three hours to cross over. The boatmen were very clever, and would not accept anything of us for ferrying us over. But scarcely had we placed our feet on the shore when the *deryabeghi* (the river officer) of the governor of Kerki stopped us, accusing us of being runaway slaves intending to return to Persia, and compelling us to follow him immediately with all our luggage and things to the castle of the governor. My surprise and terror may be easily imagined. Three of my companions whose speech and features at once betrayed their origin were allowed to go free before long. I did not fare quite so well; things would not pass off so smoothly with me, they making all kinds of objections; but finally I flew into a rage, and exchanging the Turco-Tartar dialect I had been using for that of Constantinople, I emphatically insisted either upon having my passport shown to the Bi (governor) at once, or upon being taken into his presence.

At the noise I made the *toptchubashi* (an officer of artillery), who was of Persian origin, said something in a whisper to the deryabeghi. Then he took me aside, and telling me that he had gone several times to Stambul, from Tebriz, his native city, he knew very well persons belonging to Roum, and I might be perfectly quiet, as no harm would befall me.

Every stranger must submit to this searching investigation; for as slaves who had become free and were returning home had to pay a tax of two gold pieces at the border, there were many of them who resorted to all kinds of subterfuges and disguises to steal unrecognized over the frontiers. The servant who had taken my passport to the governor soon returned, not only bringing back with him my papers, but a present of five tenghis which the governor had sent me.

I was very sorry to learn that Mollah Zeman, the chief of the caravan going from Bokhara to Herat, was not expected to make his appearance before the lapse of eight or ten days. I consequently left in company of Mollah Ishak to go amongst the Ersari-Turkomans living in the neighbourhood. Here I entered once the house of Khalfa Niyaz, an ishan who had inherited sanctity, science, and authority from his father. He had a cloister of his own, and had obtained a special license from Mecca to recite sacred poems. In reading, he always had a cup filled with water placed by his side, and would spit into the water whenever he had finished reading a poem. The saliva thus permeated by the sanctity of the words he would then sell as a miraculous panacea to the highest bidder.

As we had an abundance of leisure, my faithful mollah and I, we visited the Lebab-Turkomans (viz., Turkomans on the bank). We were given quarters in the yard of an abandoned mosque. In the evening hours the Turkomans would bring with them one of their poetical tales, or a poem out of their collections of songs, and I was in the habit of reading it out aloud to them. It was delightful to have them sitting around me in the stillly night within view of the Oxus rolling onward, they listening to me with rapt attention while I read about the brave feats of one of their heroes.

One evening the reading had lasted as late as midnight. I was quite fagged out, and, forgetting to heed the advice I had been frequently given not to lie down near a building in ruins, I stretched my weary limbs close to a wall and very soon fell asleep. I might have slept for an hour when I was suddenly roused by a painful sensation. I jumped up screaming; I thought a hundred poisoned needles had run into my leg. The spot from which the pain proceeded was a small point near the big toe of my right foot. My cries roused an old Turkoman, lying nearest to me, who, without asking any questions, immediately broke out in the following comforting apostrophe: "Unhappy hadji! thou wast bitten by a scorpion, and that at the unlucky season of the *saratan* (canicular or dog days). God have mercy on thee!" Saying these words he seized my foot, and tightly swathing my foot so as almost to sever it from the heel, he immediately applied his mouth to the wounded spot, and began to suck at it with such a violence that I felt it passing through my whole body. Another soon took his place, and re-swathing my foot twice they left me to my fate, with the sorry comfort that it would be decided before next morning's prayers whether it would please Allah to free me from my pain or from the vanities of this world. Although I was quite stupefied with being thrown about, and the burning and stinging pain which kept on increasing in intensity, my memory still reverted in a dull, mechanical way to a recollection of the act that the scorpions of Belkh were known in ancient times for their venomous nature. My distress was rendered more intolerable by my fears, and that I had given up every hope during the many hours of suffering was proved by the circumstance that, totally unmindful of my incognito, I had broken out into such moans and plaintive exclamations as seemed to be quite outlandish to the Tartars, who, as I subsequently learned, were in the habit of bursting out into shouts of joy on an occasion of this kind. In a few seconds the pain had darted from the tips of my toes to the top of my head, rushing up and down like a stream of fire, but being confined nevertheless to my right side only. The tortures I was suffering beggar all description, and losing all further interest in life I dashed my head against the ground reckless of all consequences, and seeking relief in death. This action of suicidal violence was speedily remarked by the others, and they, taking no heed of my remonstrance, tied me securely to a tree. Thus I continued to be in a prostrate, half-fainting condition for several hours, staring fixedly at the starry vault above me, whilst the cold sweat of agony was gathering in heavy drops on my forehead. The Pleiades were slowly moving towards the west, the

beloved West, which I despaired of ever seeing again. Being perfectly conscious I looked forward to the hour of prayer with its sounds of devotion, or rather to the dawn of day. Meanwhile gentle sleep stole over me, sealing my burning eyelids, but I was soon roused from my beneficent slumbers by the monotonous: "La Illah, il Allah !"

When I awoke and began to arrange my ideas I thought I felt a slight cessation of the pain. The burning and stinging sensation grew less and less violent, and about the time that the sun had risen to the height of a lance, I could attempt to stand on my foot, although very feebly and clumsily yet. My companions assured me that the morning prayer had the effect of exorcising the devil which had crept into my body by means of the bite of the scorpion. Of course I dared not suggest any doubts as to this pious version of my cure, but was too well pleased under any circumstances to have got over this dreadful night, the horrors of which will be ever present in my memory.

After having waited for many weary days for the arrival of the caravan from Herat we were at length informed that the looked-for event was near at hand. I immediately hastened to Kerki, in the hope of starting at once. But my hopes in this direction were doomed to disappointment. There were about forty freed slaves from Persia and Herat in the caravan of Mollah Zeman, who were now on their way home under his dearly-paid protection. In journeying alone these poor freed-men run the risk of being pounced upon and sold into slavery again. These former slaves returning home must pay toll here, and this gave occasion to a great deal of noisy demonstration, the kervanbashi having stated the number of slaves at a lower figure than was warranted by the actual facts, whilst the officer of customs claimed toll for others not slaves, setting down every person who was not known to him to be free as a slave, and demanding toll for him. And as neither of them would yield, but stood up in defence of their respective allegations, the hubbub and anger seemed to be in a fair way of never subsiding. It took the entire day to examine the goods, the men, the camels, and the asses. We left at last, not, however, without the escort of the officer of the customs, who kept a vigilant eye upon the caravan lest some straggling travellers might join it at some by-path. He did not leave us until we had crossed the frontiers of Bokhara, and had proceeded on our journey through the desert.

At the first station I gathered that there were a great number of people, besides myself, in the caravan who were longing to set their eyes on the southernmost border of Central Asia. The freedmen appeared to seek our company by preference, that is, the company of the hadjis, and by their joining us I had occasion to hear of truly affecting instances of the misery of some. Near me was sitting a grayheaded old man who had just ransomed his son, aged thirty, in Bokhara, and was taking him back to the arms of a young wife and infants. He had to purchase his son's freedom by sacrificing all he had, the ransom amounting to fifty gold pieces. "I shall rather bear poverty," he said, "than see my son in chains." His home was in Khaf, in Eastern Persia. Not far from me there was lying a muscular man, whose hair had turned gray with mental agony. A few years ago the Turkomans had carried away into slavery his wife, his sister, and six children. For a whole year he had wearily to drag his steps through Khiva and Bokhara before he could find a trace of them. When he had succeeded in tracking them a heavy blow was in store for him. His wife and the two smallest of the children as well as his sister had perished from the hardships of slavery, and of the four remaining children he could purchase the freedom of only the two younger ones; the two elder ones, girls, who had blossomed into beautiful lasses, being rated too high and above the amount of ransom he could afford to pay. There was a group of an aged woman and a young man that attracted our attention.

They were mother and son, he a young man from Herat, and she fifty years old. He had purchased the liberty of his mother. Two years before, as she was travelling in the company of her husband and eldest son, they were attacked and made prisoners. Her husband and son were massacred before her eyes, and she was sold into slavery at Bokhara for twenty gold pieces. When her younger son found her and offered to ransom her, they doubled the amount as soon as they recognized him as a son, rapaciously speculating in his filial affection. Let me mention the case of another unfortunate man who had been sold into slavery about eight years previously, and was ransomed after about six years of slavery by his father. On their way home when but a few hours' march from their native town, both father and son were fallen upon by Turkomans, who immediately carried them to Bokhara to be sold. Now they had both regained their freedom and were returning home.

We were following a southern course, through an interminable level plain destitute of vegetation with the exception of a species of thistle, growing sparsely, which furnishes a sweet morsel for the camel. It is rather wonderful how these animals will pull off with their tongues and swallow a plant the mere touch of which is apt to wound the most callous hand.

At Maimene, the caravan camping outside the town, I put up at the *tekkie* (convent) of one Ishan Eyub, to whom I had been given a letter of introduction by Hadji Salih. The following day I set up my shop at the corner of a street. My stock of wares, however, was quite reduced owing to the fact that I had not replenished it since the first purchases I had made. One of my companions came up to me and said in a tone of warning and compassion: "Hadji Reshid, half of thy knives, needles, and glass beads, thou hast already eaten up, the other half, together with thy ear, will follow in a short time; what will then become of thee?" The man was perfectly right, but what was I to do? My future caused me many an anxious thought, the Persian border being far away, with winter approaching. I comforted myself very soon, however, with the remembrance of my former experiences amongst the Uzbegs, whom I knew never to allow a hadji or a beggar to leave their door empty-handed. I was sure of bread and fruit, and, now and then, even of a gift of some piece of clothing; and with these I hoped to be able to get on in my journey.

No difficulties about the tolls retained us at Maimene, but the kervanbashi and more prominent merchants of our caravan put off their departure on account of their own private affairs. They wished to attend two or three horse fairs at least, the prices of these animals being very low here. The horses are brought to the fair by the Uzbegs and Turkomans of the environs, and are carried from here to Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, and often to India. Horses which I saw sold in Persia for thirty to forty gold pieces apiece, could be bought here at one hundred to one hundred and sixty tenghis (a tenghi being about ninepence).

Our road now lay continuously through mountainous regions. Upon reaching the border of Maimene, we were confronted again by a Yuzbashi, performing the office of frontier's guard, who levied upon us an additional toll under the title of whip money, this being the third toll we had to pay within the Khanate of Maimene. A merchant from Herat to whom I complained about this extortion, observed to me: "Thank God we are called upon to pay toll only. In former days travelling in these parts was most dangerous, for the Khan himself was plundering the caravans."

A troop of *Djemshidis* who were sent by the Khan from *Bala Murgab* for our protection against predatory tribes through whose territories we were to pass, joined us at the frontier, forming our escort. I

was informed that our caravan had not been exposed to such imminent danger as awaited them here during the whole journey from Bokhara. We kept our eyes open, carefully glancing to the right and left, and cautiously surveying every little hill we passed. Thus we journeyed on in the greatest suspense, but it was in all probability owing to the size of the caravan and its watchfulness that we escaped being attacked.

At the time the caravan left Herat for Bokhara it was spring, and Herat was then besieged by the Afghans under Dost Mohammed. Six months had passed since the news of the capture of the city; its pillage and destruction had reached us long ago, and the intense longing of those of our caravan who were from Herat to see again their families, friends, and houses may therefore be easily imagined. We were, nevertheless, made to wait a whole day at Kerrukh, one of the border villages of Herat, until the officer of the Customs, who had come already upon us in the morning, had, in the overbearing and supercilious manner peculiar to the Afghans, finished making up, with a great deal of ado, an extensive list of every traveller, animal, and each piece of goods we had with us. I had imagined Afghanistan to be a country with somewhat of a regular administration; nay, I had fondly hoped that my sufferings would terminate here, and that I might dispense henceforth with the assumption of the character of a dervish. Alas! I was sadly mistaken. Nowhere had we been treated in such a brutal manner as we were treated here by the Afghan Customs collectors. We had to pay duty on the very clothes we wore, with the exception of the shirt. On my ass I had to pay a duty of six krans, and he who was not able to pay had simply all his things confiscated.

Towards evening, when the plundering was over, the governor of Kerrukh, who has the rank of a major, made his appearance in order that he might examine us. At me he took a good long look, evidently being struck by my foreign features, and immediately summoned the kervanbashi to make some whispered inquiries about me. He then called me to come near him, made me sit down, and treated me with marked politeness. Whilst talking with me he studiously turned the conversation on Bokhara, smiling always in a mysterious way as he did so. But I remained faithful to the part I had assumed. On taking leave he wanted to shake hands with me in the English fashion, but I anticipated the motion of his hand by raising mine as if in the act of bestowing a *fatiha* upon him, whereupon he left me with a laugh. We were finally allowed to leave Kerrukh, and entered Herat on the following morning after a toilsome journey of six weeks.



CHRONICLE

OBRUSÁNSZKY, Borbála

Tsyrenzorzhiev Readings — 2012 —

**Tibetan Civilization and Nomadic Peoples of Eurasia:
Cross-Cultural Contacts**

Between 23 and 26 May 2012 the Fifth International Scientific Conference commemorating Rabdan Tsyrendorzhiev (May 19, 1923 – April 15, 1999), the founder of the Buryat Culture Society in Ukraine was held in Ukraine, Kiev. The conference title was *“Tsyrendorzhiev Readings – 2012 - Tibetan Civilization and Nomadic Peoples of Eurasia: Cross-Cultural Contacts”*.

The conference was organized by the Buryat Culture Society, the A. Krymsky Institute of Oriental Studies of The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the G. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and the Bohdan and Varvara Hanenko National Arts Museum.

As can be seen from the title, this academic forum was centered on three main topics: Tibetology, Mongolian Studies and Ancient History of Steppe Civilization. In the first part the audience could listen to some interesting papers on Buddhism and Shamanistic beliefs. One of the most interesting papers was presented by Volodymyr Jachenko, entitled "Philosophical and Anthropological Dimensions of the Study of Shamanism ". In contrary to most scholars of Religious Studies who wish to travel to the Far East or Central Asia in order to get more research on Shamanism, he discovered some common ancient elements among Eastern-European traditions. According to him the Ukrainian folklore texts, e.g. tales, preserved many magical elements. He emphasized that he so-called Shamanistic belief has not disappeared from present-day Ukraine; several documents remained in use mainly in the Transcarpathian region, next to the city of Beregszász, where the so-called “Morifars” lived and practiced magical healing in the course of the 20th century. Their activities and practices reminded Russian and Ukrainian scholars of the practices of the Siberian Shamans. Morifars were native Hungarians and they preserved their ancient Shamanistic beliefs as in other places of former Hungarian Kingdom. The practices of Shamanism together with its symbolism can be found in the Ukrainian folk tales, too. The presented examples reminded me of the Hungarian folk tales, which is quite understandable, because we can find these elements among modern Ukrainian as well Turkic people in the Caucasus and Eastern-Europe. It is quite possible that all these people inherited the ancient Scythian and Hun elements, their ancestors who lived on the vast Eurasian steppeland.

Results of archaeology

The other interesting topic of the conference was dedicated to Eurasian steppe history. There were several outstanding reports on new archaeological excavations on the Eastern-European Plain. Vladimir Ivanov from Bashkiria presented a paper entitled "Archaeological Evidence of the Central Asian Nomads' Presence in Eastern Europe, 13-14th Century ", in which he analyzed archaeological findings on the Pechenegs, Cumans and Mongols (Golden Horde), and drew their centers of dominance. According to him and a growing number of his colleagues the Pechenegs and the Cumans did not come from the East, but they emerged from Eastern Europe. The area was rather peaceful, only in the course of the 11th century came a great wave of Oguz Turkic alliance, who wanted to enter even the Hungarian Kingdom. One prominent warrior, who fought against them, was the Hungarian King St. Ladislaus (1077-1095).

In Ivanov's presentation the Pechenegs and the Ghuzz settled down at the northern shores of the Black Sea, and stretched their dominance up to Western Ukraine and as far as Moldova. Most steppe people intended to occupy territories of the Middle Volga and the pass between the Ural Mountain and the Caspian Sea, a stretch of more than 100 miles, which was rich in mineral sources. In his opinion the so-called "ethnic separation" theory is not a right method to identify an archaeological finding and determine peoples and tribe alliances in the vast territory of the steppe, because emerging tribes used the same objects as the declined ones, so they do not give a precise statement of the ethnic groups' living realms. According to him statistics is a more precise way of identifying steppe tribes.

He mentioned the so-called "Finno-Ugric" nations too, but he has not used this old linguistics term, he split them into Finnish and Ugrian branches. He explained that the Ufa Science Center Department of Biochemistry and Cytology Laboratory carried out genetic tests and the results showed that the "Finno-Ugric" peoples' origin lead us to Turkic people, who migrated from the south to northward direction. The brand new Natural History result confirmed the old results of Hungarian linguists of the 19th century (József Thúry and Gábor Bálint), who declared already in the second half of the 19th century that the so-called "Finno-Ugric" languages had strong influence of the Turkic and Tatar languages.

Yaroslav Pulupcsuk presented a paper entitled "Kimaks, qay and qun: Turks or Protomongolians?" He has found according to the relevant historical sources, who lived in the Kimak Khaganate. In particular, he used works of Arabic geographers, who had detailed accounts of the peoples living in Central Asia. They recorded that Kuns or Cumans were descendants of the Huns, Kay was a part of the Kitay tribe, who moved westward.

Irina Chen presented a paper on the origin of a musical instrument with the following title: "The Cultural Diffusion in the Traditional Instrumental Music of China and Mongolia". She found that early Chinese sources from the Han-period mentioned such instruments, which can be seen nowadays in Mongolia. She opines that the Chinese learned its usage during the Yuan-dynasty. Although there are some additional sources to that, before the Mongols, Huns already had a great impact on Chinese musical instruments.

Andrei Sabasov collected Russian names, which derived from the Mongolian languages. He listed such names, which are preserved in the early Russian chronicles. It turned out that there were lots of

Russian noble families which were wearing Mongolian names, and won privileges through military service from the later imperial Tzarist Court. He mentioned the dynasty of Kadan, who took part in the Mongol invasion of Hungary. We had only scattered information on him. Probably he had not returned to Central Asia, but settled down in present-day Ukraine. The famous warlord was Ögödej Khaan's sixth son and he was one of Batu's best friends.

Mikhail Svecov claimed that not only branches of Christianity, but also Buddhism appeared on the Eastern European steppe between the 6-14th centuries. Mainly Bulgarian archaeological findings refer to that. According to him, one of the most serious evidences of a Buddha statue and mandalas were found. These findings are certainly not derived from the Mongolian period, but from an earlier period, because Khans of the Golden Horde had not practiced Buddhism; in their courts Nestorians, later Muslim priests were in service.

Towards the end of the conference, in a round table setting, the phenomenon of Kurgans was considered in Eurasian cultural context. Attention was paid to such countries as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Japan, and Russia. Participants noted the numerous presences of Kurgans in the modern cultural landscape of many countries (both European and Asian). J. Terasawa, the famous Buddhist monk from Japan, suggested that Kurgans are an important ancient symbol that unites Europe and Asia for many millennia.



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Mr. Quinlan also authored four books as well as published numerous articles in scholarly journals on Moldova and Romania. Three of his more recent articles on Moldova are "Moldova under Lucinschi," and "Back to the Future: An Overview of Moldova under Voronin," published in *Demokratizatsiya*, and "A Foot in Both Camps: Moldova and the Transnistrian Conundrum from the Kozak Memorandum," published in the *East European Quarterly*. He received his Ph.D. from Boston College, where he did a doctoral thesis under Professor Radu Florescu.

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- ✚ Has visited all 25 Eastern European countries at least twice and has traveled there nonstop for 3 years.
- ✚ Has traveled to over 80 countries, walked across America 4 times, backpacked over 12,500 miles in the mountains, and was a finalist in the California Outdoors Hall of Fame.
- ✚ He's been covered in *The New York Times Magazine*, *San Francisco Chronicle*, *San Jose Mercury News*, *Backpacker Magazine*, TGO (The Great Outdoors) Magazine in the UK, *New Mexico Magazine*, and others. He's been interviewed on radio stations and podcasts.
- ✚ Amazon.com & Lincoln Mercury selected him as the best example of someone who is fulfilling the dream of traveling the world, and produced a video profile on him.
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